Description:

<<In this work we disclose
a vulnerability in OpenSSL, affecting all versions and
forks (e.g. LibreSSL and BoringSSL) since roughly October
2005, which renders the implementation of the DSA signature
scheme vulnerable to cache-based side-channel attacks.
Exploiting the software defect, we demonstrate the first published
cache-based key-recovery attack on these protocols:
260 SSH-2 handshakes to extract a 1024/160-bit DSA host
key from an OpenSSH server, and 580 TLS 1.2 handshakes
to extract a 2048/256-bit DSA key from an stunnel server.>>

http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/594

Resolution:

https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534