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[python-committers] Vote on governance will happen between Nov 16

Alex Martelli aleax at google.com
Tue Oct 23 12:51:00 EDT 2018 
While I suspect most participants are aware of this, just in care some
don't I thought I'd just point out that it's futile to look for a "perfect"
voting system -- Kenneth Arrow proved that long ago, see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem

Alex

On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 9:08 AM Tim Peters <tim.peters at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> [Donald Stufft <donald at stufft.io>]
>
>> ...
>> I’m struggling to find a resource besides that doesn’t also include
>> shilling for another voting system or isn’t a lengthy paper but
>> https://rangevoting.org/IRVpartic.html gives an example and
>> https://rangevoting.org/TarrIrv.html is a more complex example.
>>
>
> The rangevoting site has a great deal of info about all sorts of voting
> systems.  Over a decade ago, Ka-Ping Yee (who used to be very active in
> Python development) ran some _visual_ voting simulations on 5 popular
> systems, which scared him (& me) away from IRV forever:
>
>     http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
>
> """
> The following images visually demonstrate how Plurality penalizes centrist
> candidates and Borda favours them; how Approval and Condorcet yield nearly
> identical results; and how the Hare method yields extremely strange
> behaviour. Alarmingly, the Hare method (also known as "IRV") is gaining
> momentum as the most popular type of election-method reform in the United
> States (in Berkeley, Oakland, and just last November in San Francisco, for
> example).
> """
>
> That said, in the absence of political factions maneuvering to increase
> their own power over time, with money and marketing clout to persuade
> voters to play along, I'm not much concerned about the system used for a
> one-shot vote.  Even if we all strive to be as "strategic" and/or
> "tactical" as possible, we'll all be pushing in different directions.
>
> One massive (to my eyes) advantage of range voting is that it never pays
> to give your true favorite less than your top score, or your true
> least-favorite more than your bottom score.  (Note:  the "approval voting"
> used for PSF elections is essentially range voting limited to two possible
> scores - and it should be very easy in that context to see that it can't
> pay to approve a candidate you don't approve of, or vice versa.)
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