Message267710
| Author | dstufft |
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| Recipients | Colm Buckley, Lukasa, alex, christian.heimes, doko, dstufft, larry, lemburg, martin.panter, matejcik, ned.deily, python-dev, rhettinger, skrah, thomas-petazzoni, vstinner, ztane |
| Date | 2016-06-07.17:52:01 |
| SpamBayes Score | -1.0 |
| Marked as misclassified | Yes |
| Message-id | <1465321921.55.0.629558740358.issue26839@psf.upfronthosting.co.za> |
| In-reply-to |
| Content | |
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> I don't follow whose patch does what. But here's what I find acceptable, from a high level. > > * The semantics as presented by the documentation must be preserved. os.urandom() and other operations that declare they're safe for cryptographic use must remain safe for cryptographic use. > * "import random" must not block. > * "import hashlib" must not block. > > Is there a patch set that accomplishes that? I *think* nonblocking_urandom_noraise.patch will solve the 90+ second start up without affecting os.urandom which should solve the first one (once the already applied patch gets reverted), but I'm afraid I don't know C well enough to meaningfully review that for accuracy. None of the current patches solve the second without invalidating the first, but it would be, I believe, an additional patch ontop of nonblocking_urandom_noraise.patch. The third is already the case. |
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| History | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Date | User | Action | Args |
| 2016-06-07 17:52:01 | dstufft | set | recipients: + dstufft, lemburg, rhettinger, doko, vstinner, larry, christian.heimes, matejcik, ned.deily, alex, skrah, python-dev, martin.panter, ztane, Lukasa, thomas-petazzoni, Colm Buckley |
| 2016-06-07 17:52:01 | dstufft | set | messageid: <1465321921.55.0.629558740358.issue26839@psf.upfronthosting.co.za> |
| 2016-06-07 17:52:01 | dstufft | link | issue26839 messages |
| 2016-06-07 17:52:01 | dstufft | create | |