The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level
protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems.
This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common
terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all
versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility
mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
schemes.¶
This document updates RFC 3864 and
obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233,
7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.¶
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by
the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further
information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of
RFC 7841.¶
Information about the current status of this document, any
errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110.¶
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.¶
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Contributions published or made publicly available before November
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Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s)
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be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative
works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process,
except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it
into languages other than English.¶
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a family of stateless,
application-level, request/response protocols that share a generic interface,
extensible semantics, and self-descriptive messages to enable flexible
interaction with network-based hypertext information systems.¶
HTTP hides the details of how a service is implemented by presenting a
uniform interface to clients that is independent of the types of resources
provided. Likewise, servers do not need to be aware of each client's
purpose: a request can be considered in isolation rather than being
associated with a specific type of client or a predetermined sequence of
application steps. This allows general-purpose implementations to be used
effectively in many different contexts, reduces interaction complexity, and
enables independent evolution over time.¶
HTTP is also designed for use as an intermediation protocol, wherein
proxies and gateways can translate non-HTTP information systems into a
more generic interface.¶
One consequence of this flexibility is that the protocol cannot be
defined in terms of what occurs behind the interface. Instead, we
are limited to defining the syntax of communication, the intent
of received communication, and the expected behavior of recipients.
If the communication is considered in isolation, then successful
actions ought to be reflected in corresponding changes to the
observable interface provided by servers. However, since multiple
clients might act in parallel and perhaps at cross-purposes, we
cannot require that such changes be observable beyond the scope
of a single response.¶
HTTP has been the primary information transfer protocol for the World
Wide Web since its introduction in 1990. It began as a trivial
mechanism for low-latency requests, with a single method (GET) to
request transfer of a presumed hypertext document identified by a given pathname.
As the Web grew, HTTP was extended to enclose requests and responses within
messages, transfer arbitrary data formats using MIME-like media types, and
route requests through intermediaries. These protocols were eventually
defined as HTTP/0.9 and HTTP/1.0 (see [HTTP/1.0]).¶
HTTP/1.1 was designed to refine the protocol's features while retaining
compatibility with the existing text-based messaging syntax, improving
its interoperability, scalability, and robustness across the Internet.
This included length-based data delimiters for both fixed and dynamic
(chunked) content, a consistent framework for content negotiation,
opaque validators for conditional requests, cache controls for better
cache consistency, range requests for partial updates, and default
persistent connections. HTTP/1.1 was introduced in 1995 and published on
the Standards Track in 1997 [RFC2068], revised in
1999 [RFC2616], and revised again in 2014
([RFC7230] through [RFC7235]).¶
HTTP/2 ([HTTP/2]) introduced a multiplexed session layer
on top of the existing TLS and TCP protocols for exchanging concurrent
HTTP messages with efficient field compression and server push.
HTTP/3 ([HTTP/3]) provides greater independence for concurrent
messages by using QUIC as a secure multiplexed transport over UDP instead of
TCP.¶
All three major versions of HTTP rely on the semantics defined by
this document. They have not obsoleted each other because each one has
specific benefits and limitations depending on the context of use.
Implementations are expected to choose the most appropriate transport and
messaging syntax for their particular context.¶
This revision of HTTP separates the definition of semantics (this document)
and caching ([CACHING]) from the current HTTP/1.1 messaging
syntax ([HTTP/1.1]) to allow each major protocol version
to progress independently while referring to the same core semantics.¶
HTTP provides a uniform interface for interacting with a resource
(Section 3.1) -- regardless of its type, nature, or
implementation -- by sending messages that manipulate or transfer
representations (Section 3.2).¶
Each message is either a request or a response. A client constructs request
messages that communicate its intentions and routes those messages toward
an identified origin server. A server listens for requests, parses each
message received, interprets the message semantics in relation to the
identified target resource, and responds to that request with one or more
response messages. The client examines received responses to see if its
intentions were carried out, determining what to do next based on the
status codes and content received.¶
HTTP semantics include the intentions defined by each request method
(Section 9), extensions to those semantics that might be
described in request header fields,
status codes that describe the response (Section 15), and
other control data and resource metadata that might be given in response
fields.¶
Semantics also include representation metadata that describe how
content is intended to be interpreted by a recipient, request header
fields that might influence content selection, and the various selection
algorithms that are collectively referred to as
"content negotiation" (Section 12).¶
[*] This document only obsoletes the portions of
RFC 7230 that are independent of
the HTTP/1.1 messaging syntax and connection management; the remaining
bits of RFC 7230 are
obsoleted by "HTTP/1.1" [HTTP/1.1].¶
This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of
[RFC5234], extended with the notation for case-sensitivity
in strings defined in [RFC7405].¶
It also uses a list extension, defined in Section 5.6.1,
that allows for compact definition of comma-separated lists using a "#"
operator (similar to how the "*" operator indicates repetition). Appendix A shows the collected grammar with all list
operators expanded to standard ABNF notation.¶
As a convention, ABNF rule names prefixed with "obs-" denote
obsolete grammar rules that appear for historical reasons.¶
The following core rules are included by
reference, as defined in Appendix B.1 of [RFC5234]:
ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF (CR LF), CTL (controls),
DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote),
HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), HTAB (horizontal tab), LF (line feed),
OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data), SP (space), and
VCHAR (any visible US-ASCII character).¶
Section 5.6 defines some generic syntactic
components for field values.¶
This specification uses the terms
"character",
"character encoding scheme",
"charset", and
"protocol element"
as they are defined in [RFC6365].¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT",
"REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be
interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as
shown here.¶
This specification targets conformance criteria according to the role of
a participant in HTTP communication. Hence, requirements are placed
on senders, recipients, clients, servers, user agents, intermediaries,
origin servers, proxies, gateways, or caches, depending on what behavior
is being constrained by the requirement. Additional requirements
are placed on implementations, resource owners, and protocol element
registrations when they apply beyond the scope of a single communication.¶
The verb "generate" is used instead of "send" where a requirement applies
only to implementations that create the protocol element, rather than an
implementation that forwards a received element downstream.¶
An implementation is considered conformant if it complies with all of the
requirements associated with the roles it partakes in HTTP.¶
A sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements that do not match the grammar
defined by the corresponding ABNF rules.
Within a given message, a sender MUST NOT generate protocol elements or
syntax alternatives that are only allowed to be generated by participants in
other roles (i.e., a role that the sender does not have for that message).¶
Conformance to HTTP includes both conformance to the particular messaging
syntax of the protocol version in use and conformance to the semantics of
protocol elements sent. For example, a client that claims conformance to
HTTP/1.1 but fails to recognize the features required of HTTP/1.1
recipients will fail to interoperate with servers that adjust their
responses in accordance with those claims.
Features that reflect user choices, such as content negotiation and
user-selected extensions, can impact application behavior beyond the
protocol stream; sending protocol elements that inaccurately reflect a
user's choices will confuse the user and inhibit choice.¶
When an implementation fails semantic conformance, recipients of that
implementation's messages will eventually develop workarounds to adjust
their behavior accordingly. A recipient MAY employ such workarounds while
remaining conformant to this protocol if the workarounds are limited to the
implementations at fault. For example, servers often scan portions of the
User-Agent field value, and user agents often scan the Server field value,
to adjust their own behavior with respect to known bugs or poorly chosen
defaults.¶
A recipient SHOULD parse a received protocol element defensively, with
only marginal expectations that the element will conform to its ABNF
grammar and fit within a reasonable buffer size.¶
HTTP does not have specific length limitations for many of its protocol
elements because the lengths that might be appropriate will vary widely,
depending on the deployment context and purpose of the implementation.
Hence, interoperability between senders and recipients depends on shared
expectations regarding what is a reasonable length for each protocol
element. Furthermore, what is commonly understood to be a reasonable length
for some protocol elements has changed over the course of the past three
decades of HTTP use and is expected to continue changing in the future.¶
At a minimum, a recipient MUST be able to parse and process protocol
element lengths that are at least as long as the values that it generates
for those same protocol elements in other messages. For example, an origin
server that publishes very long URI references to its own resources needs
to be able to parse and process those same references when received as a
target URI.¶
Many received protocol elements are only parsed to the extent necessary to
identify and forward that element downstream. For example, an intermediary
might parse a received field into its field name and field value components,
but then forward the field without further parsing inside the field value.¶
A recipient MUST interpret a received protocol element according to the
semantics defined for it by this specification, including extensions to
this specification, unless the recipient has determined (through experience
or configuration) that the sender incorrectly implements what is implied by
those semantics.
For example, an origin server might disregard the contents of a received
Accept-Encoding header field if inspection of the
User-Agent header field indicates a specific implementation
version that is known to fail on receipt of certain content codings.¶
Unless noted otherwise, a recipient MAY attempt to recover a usable
protocol element from an invalid construct. HTTP does not define
specific error handling mechanisms except when they have a direct impact
on security, since different applications of the protocol require
different error handling strategies. For example, a Web browser might
wish to transparently recover from a response where the
Location header field doesn't parse according to the ABNF,
whereas a systems control client might consider any form of error recovery
to be dangerous.¶
Some requests can be automatically retried by a client in the event of
an underlying connection failure, as described in
Section 9.2.2.¶
HTTP's version number consists of two decimal digits separated by a "."
(period or decimal point). The first digit (major version) indicates the
messaging syntax, whereas the second digit (minor version)
indicates the highest minor version within that major version to which the
sender is conformant (able to understand for future communication).¶
While HTTP's core semantics don't change between protocol versions, their
expression "on the wire" can change, and so the
HTTP version number changes when incompatible changes are made to the wire
format. Additionally, HTTP allows incremental, backwards-compatible
changes to be made to the protocol without changing its version through
the use of defined extension points (Section 16).¶
The protocol version as a whole indicates the sender's conformance with
the set of requirements laid out in that version's corresponding
specification(s).
For example, the version "HTTP/1.1" is defined by the combined
specifications of this document, "HTTP Caching" [CACHING],
and "HTTP/1.1" [HTTP/1.1].¶
HTTP's major version number is incremented when an incompatible message
syntax is introduced. The minor number is incremented when changes made to
the protocol have the effect of adding to the message semantics or
implying additional capabilities of the sender.¶
The minor version advertises the sender's communication capabilities even
when the sender is only using a backwards-compatible subset of the
protocol, thereby letting the recipient know that more advanced features
can be used in response (by servers) or in future requests (by clients).¶
When a major version of HTTP does not define any minor versions, the minor
version "0" is implied. The "0" is used when referring to that protocol
within elements that require a minor version identifier.¶
HTTP was created for the World Wide Web (WWW) architecture
and has evolved over time to support the scalability needs of a worldwide
hypertext system. Much of that architecture is reflected in the terminology
used to define HTTP.¶
The target of an HTTP request is called a "resource".
HTTP does not limit the nature of a resource; it merely
defines an interface that might be used to interact with resources.
Most resources are identified by a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), as
described in Section 4.¶
One design goal of HTTP is to separate resource identification from
request semantics, which is made possible by vesting the request
semantics in the request method (Section 9) and a few
request-modifying header fields.
A resource cannot treat a request in a manner inconsistent with the
semantics of the method of the request. For example, though the URI of a
resource might imply semantics that are not safe, a client can expect the
resource to avoid actions that are unsafe when processing a request with a
safe method (see Section 9.2.1).¶
HTTP relies upon the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
standard [URI] to indicate the target resource
(Section 7.1) and relationships between resources.¶
A "representation" is information
that is intended to reflect a past, current, or desired state of a given
resource, in a format that can be readily communicated via the protocol.
A representation consists of a set of representation metadata and a
potentially unbounded stream of representation data
(Section 8).¶
HTTP allows "information hiding" behind its uniform interface by defining
communication with respect to a transferable representation of the resource
state, rather than transferring the resource itself. This allows the
resource identified by a URI to be anything, including temporal functions
like "the current weather in Laguna Beach", while potentially providing
information that represents that resource at the time a message is
generated [REST].¶
The uniform interface is similar to a window through which one can observe
and act upon a thing only through the communication of messages to an
independent actor on the other side. A shared abstraction is needed to
represent ("take the place of") the current or desired state of that thing
in our communications. When a representation is hypertext, it can provide
both a representation of the resource state and processing instructions
that help guide the recipient's future interactions.¶
A target resource might be provided with, or be capable of
generating, multiple representations that are each intended to reflect the
resource's current state. An algorithm, usually based on
content negotiation (Section 12),
would be used to select one of those representations as being most
applicable to a given request.
This "selected representation" provides the data and metadata
for evaluating conditional requests (Section 13)
and constructing the content for 200 (OK),
206 (Partial Content), and
304 (Not Modified) responses to GET (Section 9.3.1).¶
HTTP is a client/server protocol that operates over a reliable
transport- or session-layer "connection".¶
An HTTP "client" is a program that establishes a connection
to a server for the purpose of sending one or more HTTP requests.
An HTTP "server" is a program that accepts connections
in order to service HTTP requests by sending HTTP responses.¶
The terms client and server refer only to the roles that
these programs perform for a particular connection. The same program
might act as a client on some connections and a server on others.¶
HTTP is defined as a stateless protocol, meaning that each request message's semantics
can be understood in isolation, and that the relationship between connections
and messages on them has no impact on the interpretation of those messages.
For example, a CONNECT request (Section 9.3.6) or a request with
the Upgrade header field (Section 7.8) can occur at any time,
not just in the first message on a connection. Many implementations depend on
HTTP's stateless design in order to reuse proxied connections or dynamically
load balance requests across multiple servers.¶
As a result, a server MUST NOT
assume that two requests on the same connection are from the same user
agent unless the connection is secured and specific to that agent.
Some non-standard HTTP extensions (e.g., [RFC4559]) have
been known to violate this requirement, resulting in security and
interoperability problems.¶
HTTP is a stateless request/response protocol for exchanging
"messages" across a connection.
The terms "sender" and "recipient" refer to
any implementation that sends or receives a given message, respectively.¶
A client sends requests to a server in the form of a "request"
message with a method (Section 9) and request target
(Section 7.1). The request might also contain
header fields (Section 6.3) for request modifiers,
client information, and representation metadata,
content (Section 6.4) intended for processing
in accordance with the method, and
trailer fields (Section 6.5) to communicate information
collected while sending the content.¶
A server responds to a client's request by sending one or more
"response" messages, each including a status
code (Section 15). The response might also contain
header fields for server information, resource metadata, and representation
metadata, content to be interpreted in accordance with the status
code, and trailer fields to communicate information
collected while sending the content.¶
The term "user agent" refers to any of the various
client programs that initiate a request.¶
The most familiar form of user agent is the general-purpose Web browser, but
that's only a small percentage of implementations. Other common user agents
include spiders (web-traversing robots), command-line tools, billboard
screens, household appliances, scales, light bulbs, firmware update scripts,
mobile apps, and communication devices in a multitude of shapes and sizes.¶
Being a user agent does not imply that there is a human user directly
interacting with the software agent at the time of a request. In many
cases, a user agent is installed or configured to run in the background
and save its results for later inspection (or save only a subset of those
results that might be interesting or erroneous). Spiders, for example, are
typically given a start URI and configured to follow certain behavior while
crawling the Web as a hypertext graph.¶
Many user agents cannot, or choose not to,
make interactive suggestions to their user or provide adequate warning for
security or privacy concerns. In the few cases where this
specification requires reporting of errors to the user, it is acceptable
for such reporting to only be observable in an error console or log file.
Likewise, requirements that an automated action be confirmed by the user
before proceeding might be met via advance configuration choices,
run-time options, or simple avoidance of the unsafe action; confirmation
does not imply any specific user interface or interruption of normal
processing if the user has already made that choice.¶
The term "origin server" refers to a program that can
originate authoritative responses for a given target resource.¶
The most familiar form of origin server are large public websites.
However, like user agents being equated with browsers, it is easy to be
misled into thinking that all origin servers are alike.
Common origin servers also include home automation units, configurable
networking components, office machines, autonomous robots, news feeds,
traffic cameras, real-time ad selectors, and video-on-demand platforms.¶
Most HTTP communication consists of a retrieval request (GET) for
a representation of some resource identified by a URI. In the
simplest case, this might be accomplished via a single bidirectional
connection (===) between the user agent (UA) and the origin server (O).¶
request >
UA ======================================= O
< response
A "cache" is a local store of previous response messages and the
subsystem that controls its message storage, retrieval, and deletion.
A cache stores cacheable responses in order to reduce the response
time and network bandwidth consumption on future, equivalent
requests. Any client or server MAY employ a cache, though a cache
cannot be used while acting as a tunnel.¶
The effect of a cache is that the request/response chain is shortened
if one of the participants along the chain has a cached response
applicable to that request. The following illustrates the resulting
chain if B has a cached copy of an earlier response from O (via C)
for a request that has not been cached by UA or A.¶
> >
UA =========== A =========== B - - - - - - C - - - - - - O
< <
A response is "cacheable" if a cache is allowed to store a copy of
the response message for use in answering subsequent requests.
Even when a response is cacheable, there might be additional
constraints placed by the client or by the origin server on when
that cached response can be used for a particular request. HTTP
requirements for cache behavior and cacheable responses are
defined in [CACHING].¶
There is a wide variety of architectures and configurations
of caches deployed across the World Wide Web and
inside large organizations. These include national hierarchies
of proxy caches to save bandwidth and reduce latency, content delivery
networks that use gateway caching to optimize regional and global distribution of popular sites,
collaborative systems that
broadcast or multicast cache entries, archives of pre-fetched cache
entries for use in off-line or high-latency environments, and so on.¶
The following example illustrates a typical HTTP/1.1 message exchange for a
GET request (Section 9.3.1) on the URI "http://www.example.com/hello.txt":¶
URI references are used to target requests, indicate redirects, and define
relationships.¶
The definitions of "URI-reference",
"absolute-URI", "relative-part", "authority", "port", "host",
"path-abempty", "segment", and "query" are adopted from the
URI generic syntax.
An "absolute-path" rule is defined for protocol elements that can contain a
non-empty path component. (This rule differs slightly from the path-abempty
rule of RFC 3986, which allows for an empty path,
and path-absolute rule, which does not allow paths that begin with "//".)
A "partial-URI" rule is defined for protocol elements
that can contain a relative URI but not a fragment component.¶
URI-reference = <URI-reference, see [URI], Section 4.1>
absolute-URI = <absolute-URI, see [URI], Section 4.3>
relative-part = <relative-part, see [URI], Section 4.2>
authority = <authority, see [URI], Section 3.2>
uri-host = <host, see [URI], Section 3.2.2>
port = <port, see [URI], Section 3.2.3>
path-abempty = <path-abempty, see [URI], Section 3.3>
segment = <segment, see [URI], Section 3.3>
query = <query, see [URI], Section 3.4>
absolute-path = 1*( "/" segment )
partial-URI = relative-part [ "?" query ]
Each protocol element in HTTP that allows a URI reference will indicate
in its ABNF production whether the element allows any form of reference
(URI-reference), only a URI in absolute form (absolute-URI), only the
path and optional query components (partial-URI),
or some combination of the above.
Unless otherwise indicated, URI references are parsed
relative to the target URI (Section 7.1).¶
It is RECOMMENDED that all senders and recipients support, at a minimum,
URIs with lengths of 8000 octets in protocol elements. Note that this
implies some structures and on-wire representations (for example, the
request line in HTTP/1.1) will necessarily be larger in some cases.¶
Note that the presence of an "http" or "https" URI does not imply that
there is always an HTTP server at the identified origin listening for
connections. Anyone can mint a URI, whether or not a server exists and
whether or not that server currently maps that identifier to a resource.
The delegated nature of registered names and IP addresses creates a
federated namespace whether or not an HTTP server is present.¶
The "http" URI scheme is hereby defined for minting identifiers within the
hierarchical namespace governed by a potential HTTP origin server
listening for TCP ([TCP]) connections on a given port.¶
The origin server for an "http" URI is identified by the
authority component, which includes a host identifier
([URI], Section 3.2.2)
and optional port number ([URI], Section 3.2.3).
If the port subcomponent is empty or not given, TCP port 80 (the
reserved port for WWW services) is the default.
The origin determines who has the right to respond authoritatively to
requests that target the identified resource, as defined in
Section 4.3.2.¶
A sender MUST NOT generate an "http" URI with an empty host identifier.
A recipient that processes such a URI reference MUST reject it as invalid.¶
The hierarchical path component and optional query component identify the
target resource within that origin server's namespace.¶
The "https" URI scheme is hereby defined for minting identifiers within the
hierarchical namespace governed by a potential origin server listening for
TCP connections on a given port and capable of establishing a TLS
([TLS13]) connection that has been secured for HTTP
communication. In this context, "secured" specifically
means that the server has been authenticated as acting on behalf of the
identified authority and all HTTP communication with that server has
confidentiality and integrity protection that is acceptable to both client
and server.¶
The origin server for an "https" URI is identified by the
authority component, which includes a host identifier
([URI], Section 3.2.2)
and optional port number ([URI], Section 3.2.3).
If the port subcomponent is empty or not given, TCP port 443
(the reserved port for HTTP over TLS) is the default.
The origin determines who has the right to respond authoritatively to
requests that target the identified resource, as defined in
Section 4.3.3.¶
A sender MUST NOT generate an "https" URI with an empty host identifier.
A recipient that processes such a URI reference MUST reject it as invalid.¶
The hierarchical path component and optional query component identify the
target resource within that origin server's namespace.¶
A client MUST ensure that its HTTP requests for an "https" resource are
secured, prior to being communicated, and that it only accepts secured
responses to those requests. Note that the definition of what cryptographic
mechanisms are acceptable to client and server are usually negotiated and
can change over time.¶
Resources made available via the "https" scheme have no shared identity
with the "http" scheme. They are distinct origins with separate namespaces.
However, extensions to HTTP that are defined as applying to all origins with
the same host, such as the Cookie protocol [COOKIE],
allow information set by one service to impact communication with other
services within a matching group of host domains. Such extensions ought to
be designed with great care to prevent information obtained from a secured
connection being inadvertently exchanged within an unsecured context.¶
URIs with an "http" or "https" scheme are normalized and compared according to the
methods defined in Section 6 of [URI], using
the defaults described above for each scheme.¶
HTTP does not require the use of a specific method for determining
equivalence. For example, a cache key might be compared as a simple
string, after syntax-based normalization, or after scheme-based
normalization.¶
Scheme-based normalization (Section 6.2.3 of [URI]) of "http" and "https" URIs involves the following
additional rules:¶
If the port is equal to the default port for a scheme, the normal form
is to omit the port subcomponent.¶
When not being used as the target of an OPTIONS request, an empty path
component is equivalent to an absolute path of "/", so the normal form is
to provide a path of "/" instead.¶
The scheme and host are case-insensitive and normally provided in
lowercase; all other components are compared in a case-sensitive
manner.¶
Characters other than those in the "reserved" set are equivalent to
their percent-encoded octets: the normal form is to not encode them (see
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of [URI]).¶
For example, the following three URIs are equivalent:¶
Two HTTP URIs that are equivalent after normalization (using any method)
can be assumed to identify the same resource, and any HTTP component MAY
perform normalization. As a result, distinct resources SHOULD NOT be
identified by HTTP URIs that are equivalent after normalization (using any
method defined in Section 6.2 of [URI]).¶
The URI generic syntax for authority also includes a userinfo subcomponent
([URI], Section 3.2.1) for including user
authentication information in the URI. In that subcomponent, the
use of the format "user:password" is deprecated.¶
Some implementations make use of the userinfo component for internal
configuration of authentication information, such as within command
invocation options, configuration files, or bookmark lists, even
though such usage might expose a user identifier or password.¶
A sender MUST NOT generate the userinfo subcomponent (and its "@"
delimiter) when an "http" or "https" URI reference is generated within a
message as a target URI or field value.¶
Before making use of an "http" or "https" URI reference received from an untrusted
source, a recipient SHOULD parse for userinfo and treat its presence as
an error; it is likely being used to obscure the authority for the sake of
phishing attacks.¶
Fragment identifiers allow for indirect identification
of a secondary resource, independent of the URI scheme, as defined in
Section 3.5 of [URI].
Some protocol elements that refer to a URI allow inclusion of a fragment,
while others do not. They are distinguished by use of the ABNF rule for
elements where fragment is allowed; otherwise, a specific rule that excludes
fragments is used.¶
Authoritative access refers to dereferencing a given identifier,
for the sake of access to the identified resource, in a way that the client
believes is authoritative (controlled by the resource owner). The process
for determining whether access is granted is defined by the URI scheme and often uses
data within the URI components, such as the authority component when
the generic syntax is used. However, authoritative access is not limited to
the identified mechanism.¶
Section 4.3.1 defines the concept of an origin as an aid to
such uses, and the subsequent subsections explain how to establish that a
peer has the authority to represent an origin.¶
See Section 17.1 for security considerations
related to establishing authority.¶
The "origin" for a given URI is the triple of scheme, host,
and port after normalizing the scheme and host to lowercase and
normalizing the port to remove any leading zeros. If port is elided from
the URI, the default port for that scheme is used. For example, the URI¶
Each origin defines its own namespace and controls how identifiers
within that namespace are mapped to resources. In turn, how the origin
responds to valid requests, consistently over time, determines the
semantics that users will associate with a URI, and the usefulness of
those semantics is what ultimately transforms these mechanisms into a
resource for users to reference and access in the future.¶
Two origins are distinct if they differ in scheme, host, or port. Even
when it can be verified that the same entity controls two distinct origins,
the two namespaces under those origins are distinct unless explicitly
aliased by a server authoritative for that origin.¶
Origin is also used within HTML and related Web protocols, beyond the
scope of this document, as described in [RFC6454].¶
Although HTTP is independent of the transport protocol, the "http" scheme
(Section 4.2.1) is specific to associating authority with
whomever controls the origin
server listening for TCP connections on the indicated port of whatever
host is identified within the authority component. This is a very weak
sense of authority because it depends on both client-specific name
resolution mechanisms and communication that might not be secured from
an on-path attacker. Nevertheless, it is a sufficient minimum for
binding "http" identifiers to an origin server for consistent resolution
within a trusted environment.¶
If the host identifier is provided as an IP address, the origin server is
the listener (if any) on the indicated TCP port at that IP address.
If host is a registered name, the registered name is an indirect identifier
for use with a name resolution service, such as DNS, to find an address for
an appropriate origin server.¶
When an "http" URI is used within a context that calls for access to the
indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving the host
identifier to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that
address on the indicated port, and sending over that connection an HTTP
request message containing a request target that matches the client's
target URI (Section 7.1).¶
If the server responds to such a request with a non-interim HTTP response
message, as described in Section 15, then that response
is considered an authoritative answer to the client's request.¶
Note, however, that the above is not the only means for obtaining an
authoritative response, nor does it imply that an authoritative response
is always necessary (see [CACHING]).
For example, the Alt-Svc header field [ALTSVC] allows an
origin server to identify other services that are also authoritative for
that origin. Access to "http" identified resources might also be provided
by protocols outside the scope of this document.¶
The "https" scheme (Section 4.2.2) associates authority based
on the ability of a server to use the private key corresponding to a
certificate that the client considers to be trustworthy for the identified
origin server. The client usually relies upon a chain of trust, conveyed
from some prearranged or configured trust anchor, to deem a certificate
trustworthy (Section 4.3.4).¶
In HTTP/1.1 and earlier, a client will only attribute authority to a server
when they are communicating over a successfully established and secured
connection specifically to that URI origin's host. The connection
establishment and certificate verification are used as proof of authority.¶
In HTTP/2 and HTTP/3, a client will attribute authority to a server when
they are communicating over a successfully established and secured
connection if the URI origin's host matches any of the hosts present in the
server's certificate and the client believes that it could open a connection
to that host for that URI. In practice, a client will make a DNS query to
check that the origin's host contains the same server IP address as the
established connection. This restriction can be removed by the origin server
sending an equivalent ORIGIN frame [RFC8336].¶
The request target's host and port value are passed within each HTTP
request, identifying the origin and distinguishing it from other namespaces
that might be controlled by the same server (Section 7.2).
It is the origin's responsibility to ensure that any services provided with
control over its certificate's private key are equally responsible for
managing the corresponding "https" namespaces or at least prepared to
reject requests that appear to have been misdirected
(Section 7.4).¶
An origin server might be unwilling to process requests for certain target
URIs even when they have the authority to do so. For example, when a host
operates distinct services on different ports (e.g., 443 and 8000), checking
the target URI at the origin server is necessary (even after the connection
has been secured) because a network attacker might cause connections for one
port to be received at some other port. Failing to check the target URI
might allow such an attacker to replace a response to one target URI
(e.g., "https://example.com/foo") with a seemingly authoritative response
from the other port (e.g., "https://example.com:8000/foo").¶
Note that the "https" scheme does not rely on TCP and the connected port
number for associating authority, since both are outside the secured
communication and thus cannot be trusted as definitive. Hence, the HTTP
communication might take place over any channel that has been secured,
as defined in Section 4.2.2, including protocols that don't
use TCP.¶
When an "https" URI is used within a context that calls for access to
the indicated resource, a client MAY attempt access by resolving the
host identifier to an IP address, establishing a TCP connection to that
address on the indicated port, securing the connection end-to-end by
successfully initiating TLS over TCP with confidentiality and integrity
protection, and sending over that connection an HTTP request message
containing a request target that matches the client's target URI
(Section 7.1).¶
If the server responds to such a request with a non-interim HTTP response
message, as described in Section 15, then that response
is considered an authoritative answer to the client's request.¶
Note, however, that the above is not the only means for obtaining an
authoritative response, nor does it imply that an authoritative response
is always necessary (see [CACHING]).¶
To establish a secured connection to dereference a URI,
a client MUST verify that the service's identity is an acceptable
match for the URI's origin server. Certificate verification is used to
prevent server impersonation by an on-path attacker or by an attacker
that controls name resolution. This process requires that a client be
configured with a set of trust anchors.¶
In general, a client MUST verify the service identity using the
verification process defined in
Section 6 of [RFC6125]. The client MUST construct
a reference identity from the service's host: if the host is a literal IP address
(Section 4.3.5), the reference identity is an IP-ID, otherwise
the host is a name and the reference identity is a DNS-ID.¶
A reference identity of type CN-ID MUST NOT be used by clients. As noted
in Section 6.2.1 of [RFC6125], a reference
identity of type CN-ID might be used by older clients.¶
A client might be specially configured to accept an alternative form of
server identity verification. For example, a client might be connecting
to a server whose address and hostname are dynamic, with an expectation that
the service will present a specific certificate (or a certificate matching
some externally defined reference identity) rather than one matching the
target URI's origin.¶
In special cases, it might be appropriate for
a client to simply ignore the server's identity, but it must be
understood that this leaves a connection open to active attack.¶
If the certificate is not valid for the target URI's origin,
a user agent MUST either obtain confirmation from the user
before proceeding (see Section 3.5) or
terminate the connection with a bad certificate error. Automated
clients MUST log the error to an appropriate audit log (if available)
and SHOULD terminate the connection (with a bad certificate error).
Automated clients MAY provide a configuration setting that disables
this check, but MUST provide a setting which enables it.¶
A server that is identified using an IP address literal in the "host" field
of an "https" URI has a reference identity of type IP-ID. An IP version 4
address uses the "IPv4address" ABNF rule, and an IP version 6 address uses
the "IP-literal" production with the "IPv6address" option; see
Section 3.2.2 of [URI]. A reference identity of
IP-ID contains the decoded bytes of the IP address.¶
An IP version 4 address is 4 octets, and an IP version 6 address is 16 octets.
Use of IP-ID is not defined for any other IP version. The iPAddress
choice in the certificate subjectAltName extension does not explicitly
include the IP version and so relies on the length of the address to
distinguish versions; see
Section 4.2.1.6 of [RFC5280].¶
A reference identity of type IP-ID matches if the address is identical to
an iPAddress value of the subjectAltName extension of the certificate.¶
HTTP uses "fields" to provide data in the form of extensible
name/value pairs with a registered key namespace. Fields are sent and
received within the header and trailer sections of messages
(Section 6).¶
A field name labels the corresponding field value as having the
semantics defined by that name. For example, the Date
header field is defined in Section 6.6.1 as containing the
origination timestamp for the message in which it appears.¶
Field names are case-insensitive and ought to be registered within the
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry"; see Section 16.3.1.¶
The interpretation of a field does not change between minor
versions of the same major HTTP version, though the default behavior of a
recipient in the absence of such a field can change. Unless specified
otherwise, fields are defined for all versions of HTTP.
In particular, the Host and Connection
fields ought to be recognized by all HTTP implementations
whether or not they advertise conformance with HTTP/1.1.¶
New fields can be introduced without changing the protocol version if
their defined semantics allow them to be safely ignored by recipients
that do not recognize them; see Section 16.3.¶
A proxy MUST forward unrecognized header fields unless the
field name is listed in the Connection header field
(Section 7.6.1) or the proxy is specifically
configured to block, or otherwise transform, such fields.
Other recipients SHOULD ignore unrecognized header and trailer fields.
Adhering to these requirements allows HTTP's functionality to be extended
without updating or removing deployed intermediaries.¶
Field sections are composed of any number of "field lines",
each with a "field name" (see Section 5.1)
identifying the field, and a "field line value" that conveys
data for that instance of the field.¶
When a field name is only present once in a section, the combined
"field value" for that field consists of the corresponding
field line value.
When a field name is repeated within a section, its combined field value
consists of the list of corresponding field line values within that section,
concatenated in order, with each field line value separated by a comma.¶
contains two field lines, both with the field name "Example-Field". The
first field line has a field line value of "Foo, Bar", while the second
field line value is "Baz". The field value for "Example-Field" is the list
"Foo, Bar, Baz".¶
A recipient MAY combine multiple field lines within a field section that
have the same field name
into one field line, without changing the semantics of the message, by
appending each subsequent field line value to the initial field line value
in order, separated by a comma (",") and optional whitespace
(OWS, defined in Section 5.6.3).
For consistency, use comma SP.¶
The order in which field lines with the
same name are received is therefore significant to the interpretation of
the field value; a proxy MUST NOT change the order of these field line
values when forwarding a message.¶
This means that, aside from the well-known exception noted below, a sender
MUST NOT generate multiple field lines with the same name in a message
(whether in the headers or trailers) or append a field line when a field
line of the same name already exists in the message, unless that field's
definition allows multiple field line values to be recombined as a
comma-separated list (i.e., at least one alternative of the field's
definition allows a comma-separated list, such as an ABNF rule of
#(values) defined in Section 5.6.1).¶
The order in which field lines with differing field names are received in a
section is not significant. However, it is good practice to send header
fields that contain additional control data first, such as
Host on requests and Date on responses, so
that implementations can decide when not to handle a message as early as
possible.¶
A server MUST NOT apply a request to the target resource until it
receives the entire request header section, since later header field lines
might include conditionals, authentication credentials, or deliberately
misleading duplicate header fields that could impact request processing.¶
HTTP does not place a predefined limit on the length of each field line, field value,
or on the length of a header or trailer section as a whole, as described in
Section 2. Various ad hoc limitations on individual
lengths are found in practice, often depending on the specific
field's semantics.¶
A server that receives a request header field line, field value, or set of
fields larger than it wishes to process MUST respond with an appropriate
4xx (Client Error) status code. Ignoring such header fields
would increase the server's vulnerability to request smuggling attacks
(Section 11.2 of [HTTP/1.1]).¶
A client MAY discard or truncate received field lines that are larger
than the client wishes to process if the field semantics are such that the
dropped value(s) can be safely ignored without changing the
message framing or response semantics.¶
HTTP field values consist of a sequence of characters in a format defined
by the field's grammar. Each field's grammar is usually defined using
ABNF ([RFC5234]).¶
A field value does not include leading or trailing whitespace. When a
specific version of HTTP allows such whitespace to appear in a message,
a field parsing implementation MUST exclude such whitespace prior to
evaluating the field value.¶
Field values are usually constrained to the range of US-ASCII characters
[USASCII].
Fields needing a greater range of characters can use an encoding,
such as the one defined in [RFC8187].
Historically, HTTP allowed field content with text in the ISO-8859-1
charset [ISO-8859-1], supporting other charsets only
through use of [RFC2047] encoding.
Specifications for newly defined fields SHOULD limit their values to
visible US-ASCII octets (VCHAR), SP, and HTAB.
A recipient SHOULD treat other allowed octets in field content
(i.e., obs-text) as opaque data.¶
Field values containing CR, LF, or NUL characters are invalid and dangerous,
due to the varying ways that implementations might parse and interpret
those characters; a recipient of CR, LF, or NUL within a field value MUST
either reject the message or replace each of those characters with SP
before further processing or forwarding of that message. Field values
containing other CTL characters are also invalid; however,
recipients MAY retain such characters for the sake of robustness when
they appear within a safe context (e.g., an application-specific quoted
string that will not be processed by any downstream HTTP parser).¶
Fields that only anticipate a single member as the field value are
referred to as "singleton fields".¶
Fields that allow multiple members as the field value are referred to as
"list-based fields". The list operator extension of
Section 5.6.1 is used as a common notation for defining
field values that can contain multiple members.¶
Because commas (",") are used as the delimiter between members, they need
to be treated with care if they are allowed as data within a member. This
is true for both list-based and singleton fields, since a singleton field
might be erroneously sent with multiple members and detecting such errors
improves interoperability. Fields that expect to contain a
comma within a member, such as within an HTTP-date or
URI-reference
element, ought to be defined with delimiters around that element to
distinguish any comma within that data from potential list separators.¶
For example, a textual date and a URI (either of which might contain a comma)
could be safely carried in list-based field values like these:¶
Note that double-quote delimiters are almost always used with the
quoted-string production (Section 5.6.4); using a different syntax inside double-quotes
will likely cause unnecessary confusion.¶
Many fields (such as Content-Type, defined in
Section 8.3) use a common syntax for parameters
that allows both unquoted (token) and quoted (quoted-string) syntax for
a parameter value (Section 5.6.6). Use of common syntax
allows recipients to reuse existing parser components. When allowing both
forms, the meaning of a parameter value ought to be the same whether it
was received as a token or a quoted string.¶
A #rule extension to the ABNF rules of [RFC5234] is used to
improve readability in the definitions of some list-based field values.¶
A construct "#" is defined, similar to "*", for defining comma-delimited
lists of elements. The full form is "<n>#<m>element" indicating
at least <n> and at most <m> elements, each separated by a single
comma (",") and optional whitespace (OWS,
defined in Section 5.6.3).¶
In any production that uses the list construct, a sender MUST NOT
generate empty list elements. In other words, a sender has to generate
lists that satisfy the following syntax:¶
Empty elements do not contribute to the count of elements present.
A recipient MUST parse and ignore
a reasonable number of empty list elements: enough to handle common mistakes
by senders that merge values, but not so much that they could be used as a
denial-of-service mechanism. In other words, a recipient MUST accept lists
that satisfy the following syntax:¶
#element => [ element ] *( OWS "," OWS [ element ] )
Note that because of the potential presence of empty list elements, the
RFC 5234 ABNF cannot enforce the cardinality of list elements, and
consequently all cases are mapped as if there was no cardinality specified.¶
Many HTTP field values are defined using common syntax
components, separated by whitespace or specific delimiting characters.
Delimiters are chosen from the set of US-ASCII visual characters not
allowed in a token (DQUOTE and "(),/:;<=>?@[\]{}").¶
This specification uses three rules to denote the use of linear
whitespace: OWS (optional whitespace), RWS (required whitespace), and
BWS ("bad" whitespace).¶
The OWS rule is used where zero or more linear whitespace octets might
appear. For protocol elements where optional whitespace is preferred to
improve readability, a sender SHOULD generate the optional whitespace
as a single SP; otherwise, a sender SHOULD NOT generate optional
whitespace except as needed to overwrite invalid or unwanted protocol
elements during in-place message filtering.¶
The RWS rule is used when at least one linear whitespace octet is required
to separate field tokens. A sender SHOULD generate RWS as a single SP.¶
OWS and RWS have the same semantics as a single SP. Any content known to
be defined as OWS or RWS MAY be replaced with a single SP before
interpreting it or forwarding the message downstream.¶
The BWS rule is used where the grammar allows optional whitespace only for
historical reasons. A sender MUST NOT generate BWS in messages.
A recipient MUST parse for such bad whitespace and remove it before
interpreting the protocol element.¶
BWS has no semantics. Any content known to be
defined as BWS MAY be removed before interpreting it or forwarding the
message downstream.¶
The backslash octet ("\") can be used as a single-octet
quoting mechanism within quoted-string and comment constructs.
Recipients that process the value of a quoted-string MUST handle a
quoted-pair as if it were replaced by the octet following the backslash.¶
A sender SHOULD NOT generate a quoted-pair in a quoted-string except
where necessary to quote DQUOTE and backslash octets occurring within that
string.
A sender SHOULD NOT generate a quoted-pair in a comment except
where necessary to quote parentheses ["(" and ")"] and backslash octets
occurring within that comment.¶
Parameters are instances of name/value pairs; they are often used in field
values as a common syntax for appending auxiliary information to an item.
Each parameter is usually delimited by an immediately preceding semicolon.¶
Parameter names are case-insensitive. Parameter values might or might
not be case-sensitive, depending on the semantics of the parameter
name. Examples of parameters and some equivalent forms can be seen in
media types (Section 8.3.1) and the Accept header field
(Section 12.5.1).¶
A parameter value that matches the token production can be
transmitted either as a token or within a quoted-string. The quoted and
unquoted values are equivalent.¶
Prior to 1995, there were three different formats commonly used by servers
to communicate timestamps. For compatibility with old implementations, all
three are defined here. The preferred format is a fixed-length and
single-zone subset of the date and time specification used by the
Internet Message Format [RFC5322].¶
A recipient that parses a timestamp value in an HTTP field MUST
accept all three HTTP-date formats. When a sender generates a field
that contains one or more timestamps defined as HTTP-date,
the sender MUST generate those timestamps in the IMF-fixdate format.¶
An HTTP-date value represents time as an instance of Coordinated
Universal Time (UTC). The first two formats indicate UTC by the
three-letter abbreviation for Greenwich Mean Time, "GMT", a predecessor
of the UTC name; values in the asctime format are assumed to be in UTC.¶
A "clock" is an implementation capable of providing a
reasonable approximation of the current instant in UTC.
A clock implementation ought to use NTP ([RFC5905]),
or some similar protocol, to synchronize with UTC.¶
HTTP-date is case sensitive. Note that Section 4.2 of [CACHING] relaxes this for cache recipients.¶
A sender MUST NOT generate additional whitespace in an HTTP-date beyond
that specifically included as SP in the grammar.
The semantics of day-name, day,
month, year, and time-of-day
are the same as those defined for the Internet Message Format constructs
with the corresponding name ([RFC5322], Section 3.3).¶
Recipients of a timestamp value in rfc850-date format, which uses a
two-digit year, MUST interpret a timestamp that appears to be more
than 50 years in the future as representing the most recent year in the
past that had the same last two digits.¶
Recipients of timestamp values are encouraged to be robust in parsing
timestamps unless otherwise restricted by the field definition.
For example, messages are occasionally forwarded over HTTP from a non-HTTP
source that might generate any of the date and time specifications defined
by the Internet Message Format.¶
Each major version of HTTP defines its own syntax for communicating
messages. This section defines an abstract data type for HTTP messages
based on a generalization of those message characteristics, common structure,
and capacity for conveying semantics. This abstraction is used to define
requirements on senders and recipients that are independent of the HTTP
version, such that a message in one version can be relayed through other
versions without changing its meaning.¶
a headers lookup table of name/value pairs for extending that control
data and conveying additional information about the sender, message,
content, or context,¶
a trailers lookup table of name/value pairs for communicating information
obtained while sending the content.¶
Framing and control data is sent first, followed by a header section
containing fields for the headers table. When a message includes content,
the content is sent after the header section, potentially followed by a
trailer section that might contain fields for the trailers table.¶
Messages are expected to be processed as a stream, wherein the purpose of
that stream and its continued processing is revealed while being read.
Hence, control data describes what the recipient needs to know immediately,
header fields describe what needs to be known before receiving content,
the content (when present) presumably contains what the recipient wants or
needs to fulfill the message semantics, and trailer fields provide
optional metadata that was unknown prior to sending the content.¶
Messages are intended to be "self-descriptive":
everything a recipient needs to know about the message can be determined by
looking at the message itself, after decoding or reconstituting parts that
have been compressed or elided in transit, without requiring an
understanding of the sender's current application state (established via
prior messages). However, a client MUST retain knowledge of the request when
parsing, interpreting, or caching a corresponding response. For example,
responses to the HEAD method look just like the beginning of a
response to GET but cannot be parsed in the same manner.¶
Note that this message abstraction is a generalization across many versions
of HTTP, including features that might not be found in some versions. For
example, trailers were introduced within the HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer
coding as a trailer section after the content. An equivalent feature is
present in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 within the header block that terminates each
stream.¶
Message framing indicates how each message begins and ends, such that each
message can be distinguished from other messages or noise on the same
connection. Each major version of HTTP defines its own framing mechanism.¶
HTTP/0.9 and early deployments of HTTP/1.0 used closure of the underlying
connection to end a response. For backwards compatibility, this implicit
framing is also allowed in HTTP/1.1. However, implicit framing can fail to
distinguish an incomplete response if the connection closes early. For
that reason, almost all modern implementations use explicit framing in
the form of length-delimited sequences of message data.¶
A message is considered "complete" when all of the octets
indicated by its framing are available. Note that,
when no explicit framing is used, a response message that is ended
by the underlying connection's close is considered complete even though it
might be indistinguishable from an incomplete response, unless a
transport-level error indicates that it is not complete.¶
Messages start with control data that describe its primary purpose. Request
message control data includes a request method (Section 9),
request target (Section 7.1), and protocol version
(Section 2.5). Response message control data includes
a status code (Section 15), optional reason phrase, and
protocol version.¶
In HTTP/1.1 ([HTTP/1.1]) and earlier, control data is sent
as the first line of a message. In HTTP/2 ([HTTP/2]) and
HTTP/3 ([HTTP/3]), control data is sent as pseudo-header
fields with a reserved name prefix (e.g., ":authority").¶
Every HTTP message has a protocol version. Depending on the version in use,
it might be identified within the message explicitly or inferred by the
connection over which the message is received. Recipients use that version
information to determine limitations or potential for later communication
with that sender.¶
When a message is forwarded by an intermediary, the protocol version is
updated to reflect the version used by that intermediary.
The Via header field (Section 7.6.3) is used to
communicate upstream protocol information within a forwarded message.¶
A client SHOULD send a request version equal to the highest
version to which the client is conformant and
whose major version is no higher than the highest version supported
by the server, if this is known. A client MUST NOT send a
version to which it is not conformant.¶
A client MAY send a lower request version if it is known that
the server incorrectly implements the HTTP specification, but only
after the client has attempted at least one normal request and determined
from the response status code or header fields (e.g., Server) that
the server improperly handles higher request versions.¶
A server SHOULD send a response version equal to the highest version to
which the server is conformant that has a major version less than or equal
to the one received in the request.
A server MUST NOT send a version to which it is not conformant.
A server can send a 505 (HTTP Version Not Supported)
response if it wishes, for any reason, to refuse service of the client's
major protocol version.¶
A recipient that receives a message with a major version number that it
implements and a minor version number higher than what it implements
SHOULD process the message as if it
were in the highest minor version within that major version to which the
recipient is conformant. A recipient can assume that a message with a
higher minor version, when sent to a recipient that has not yet indicated
support for that higher version, is sufficiently backwards-compatible to be
safely processed by any implementation of the same major version.¶
HTTP messages often transfer a complete or partial representation as the
message "content": a stream of octets sent after the header
section, as delineated by the message framing.¶
This abstract definition of content reflects the data after it has been
extracted from the message framing. For example, an HTTP/1.1 message body
(Section 6 of [HTTP/1.1]) might consist of a stream of data encoded
with the chunked transfer coding -- a sequence of data chunks, one
zero-length chunk, and a trailer section -- whereas
the content of that same message
includes only the data stream after the transfer coding has been decoded;
it does not include the chunk lengths, chunked framing syntax, nor the
trailer fields (Section 6.5).¶
The purpose of content in a request is defined by the method semantics
(Section 9).¶
For example, a representation in the content of a PUT request
(Section 9.3.4) represents the desired state of the
target resource after the request is successfully applied,
whereas a representation in the content of a POST request
(Section 9.3.3) represents information to be processed by the
target resource.¶
In a response, the content's purpose is defined by the request method,
response status code (Section 15), and response
fields describing that content.
For example, the content of a 200 (OK) response to GET
(Section 9.3.1) represents the current state of the
target resource, as observed at the time of the message
origination date (Section 6.6.1), whereas the content of
the same status code in a response to POST might represent either the
processing result or the new state of the target resource after applying
the processing.¶
The content of a 206 (Partial Content) response to GET
contains either a single part of the selected representation or a
multipart message body containing multiple parts of that representation,
as described in Section 15.3.7.¶
Response messages with an error status code usually contain content that
represents the error condition, such that the content describes the
error state and what steps are suggested for resolving it.¶
Responses to the HEAD request method (Section 9.3.2) never include
content; the associated response header fields indicate only
what their values would have been if the request method had been GET
(Section 9.3.1).¶
2xx (Successful) responses to a CONNECT request method
(Section 9.3.6) switch the connection to tunnel mode instead of
having content.¶
When a complete or partial representation is transferred as message
content, it is often desirable for the sender to supply, or the recipient
to determine, an identifier for a resource corresponding to that specific
representation. For example, a client making a GET request on a resource
for "the current weather report" might want an identifier specific to the
content returned (e.g., "weather report for Laguna Beach at 20210720T1711").
This can be useful for sharing or bookmarking content from resources that
are expected to have changing representations over time.¶
If the request has a Content-Location header field,
then the sender asserts that the content is a representation of the
resource identified by the Content-Location field value. However,
such an assertion cannot be trusted unless it can be verified by
other means (not defined by this specification). The information
might still be useful for revision history links.¶
Otherwise, the content is unidentified by HTTP, but a more specific
identifier might be supplied within the content itself.¶
For a response message, the following rules are applied in order until a
match is found:¶
If the request method is GET and the response status code is
200 (OK),
the content is a representation of the target resource (Section 7.1).¶
If the request method is GET and the response status code is
203 (Non-Authoritative Information), the content is
a potentially modified or enhanced representation of the
target resource as provided by an intermediary.¶
If the request method is GET and the response status code is
206 (Partial Content),
the content is one or more parts of a representation of the
target resource.¶
If the response has a Content-Location header field
and its field value is a reference to the same URI as the target URI,
the content is a representation of the target resource.¶
If the response has a Content-Location header field
and its field value is a reference to a URI different from the
target URI, then the sender asserts that the content is a
representation of the resource identified by the Content-Location
field value. However, such an assertion cannot be trusted unless
it can be verified by other means (not defined by this specification).¶
Otherwise, the content is unidentified by HTTP, but a more specific
identifier might be supplied within the content itself.¶
Fields (Section 5) that are located within a
"trailer section" are referred to as "trailer fields"
(or just "trailers", colloquially).
Trailer fields can be useful for supplying message integrity checks, digital
signatures, delivery metrics, or post-processing status information.¶
Trailer fields ought to be processed and stored separately from the fields
in the header section to avoid contradicting message semantics known at
the time the header section was complete. The presence or absence of
certain header fields might impact choices made for the routing or
processing of the message as a whole before the trailers are received;
those choices cannot be unmade by the later discovery of trailer fields.¶
A trailer section is only possible when supported by the version
of HTTP in use and enabled by an explicit framing mechanism.
For example, the chunked transfer coding in HTTP/1.1 allows a trailer section to be
sent after the content (Section 7.1.2 of [HTTP/1.1]).¶
Many fields cannot be processed outside the header section because
their evaluation is necessary prior to receiving the content, such as
those that describe message framing, routing, authentication,
request modifiers, response controls, or content format.
A sender MUST NOT generate a trailer field unless the sender knows the
corresponding header field name's definition permits the field to be sent
in trailers.¶
Trailer fields can be difficult to process by intermediaries that forward
messages from one protocol version to another. If the entire message can be
buffered in transit, some intermediaries could merge trailer fields into
the header section (as appropriate) before it is forwarded. However, in
most cases, the trailers are simply discarded.
A recipient MUST NOT merge a trailer field into a header section unless
the recipient understands the corresponding header field definition and
that definition explicitly permits and defines how trailer field values
can be safely merged.¶
The presence of the keyword "trailers" in the TE header field (Section 10.1.4) of a request indicates that the client is willing to
accept trailer fields, on behalf of itself and any downstream clients. For
requests from an intermediary, this implies that all
downstream clients are willing to accept trailer fields in the forwarded
response. Note that the presence of "trailers" does not mean that the
client(s) will process any particular trailer field in the response; only
that the trailer section(s) will not be dropped by any of the clients.¶
Because of the potential for trailer fields to be discarded in transit, a
server SHOULD NOT generate trailer fields that it believes are necessary
for the user agent to receive.¶
The "Trailer" header field (Section 6.6.2) can be sent
to indicate fields likely to be sent in the trailer section, which allows
recipients to prepare for their receipt before processing the content.
For example, this could be useful if a field name indicates that a dynamic
checksum should be calculated as the content is received and then
immediately checked upon receipt of the trailer field value.¶
Like header fields, trailer fields with the same name are processed in the
order received; multiple trailer field lines with the same name have the
equivalent semantics as appending the multiple values as a list of members.
Trailer fields that might be generated more than once during a message
MUST be defined as a list-based field even if each member value is only
processed once per field line received.¶
At the end of a message, a recipient MAY treat the set of received
trailer fields as a data structure of name/value pairs, similar to (but
separate from) the header fields. Additional processing expectations, if
any, can be defined within the field specification for a field intended
for use in trailers.¶
HTTP request message routing is determined by each client based on the
target resource, the client's proxy configuration, and
establishment or reuse of an inbound connection. The corresponding
response routing follows the same connection chain back to the client.¶
Although HTTP is used in a wide variety of applications, most clients rely
on the same resource identification mechanism and configuration techniques
as general-purpose Web browsers. Even when communication options are
hard-coded in a client's configuration, we can think of their combined
effect as a URI reference (Section 4.1).¶
A URI reference is resolved to its absolute form in order to obtain the
"target URI". The target URI excludes the reference's
fragment component, if any, since fragment identifiers are reserved for
client-side processing ([URI], Section 3.5).¶
To perform an action on a "target resource", the client sends
a request message containing enough components of its parsed target URI to
enable recipients to identify that same resource. For historical reasons,
the parsed target URI components, collectively referred to as the
"request target", are sent within the message control data
and the Host header field (Section 7.2).¶
There are two unusual cases for which the request target components are in
a method-specific form:¶
For CONNECT (Section 9.3.6), the request target is the host
name and port number of the tunnel destination, separated by a colon.¶
For OPTIONS (Section 9.3.7), the request target can be a
single asterisk ("*").¶
See the respective method definitions for details. These forms MUST NOT
be used with other methods.¶
Upon receipt of a client's request, a server reconstructs the target URI
from the received components in accordance with their local configuration
and incoming connection context. This reconstruction is specific to each
major protocol version. For example,
Section 3.3 of [HTTP/1.1] defines how a server
determines the target URI of an HTTP/1.1 request.¶
The "Host" header field in a request provides the host and port
information from the target URI, enabling the origin
server to distinguish among resources while servicing requests
for multiple host names.¶
In HTTP/2 [HTTP/2] and HTTP/3 [HTTP/3], the
Host header field is, in some cases, supplanted by the ":authority"
pseudo-header field of a request's control data.¶
The target URI's authority information is critical for handling a
request. A user agent MUST generate a Host header field in a request
unless it sends that information as an ":authority" pseudo-header field.
A user agent that sends Host SHOULD send it as the first field in the
header section of a request.¶
For example, a GET request to the origin server for
<http://www.example.org/pub/WWW/> would begin with:¶
Since the host and port information acts as an application-level routing
mechanism, it is a frequent target for malware seeking to poison
a shared cache or redirect a request to an unintended server.
An interception proxy is particularly vulnerable if it relies on
the host and port information for redirecting requests to internal
servers, or for use as a cache key in a shared cache, without
first verifying that the intercepted connection is targeting a
valid IP address for that host.¶
Once the target URI and its origin are determined, a client decides whether
a network request is necessary to accomplish the desired semantics and,
if so, where that request is to be directed.¶
If the request is not satisfied by a cache, then a typical client will
check its configuration to determine whether a proxy is to be used to
satisfy the request. Proxy configuration is implementation-dependent,
but is often based on URI prefix matching, selective authority matching,
or both, and the proxy itself is usually identified by an "http" or
"https" URI.¶
If an "http" or "https" proxy is applicable, the client connects
inbound by establishing (or reusing) a connection to that proxy and
then sending it an HTTP request message containing a request target
that matches the client's target URI.¶
If no proxy is applicable, a typical client will invoke a handler
routine (specific to the target URI's scheme) to obtain access to the
identified resource. How that is accomplished is dependent on the
target URI scheme and defined by its associated specification.¶
Section 4.3.2 defines how to obtain access to an
"http" resource by establishing (or reusing) an inbound connection to
the identified origin server and then sending it an HTTP request message
containing a request target that matches the client's target URI.¶
Section 4.3.3 defines how to obtain access to an
"https" resource by establishing (or reusing) an inbound secured
connection to an origin server that is authoritative for the identified
origin and then sending it an HTTP request message containing a request
target that matches the client's target URI.¶
Once a request is received by a server and parsed sufficiently to determine
its target URI, the server decides whether to process the request itself,
forward the request to another server, redirect the client to a different
resource, respond with an error, or drop the connection. This decision can
be influenced by anything about the request or connection context, but is
specifically directed at whether the server has been configured to process
requests for that target URI and whether the connection context is
appropriate for that request.¶
For example, a request might have been misdirected,
deliberately or accidentally, such that the information within a received
Host header field differs from the connection's host or port.
If the connection is from a trusted gateway, such inconsistency might
be expected; otherwise, it might indicate an attempt to bypass security
filters, trick the server into delivering non-public content, or poison a
cache. See Section 17 for security
considerations regarding message routing.¶
Unless the connection is from a trusted gateway,
an origin server MUST reject a request if any scheme-specific requirements
for the target URI are not met. In particular,
a request for an "https" resource MUST be rejected unless it has been
received over a connection that has been secured via a certificate
valid for that target URI's origin, as defined by Section 4.2.2.¶
The 421 (Misdirected Request) status code in a response
indicates that the origin server has rejected the request because it
appears to have been misdirected (Section 15.5.20).¶
A connection might be used for multiple request/response exchanges. The
mechanism used to correlate between request and response messages is
version dependent; some versions of HTTP use implicit ordering of
messages, while others use an explicit identifier.¶
All responses, regardless of the status code (including interim
responses) can be sent at any time after a request is received, even if the
request is not yet complete. A response can complete before its
corresponding request is complete (Section 6.1). Likewise, clients are not expected
to wait any specific amount of time for a response. Clients
(including intermediaries) might abandon a request if the response is not
received within a reasonable period of time.¶
A client that receives a response while it is still sending the associated
request SHOULD continue sending that request unless it receives
an explicit indication to the contrary (see, e.g., Section 9.5 of [HTTP/1.1] and Section 6.4 of [HTTP/2]).¶
As described in Section 3.7, intermediaries can serve
a variety of roles in the processing of HTTP requests and responses.
Some intermediaries are used to improve performance or availability.
Others are used for access control or to filter content.
Since an HTTP stream has characteristics similar to a pipe-and-filter
architecture, there are no inherent limits to the extent an intermediary
can enhance (or interfere) with either direction of the stream.¶
Intermediaries are expected to forward messages even when protocol elements
are not recognized (e.g., new methods, status codes, or field names) since that
preserves extensibility for downstream recipients.¶
An intermediary not acting as a tunnel MUST implement the
Connection header field, as specified in
Section 7.6.1, and exclude fields from being forwarded
that are only intended for the incoming connection.¶
An intermediary MUST NOT forward a message to itself unless it is
protected from an infinite request loop. In general, an intermediary ought
to recognize its own server names, including any aliases, local variations,
or literal IP addresses, and respond to such requests directly.¶
An HTTP message can be parsed as a stream for incremental processing or
forwarding downstream.
However, senders and recipients cannot rely on incremental
delivery of partial messages, since some implementations will buffer or
delay message forwarding for the sake of network efficiency, security
checks, or content transformations.¶
When a field aside from Connection is used to supply control
information for or about the current connection, the sender MUST list
the corresponding field name within the Connection header field.
Note that some versions of HTTP prohibit the use of fields for such
information, and therefore do not allow the Connection field.¶
Intermediaries MUST parse a received Connection
header field before a message is forwarded and, for each
connection-option in this field, remove any header or trailer field(s) from
the message with the same name as the connection-option, and then
remove the Connection header field itself (or replace it with the
intermediary's own control options for the forwarded message).¶
Hence, the Connection header field provides a declarative way of
distinguishing fields that are only intended for the
immediate recipient ("hop-by-hop") from those fields that are
intended for all recipients on the chain ("end-to-end"), enabling the
message to be self-descriptive and allowing future connection-specific
extensions to be deployed without fear that they will be blindly
forwarded by older intermediaries.¶
Furthermore, intermediaries SHOULD remove or replace fields
that are known to require removal before forwarding, whether or not they appear as a
connection-option, after applying those fields' semantics. This includes but is not limited to:¶
A sender MUST NOT send a connection option corresponding to a
field that is intended for all recipients of the content.
For example, Cache-Control is never appropriate as a
connection option (Section 5.2 of [CACHING]).¶
Connection options do not always correspond to a field
present in the message, since a connection-specific field
might not be needed if there are no parameters associated with a
connection option. In contrast, a connection-specific field
received without a corresponding connection option usually indicates
that the field has been improperly forwarded by an intermediary and
ought to be ignored by the recipient.¶
When defining a new connection option that does not correspond to a field,
specification authors ought to reserve the corresponding field name
anyway in order to avoid later collisions. Such reserved field names are
registered in the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry"
(Section 16.3.1).¶
The "Max-Forwards" header field provides a mechanism with the
TRACE (Section 9.3.8) and OPTIONS (Section 9.3.7)
request methods to limit the number of times that the request is forwarded by
proxies. This can be useful when the client is attempting to
trace a request that appears to be failing or looping mid-chain.¶
The Max-Forwards value is a decimal integer indicating the remaining
number of times this request message can be forwarded.¶
Each intermediary that receives a TRACE or OPTIONS request containing a
Max-Forwards header field MUST check and update its value prior to
forwarding the request. If the received value is zero (0), the intermediary
MUST NOT forward the request; instead, the intermediary MUST respond as
the final recipient. If the received Max-Forwards value is greater than
zero, the intermediary MUST generate an updated Max-Forwards field in the
forwarded message with a field value that is the lesser of a) the received
value decremented by one (1) or b) the recipient's maximum supported value
for Max-Forwards.¶
A recipient MAY ignore a Max-Forwards header field received with any
other request methods.¶
The "Via" header field indicates the presence of intermediate protocols and
recipients between the user agent and the server (on requests) or between
the origin server and the client (on responses), similar to the
"Received" header field in email
(Section 3.6.7 of [RFC5322]).
Via can be used for tracking message forwards,
avoiding request loops, and identifying the protocol capabilities of
senders along the request/response chain.¶
Each member of the Via field value represents a proxy or gateway that has
forwarded the message. Each intermediary appends its own information
about how the message was received, such that the end result is ordered
according to the sequence of forwarding recipients.¶
A proxy MUST send an appropriate Via header field, as described below, in
each message that it forwards.
An HTTP-to-HTTP gateway MUST send an appropriate Via header field in
each inbound request message and MAY send a Via header field in
forwarded response messages.¶
For each intermediary, the received-protocol indicates the protocol and
protocol version used by the upstream sender of the message. Hence, the
Via field value records the advertised protocol capabilities of the
request/response chain such that they remain visible to downstream
recipients; this can be useful for determining what backwards-incompatible
features might be safe to use in response, or within a later request, as
described in Section 2.5. For brevity, the protocol-name
is omitted when the received protocol is HTTP.¶
The received-by portion is normally the host and optional
port number of a recipient server or client that subsequently forwarded the
message.
However, if the real host is considered to be sensitive information, a
sender MAY replace it with a pseudonym. If a port is not provided,
a recipient MAY interpret that as meaning it was received on the default
port, if any, for the received-protocol.¶
A sender MAY generate comments to identify the
software of each recipient, analogous to the User-Agent and
Server header fields. However, comments in Via
are optional, and a recipient MAY remove them prior to forwarding the
message.¶
For example, a request message could be sent from an HTTP/1.0 user
agent to an internal proxy code-named "fred", which uses HTTP/1.1 to
forward the request to a public proxy at p.example.net, which completes
the request by forwarding it to the origin server at www.example.com.
The request received by www.example.com would then have the following
Via header field:¶
An intermediary used as a portal through a network firewall
SHOULD NOT forward the names and ports of hosts within the firewall
region unless it is explicitly enabled to do so. If not enabled, such an
intermediary SHOULD replace each received-by host of any host behind the
firewall by an appropriate pseudonym for that host.¶
An intermediary MAY combine an ordered subsequence of Via header
field list members into a single member if the entries have identical
received-protocol values. For example,¶
A sender SHOULD NOT combine multiple list members unless they are all
under the same organizational control and the hosts have already been
replaced by pseudonyms. A sender MUST NOT combine members that
have different received-protocol values.¶
Some intermediaries include features for transforming messages and their
content. A proxy might, for example, convert between image formats in
order to save cache space or to reduce the amount of traffic on a slow
link. However, operational problems might occur when these transformations
are applied to content intended for critical applications, such as medical
imaging or scientific data analysis, particularly when integrity checks or
digital signatures are used to ensure that the content received is
identical to the original.¶
An HTTP-to-HTTP proxy is called a "transforming proxy"
if it is designed or configured to modify messages in a semantically
meaningful way (i.e., modifications, beyond those required by normal
HTTP processing, that change the message in a way that would be
significant to the original sender or potentially significant to
downstream recipients). For example, a transforming proxy might be
acting as a shared annotation server (modifying responses to include
references to a local annotation database), a malware filter, a
format transcoder, or a privacy filter. Such transformations are presumed
to be desired by whichever client (or client organization) chose the
proxy.¶
If a proxy receives a target URI with a host name that is not a
fully qualified domain name, it MAY add its own domain to the host name
it received when forwarding the request. A proxy MUST NOT change the
host name if the target URI contains a fully qualified domain name.¶
A proxy MUST NOT modify the "absolute-path" and "query" parts of the
received target URI when forwarding it to the next inbound server except
as required by that forwarding protocol. For example, a proxy forwarding
a request to an origin server via HTTP/1.1 will replace an empty path with
"/" (Section 3.2.1 of [HTTP/1.1]) or "*" (Section 3.2.4 of [HTTP/1.1]),
depending on the request method.¶
A proxy MUST NOT transform the content (Section 6.4) of a
response message that contains a no-transform cache directive
(Section 5.2.2.6 of [CACHING]). Note that this
does not apply to message transformations that do not change the content,
such as the addition or removal of transfer codings
(Section 7 of [HTTP/1.1]).¶
A proxy MAY transform the content of a message
that does not contain a no-transform cache directive.
A proxy that transforms the content of a 200 (OK) response
can inform downstream recipients that a transformation has been
applied by changing the response status code to
203 (Non-Authoritative Information) (Section 15.3.4).¶
A proxy SHOULD NOT modify header fields that provide information about
the endpoints of the communication chain, the resource state, or the
selected representation (other than the content) unless the field's
definition specifically allows such modification or the modification is
deemed necessary for privacy or security.¶
The "Upgrade" header field is intended to provide a simple mechanism
for transitioning from HTTP/1.1 to some other protocol on the same
connection.¶
A client MAY send a list of protocol names in the Upgrade header field
of a request to invite the server to switch to one or more of the named
protocols, in order of descending preference, before sending
the final response. A server MAY ignore a received Upgrade header field
if it wishes to continue using the current protocol on that connection.
Upgrade cannot be used to insist on a protocol change.¶
Although protocol names are registered with a preferred case,
recipients SHOULD use case-insensitive comparison when matching each
protocol-name to supported protocols.¶
A server that sends a 101 (Switching Protocols) response
MUST send an Upgrade header field to indicate the new protocol(s) to
which the connection is being switched; if multiple protocol layers are
being switched, the sender MUST list the protocols in layer-ascending
order. A server MUST NOT switch to a protocol that was not indicated by
the client in the corresponding request's Upgrade header field.
A server MAY choose to ignore the order of preference indicated by the
client and select the new protocol(s) based on other factors, such as the
nature of the request or the current load on the server.¶
A server that sends a 426 (Upgrade Required) response
MUST send an Upgrade header field to indicate the acceptable protocols,
in order of descending preference.¶
A server MAY send an Upgrade header field in any other response to
advertise that it implements support for upgrading to the listed protocols,
in order of descending preference, when appropriate for a future request.¶
The following is a hypothetical example sent by a client:¶
The capabilities and nature of the
application-level communication after the protocol change is entirely
dependent upon the new protocol(s) chosen. However, immediately after
sending the 101 (Switching Protocols) response, the server is expected to continue responding to
the original request as if it had received its equivalent within the new
protocol (i.e., the server still has an outstanding request to satisfy
after the protocol has been changed, and is expected to do so without
requiring the request to be repeated).¶
For example, if the Upgrade header field is received in a GET request
and the server decides to switch protocols, it first responds
with a 101 (Switching Protocols) message in HTTP/1.1 and
then immediately follows that with the new protocol's equivalent of a
response to a GET on the target resource. This allows a connection to be
upgraded to protocols with the same semantics as HTTP without the
latency cost of an additional round trip. A server MUST NOT switch
protocols unless the received message semantics can be honored by the new
protocol; an OPTIONS request can be honored by any protocol.¶
The following is an example response to the above hypothetical request:¶
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
Connection: upgrade
Upgrade: websocket
[... data stream switches to websocket with an appropriate response
(as defined by new protocol) to the "GET /hello" request ...]
A sender of Upgrade MUST also send an "Upgrade" connection option in the
Connection header field (Section 7.6.1)
to inform intermediaries not to forward this field.
A server that receives an Upgrade header field in an HTTP/1.0 request
MUST ignore that Upgrade field.¶
A client cannot begin using an upgraded protocol on the connection until
it has completely sent the request message (i.e., the client can't change
the protocol it is sending in the middle of a message).
If a server receives both an Upgrade and an Expect header field
with the "100-continue" expectation (Section 10.1.1), the
server MUST send a 100 (Continue) response before sending
a 101 (Switching Protocols) response.¶
The Upgrade header field only applies to switching protocols on top of the
existing connection; it cannot be used to switch the underlying connection
(transport) protocol, nor to switch the existing communication to a
different connection. For those purposes, it is more appropriate to use a
3xx (Redirection) response (Section 15.4).¶
This specification only defines the protocol name "HTTP" for use by
the family of Hypertext Transfer Protocols, as defined by the HTTP
version rules of Section 2.5 and future updates to this
specification. Additional protocol names ought to be registered using the
registration procedure defined in Section 16.7.¶
The request method token is the primary source of request semantics;
it indicates the purpose for which the client has made this request
and what is expected by the client as a successful result.¶
The request method's semantics might be further specialized by the
semantics of some header fields when present in a request
if those additional semantics do not conflict with the method.
For example, a client can send conditional request header fields
(Section 13.1) to make the requested
action conditional on the current state of the target resource.¶
HTTP is designed to be usable as an interface to distributed
object systems. The request method invokes an action to be applied to
a target resource in much the same way that a remote
method invocation can be sent to an identified object.¶
The method token is case-sensitive because it might be used as a gateway
to object-based systems with case-sensitive method names. By convention,
standardized methods are defined in all-uppercase US-ASCII letters.¶
Unlike distributed objects, the standardized request methods in HTTP are
not resource-specific, since uniform interfaces provide for better
visibility and reuse in network-based systems [REST].
Once defined, a standardized method ought to have the same semantics when
applied to any resource, though each resource determines for itself
whether those semantics are implemented or allowed.¶
This specification defines a number of standardized methods that are
commonly used in HTTP, as outlined by the following table.¶
All general-purpose servers MUST support the methods GET and HEAD.
All other methods are OPTIONAL.¶
The set of methods allowed by a target resource can be listed in an
Allow header field (Section 10.2.1).
However, the set of allowed methods can change dynamically.
An origin server that receives a request method that is unrecognized or
not implemented SHOULD respond with the
501 (Not Implemented) status code.
An origin server that receives a request method that is recognized and
implemented, but not allowed for the target resource, SHOULD respond
with the 405 (Method Not Allowed) status code.¶
Additional methods, outside the scope of this specification, have been
specified for use in HTTP. All such methods ought to be registered
within the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Method Registry",
as described in Section 16.1.¶
Request methods are considered "safe" if
their defined semantics are essentially read-only; i.e., the client does
not request, and does not expect, any state change on the origin server
as a result of applying a safe method to a target resource. Likewise,
reasonable use of a safe method is not expected to cause any harm,
loss of property, or unusual burden on the origin server.¶
This definition of safe methods does not prevent an implementation from
including behavior that is potentially harmful, that is not entirely read-only,
or that causes side effects while invoking a safe method. What is
important, however, is that the client did not request that additional
behavior and cannot be held accountable for it. For example,
most servers append request information to access log files at the
completion of every response, regardless of the method, and that is
considered safe even though the log storage might become full and cause
the server to fail. Likewise, a safe request initiated by selecting an
advertisement on the Web will often have the side effect of charging an
advertising account.¶
Of the request methods defined by this specification, the
GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, and
TRACE methods are defined to be safe.¶
The purpose of distinguishing between safe and unsafe methods is to
allow automated retrieval processes (spiders) and cache performance
optimization (pre-fetching) to work without fear of causing harm.
In addition, it allows a user agent to apply appropriate constraints
on the automated use of unsafe methods when processing potentially
untrusted content.¶
A user agent SHOULD distinguish between safe and unsafe methods when
presenting potential actions to a user, such that the user can be made
aware of an unsafe action before it is requested.¶
When a resource is constructed such that parameters within the target URI
have the effect of selecting an action, it is the resource
owner's responsibility to ensure that the action is consistent with the
request method semantics.
For example, it is common for Web-based content editing software
to use actions within query parameters, such as "page?do=delete".
If the purpose of such a resource is to perform an unsafe action, then
the resource owner MUST disable or disallow that action when it is
accessed using a safe request method. Failure to do so will result in
unfortunate side effects when automated processes perform a GET on
every URI reference for the sake of link maintenance, pre-fetching,
building a search index, etc.¶
A request method is considered "idempotent"
if the intended effect on the server of multiple identical requests with
that method is the same as the effect for a single such request.
Of the request methods defined by this
specification, PUT, DELETE, and safe request
methods are idempotent.¶
Like the definition of safe, the idempotent property only applies to
what has been requested by the user; a server is free to log each request
separately, retain a revision control history, or implement other
non-idempotent side effects for each idempotent request.¶
Idempotent methods are distinguished because the request can be repeated
automatically if a communication failure occurs before the client is
able to read the server's response. For example, if a client sends a PUT
request and the underlying connection is closed before any response is
received, then the client can establish a new connection and retry the
idempotent request. It knows that repeating the request will have
the same intended effect, even if the original request succeeded, though
the response might differ.¶
A client SHOULD NOT automatically retry a request with a non-idempotent
method unless it has some means to know that the request semantics are
actually idempotent, regardless of the method, or some means to detect that
the original request was never applied.¶
For example, a user agent can repeat a POST request automatically if it
knows (through design or configuration) that the request is safe for that
resource. Likewise, a user agent designed specifically to operate on
a version control repository might be able to recover from partial failure
conditions by checking the target resource revision(s) after a failed
connection, reverting or fixing any changes that were partially applied,
and then automatically retrying the requests that failed.¶
Some clients take a riskier approach and attempt to guess when an
automatic retry is possible. For example, a client might automatically
retry a POST request if the underlying transport connection closed before
any part of a response is received, particularly if an idle persistent
connection was used.¶
A proxy MUST NOT automatically retry non-idempotent requests.
A client SHOULD NOT automatically retry a failed automatic retry.¶
For a cache to store and use a response, the associated method needs to
explicitly allow caching and to detail under what conditions a response can
be used to satisfy subsequent requests; a method definition that does not
do so cannot be cached. For additional requirements see [CACHING].¶
This specification defines caching semantics for GET, HEAD, and POST,
although the overwhelming majority of cache implementations only support
GET and HEAD.¶
The GET method requests transfer of a current
selected representation for the
target resource.
A successful response reflects the quality of "sameness" identified by
the target URI (Section 1.2.2 of [URI]). Hence,
retrieving identifiable information via HTTP is usually performed by
making a GET request on an identifier associated with the potential for
providing that information in a 200 (OK) response.¶
GET is the primary mechanism of information retrieval and the focus of
almost all performance optimizations. Applications that produce a URI for
each important resource can benefit from those optimizations while enabling
their reuse by other applications, creating a network effect that promotes
further expansion of the Web.¶
It is tempting to think of resource identifiers as remote file system
pathnames and of representations as being a copy of the contents of such
files. In fact, that is how many resources are implemented (see
Section 17.3 for related security considerations).
However, there are no such limitations in practice.¶
The HTTP interface for
a resource is just as likely to be implemented as a tree of content
objects, a programmatic view on various database records, or a gateway to
other information systems. Even when the URI mapping mechanism is tied to a
file system, an origin server might be configured to execute the files with
the request as input and send the output as the representation rather than
transfer the files directly. Regardless, only the origin server needs to
know how each resource identifier corresponds to an implementation
and how that implementation manages to select and send a current
representation of the target resource.¶
A client can alter the semantics of GET to be a "range request", requesting
transfer of only some part(s) of the selected representation, by sending a
Range header field in the request (Section 14.2).¶
Although request message framing is independent of the method used,
content received in a GET request has no generally defined semantics,
cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some
implementations to reject the request and close the connection because of
its potential as a request smuggling attack
(Section 11.2 of [HTTP/1.1]).
A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a GET request unless it is
made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated,
in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately
supported. An origin server SHOULD NOT rely on private agreements to
receive content, since participants in HTTP communication are often
unaware of intermediaries along the request chain.¶
The response to a GET request is cacheable; a cache MAY use it to satisfy
subsequent GET and HEAD requests unless otherwise indicated by the
Cache-Control header field (Section 5.2 of [CACHING]).¶
When information retrieval is performed with a mechanism that constructs a
target URI from user-provided information, such as the query fields of a
form using GET, potentially sensitive data might be provided that would not
be appropriate for disclosure within a URI
(see Section 17.9). In some cases, the
data can be filtered or transformed such that it would not reveal such
information. In others, particularly when there is no benefit from caching
a response, using the POST method (Section 9.3.3) instead of GET
can transmit such information in the request content rather than within
the target URI.¶
The HEAD method is identical to GET except that the server MUST NOT
send content in the response. HEAD is used to obtain metadata about the
selected representation without transferring its
representation data, often for the sake of testing hypertext links or
finding recent modifications.¶
The server SHOULD send the same header fields in response to a HEAD
request as it would have sent if the request method had been GET.
However, a server MAY omit header fields for which a value is determined
only while generating the content. For example, some servers buffer a
dynamic response to GET until a minimum amount of data is generated so
that they can more efficiently delimit small responses or make late
decisions with regard to content selection. Such a response to GET might
contain Content-Length and Vary fields, for
example, that are not generated within a HEAD response. These minor
inconsistencies are considered preferable to generating and discarding the
content for a HEAD request, since HEAD is usually requested for the
sake of efficiency.¶
Although request message framing is independent of the method used,
content received in a HEAD request has no generally defined semantics,
cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some
implementations to reject the request and close the connection because of
its potential as a request smuggling attack
(Section 11.2 of [HTTP/1.1]).
A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a HEAD request unless it is
made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated,
in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately
supported. An origin server SHOULD NOT rely on private agreements to
receive content, since participants in HTTP communication are often
unaware of intermediaries along the request chain.¶
The response to a HEAD request is cacheable; a cache MAY use it to
satisfy subsequent HEAD requests unless otherwise indicated by the
Cache-Control header field (Section 5.2 of [CACHING]).
A HEAD response might also affect previously cached responses to GET;
see Section 4.3.5 of [CACHING].¶
The POST method requests that the target resource process
the representation enclosed in the request according to the resource's own
specific semantics. For example, POST is used for the following functions
(among others):¶
Providing a block of data, such as the fields entered into an HTML
form, to a data-handling process;¶
Posting a message to a bulletin board, newsgroup, mailing list, blog,
or similar group of articles;¶
Creating a new resource that has yet to be identified by the origin
server; and¶
Appending data to a resource's existing representation(s).¶
An origin server indicates response semantics by choosing an appropriate
status code depending on the result of processing the POST request;
almost all of the status codes defined by this specification could be
received in a response to POST (the exceptions being 206 (Partial Content),
304 (Not Modified), and 416 (Range Not Satisfiable)).¶
If one or more resources has been created on the origin server as a result
of successfully processing a POST request, the origin server SHOULD send
a 201 (Created) response containing a Location
header field that provides an identifier for the primary resource created
(Section 10.2.2) and a representation that describes the
status of the request while referring to the new resource(s).¶
Responses to POST requests are only cacheable when they include explicit
freshness information (see Section 4.2.1 of [CACHING]) and a
Content-Location header field that has the same value as
the POST's target URI (Section 8.7). A cached POST response can be reused
to satisfy a later GET or HEAD request. In contrast, a POST request cannot
be satisfied by a cached POST response because POST is potentially unsafe;
see Section 4 of [CACHING].¶
If the result of processing a POST would be equivalent to a representation
of an existing resource, an origin server MAY redirect the user agent to
that resource by sending a 303 (See Other) response with the
existing resource's identifier in the Location field.
This has the benefits of providing the user agent a resource identifier
and transferring the representation via a method more amenable to shared
caching, though at the cost of an extra request if the user agent does not
already have the representation cached.¶
The PUT method requests that the state of the target resource
be created or replaced with the state defined by the representation
enclosed in the request message content. A successful PUT of a given
representation would suggest that a subsequent GET on that same target
resource will result in an equivalent representation being sent in
a 200 (OK) response. However, there is no guarantee that
such a state change will be observable, since the target resource might be
acted upon by other user agents in parallel, or might be subject to dynamic
processing by the origin server, before any subsequent GET is received.
A successful response only implies that the user agent's intent was
achieved at the time of its processing by the origin server.¶
If the target resource does not have a current representation and
the PUT successfully creates one, then the origin server MUST inform
the user agent by sending a 201 (Created) response. If the
target resource does have a current representation and that representation is
successfully modified in accordance with the state of the enclosed
representation, then the origin server MUST send either a
200 (OK) or a 204 (No Content) response to
indicate successful completion of the request.¶
An origin server SHOULD verify that the PUT representation is consistent
with its configured constraints for the target resource. For example, if
an origin server determines a resource's representation metadata based on
the URI, then the origin server needs to ensure that the content received
in a successful PUT request is consistent with that metadata. When a PUT
representation is inconsistent with the target resource, the origin
server SHOULD either make them consistent, by transforming the
representation or changing the resource configuration, or respond
with an appropriate error message containing sufficient information
to explain why the representation is unsuitable. The
409 (Conflict) or 415 (Unsupported Media Type)
status codes are suggested, with the latter being specific to constraints on
Content-Type values.¶
For example, if the target resource is configured to always have a
Content-Type of "text/html" and the representation being PUT
has a Content-Type of "image/jpeg", the origin server ought to do one of:¶
reconfigure the target resource to reflect the new media type;¶
transform the PUT representation to a format consistent with that
of the resource before saving it as the new resource state; or,¶
reject the request with a 415 (Unsupported Media Type)
response indicating that the target resource is limited to "text/html",
perhaps including a link to a different resource that would be a
suitable target for the new representation.¶
HTTP does not define exactly how a PUT method affects the state
of an origin server beyond what can be expressed by the intent of
the user agent request and the semantics of the origin server response.
It does not define what a resource might be, in any sense of that
word, beyond the interface provided via HTTP. It does not define
how resource state is "stored", nor how such storage might change
as a result of a change in resource state, nor how the origin server
translates resource state into representations. Generally speaking,
all implementation details behind the resource interface are
intentionally hidden by the server.¶
This extends to how header and trailer fields are stored; while common
header fields like Content-Type will typically be stored
and returned upon subsequent GET requests, header and trailer field
handling is specific to the resource that received the request. As a result,
an origin server SHOULD ignore unrecognized header and trailer fields
received in a PUT request (i.e., not save them as part of the resource
state).¶
An origin server MUST NOT send a validator field
(Section 8.8), such as an ETag or
Last-Modified field, in a successful response to PUT unless
the request's representation data was saved without any transformation
applied to the content (i.e., the resource's new representation data is
identical to the content received in the PUT request) and the
validator field value reflects the new representation.
This requirement allows a user agent to know when the representation it
sent (and retains in memory) is the result of the PUT, and thus it doesn't
need to be retrieved again from the origin server. The new validator(s)
received in the response can be used for future conditional requests in
order to prevent accidental overwrites (Section 13.1).¶
The fundamental difference between the POST and PUT methods is
highlighted by the different intent for the enclosed representation.
The target resource in a POST request is intended to handle the
enclosed representation according to the resource's own semantics,
whereas the enclosed representation in a PUT request is defined as
replacing the state of the target resource. Hence, the intent of PUT is
idempotent and visible to intermediaries, even though the exact effect is
only known by the origin server.¶
Proper interpretation of a PUT request presumes that the user agent knows
which target resource is desired. A service that selects a proper URI on
behalf of the client, after receiving a state-changing request, SHOULD be
implemented using the POST method rather than PUT. If the origin server
will not make the requested PUT state change to the target resource and
instead wishes to have it applied to a different resource, such as when the
resource has been moved to a different URI, then the origin server MUST
send an appropriate 3xx (Redirection) response; the
user agent MAY then make its own decision regarding whether or not to
redirect the request.¶
A PUT request applied to the target resource can have side effects
on other resources. For example, an article might have a URI for
identifying "the current version" (a resource) that is separate
from the URIs identifying each particular version (different
resources that at one point shared the same state as the current version
resource). A successful PUT request on "the current version" URI might
therefore create a new version resource in addition to changing the
state of the target resource, and might also cause links to be added
between the related resources.¶
Some origin servers support use of the Content-Range header
field (Section 14.4) as a request modifier to
perform a partial PUT, as described in Section 14.5.¶
Responses to the PUT method are not cacheable. If a successful PUT request
passes through a cache that has one or more stored responses for the
target URI, those stored responses will be invalidated
(see Section 4.4 of [CACHING]).¶
The DELETE method requests that the origin server remove the association
between the target resource and its current functionality.
In effect, this method is similar to the "rm" command in UNIX: it expresses a
deletion operation on the URI mapping of the origin server rather than an
expectation that the previously associated information be deleted.¶
If the target resource has one or more current representations, they might
or might not be destroyed by the origin server, and the associated storage
might or might not be reclaimed, depending entirely on the nature of the
resource and its implementation by the origin server (which are beyond the
scope of this specification). Likewise, other implementation aspects of a
resource might need to be deactivated or archived as a result of a DELETE,
such as database or gateway connections. In general, it is assumed that the
origin server will only allow DELETE on resources for which it has a
prescribed mechanism for accomplishing the deletion.¶
Relatively few resources allow the DELETE method -- its primary use
is for remote authoring environments, where the user has some direction
regarding its effect. For example, a resource that was previously created
using a PUT request, or identified via the Location header field after a
201 (Created) response to a POST request, might allow a
corresponding DELETE request to undo those actions. Similarly, custom
user agent implementations that implement an authoring function, such as
revision control clients using HTTP for remote operations, might use
DELETE based on an assumption that the server's URI space has been crafted
to correspond to a version repository.¶
If a DELETE method is successfully applied, the origin server SHOULD send¶
a 202 (Accepted) status code if the action will likely succeed but
has not yet been enacted,¶
a 204 (No Content) status code if the action has been
enacted and no further information is to be supplied, or¶
a 200 (OK) status code if the action has been enacted and
the response message includes a representation describing the status.¶
Although request message framing is independent of the method used,
content received in a DELETE request has no generally defined semantics,
cannot alter the meaning or target of the request, and might lead some
implementations to reject the request and close the connection because of
its potential as a request smuggling attack
(Section 11.2 of [HTTP/1.1]).
A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a DELETE request unless it is
made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated,
in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately
supported. An origin server SHOULD NOT rely on private agreements to
receive content, since participants in HTTP communication are often
unaware of intermediaries along the request chain.¶
Responses to the DELETE method are not cacheable. If a successful DELETE
request passes through a cache that has one or more stored responses for
the target URI, those stored responses will be invalidated (see
Section 4.4 of [CACHING]).¶
The CONNECT method requests that the recipient establish a tunnel to the
destination origin server identified by the request target and, if
successful, thereafter restrict its behavior to blind forwarding of
data, in both directions, until the tunnel is closed.
Tunnels are commonly used to create an end-to-end virtual connection,
through one or more proxies, which can then be secured using TLS
(Transport Layer Security, [TLS13]).¶
CONNECT uses a special form of request target, unique to this method,
consisting of only the host and port number of the tunnel destination,
separated by a colon. There is no default port; a client MUST send the
port number even if the CONNECT request is based on a URI reference that
contains an authority component with an elided port
(Section 4.1). For example,¶
A server MUST reject a CONNECT request that targets an empty or invalid
port number, typically by responding with a 400 (Bad Request) status code.¶
Because CONNECT changes the request/response nature of an HTTP connection,
specific HTTP versions might have different ways of mapping its semantics
into the protocol's wire format.¶
CONNECT is intended for use in requests to a proxy.
The recipient can establish a tunnel either by directly connecting to
the server identified by the request target or, if configured to use
another proxy, by forwarding the CONNECT request to the next inbound proxy.
An origin server MAY accept a CONNECT request, but most origin servers
do not implement CONNECT.¶
Any 2xx (Successful) response indicates
that the sender (and all inbound proxies) will switch to tunnel mode
immediately after the response header section; data received after that
header section is from the server identified by the request target.
Any response other than a successful response indicates that the tunnel
has not yet been formed.¶
A tunnel is closed when a tunnel intermediary detects that either side
has closed its connection: the intermediary MUST attempt to send any
outstanding data that came from the closed side to the other side, close
both connections, and then discard any remaining data left undelivered.¶
Proxy authentication might be used to establish the
authority to create a tunnel. For example,¶
There are significant risks in establishing a tunnel to arbitrary servers,
particularly when the destination is a well-known or reserved TCP port that
is not intended for Web traffic. For example, a CONNECT to
"example.com:25" would suggest that the proxy connect to the reserved
port for SMTP traffic; if allowed, that could trick the proxy into
relaying spam email. Proxies that support CONNECT SHOULD restrict its
use to a limited set of known ports or a configurable list of safe
request targets.¶
A server MUST NOT send any Transfer-Encoding or
Content-Length header fields in a
2xx (Successful) response to CONNECT.
A client MUST ignore any Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header
fields received in a successful response to CONNECT.¶
A CONNECT request message does not have content. The interpretation of
data sent after the header section of the CONNECT request message is
specific to the version of HTTP in use.¶
Responses to the CONNECT method are not cacheable.¶
The OPTIONS method requests information about the communication options
available for the target resource, at either the origin server or an
intervening intermediary. This method allows a client to determine the
options and/or requirements associated with a resource, or the capabilities
of a server, without implying a resource action.¶
An OPTIONS request with an asterisk ("*") as the request target
(Section 7.1) applies to the server in general rather than to a
specific resource. Since a server's communication options typically depend
on the resource, the "*" request is only useful as a "ping" or "no-op"
type of method; it does nothing beyond allowing the client to test
the capabilities of the server. For example, this can be used to test
a proxy for HTTP/1.1 conformance (or lack thereof).¶
If the request target is not an asterisk, the OPTIONS request applies
to the options that are available when communicating with the target
resource.¶
A server generating a successful response to OPTIONS SHOULD send any
header that might indicate optional features implemented by the
server and applicable to the target resource (e.g., Allow),
including potential extensions not defined by this specification.
The response content, if any, might also describe the communication options
in a machine or human-readable representation. A standard format for such a
representation is not defined by this specification, but might be defined by
future extensions to HTTP.¶
A client MAY send a Max-Forwards header field in an
OPTIONS request to target a specific recipient in the request chain (see
Section 7.6.2). A proxy MUST NOT generate a
Max-Forwards header field while forwarding a request unless that request
was received with a Max-Forwards field.¶
A client that generates an OPTIONS request containing content
MUST send a valid Content-Type header field describing
the representation media type. Note that this specification does not define
any use for such content.¶
Responses to the OPTIONS method are not cacheable.¶
The TRACE method requests a remote, application-level loop-back of the
request message. The final recipient of the request SHOULD reflect the
message received, excluding some fields described below, back to the client
as the content of a 200 (OK) response. The "message/http"
format (Section 10.1 of [HTTP/1.1]) is one way to do so.
The final recipient is either the origin server or the first server to
receive a Max-Forwards value of zero (0) in the request
(Section 7.6.2).¶
A client MUST NOT generate fields in a TRACE request containing
sensitive data that might be disclosed by the response. For example, it
would be foolish for a user agent to send stored user credentials
(Section 11) or cookies [COOKIE] in a TRACE
request. The final recipient of the request SHOULD exclude any request
fields that are likely to contain sensitive data when that recipient
generates the response content.¶
TRACE allows the client to see what is being received at the other
end of the request chain and use that data for testing or diagnostic
information. The value of the Via header field (Section 7.6.3)
is of particular interest, since it acts as a trace of the request chain.
Use of the Max-Forwards header field allows the client to
limit the length of the request chain, which is useful for testing a chain
of proxies forwarding messages in an infinite loop.¶
A client MUST NOT send content in a TRACE request.¶
The request header fields below provide additional information about the
request context, including information about the user, user agent, and
resource behind the request.¶
The "Expect" header field in a request indicates a certain set of
behaviors (expectations) that need to be supported by the server in
order to properly handle this request.¶
The only expectation defined by this specification is "100-continue"
(with no defined parameters).¶
A server that receives an Expect field value containing a member other than
100-continueMAY respond with a
417 (Expectation Failed) status code to indicate that the
unexpected expectation cannot be met.¶
A "100-continue" expectation informs recipients that the
client is about to send (presumably large) content in this request
and wishes to receive a 100 (Continue) interim response if
the method, target URI, and header fields are not sufficient to cause an immediate
success, redirect, or error response. This allows the client to wait for an
indication that it is worthwhile to send the content before actually
doing so, which can improve efficiency when the data is huge or
when the client anticipates that an error is likely (e.g., when sending a
state-changing method, for the first time, without previously verified
authentication credentials).¶
allows the origin server to immediately respond with an error message, such
as 401 (Unauthorized) or 405 (Method Not Allowed),
before the client starts filling the pipes with an unnecessary data
transfer.¶
A client MUST NOT generate a 100-continue expectation in a request that
does not include content.¶
A client that will wait for a 100 (Continue) response
before sending the request content MUST send an
Expect header field containing a 100-continue expectation.¶
A client that sends a 100-continue expectation is not required to wait
for any specific length of time; such a client MAY proceed to send the
content even if it has not yet received a response. Furthermore,
since 100 (Continue) responses cannot be sent through an
HTTP/1.0 intermediary, such a client SHOULD NOT wait for an indefinite
period before sending the content.¶
A client that receives a 417 (Expectation Failed) status
code in response to a request containing a 100-continue expectation
SHOULD repeat that request without a 100-continue expectation, since
the 417 response merely indicates that the response chain does not
support expectations (e.g., it passes through an HTTP/1.0 server).¶
A server that receives a 100-continue expectation in an HTTP/1.0 request
MUST ignore that expectation.¶
A server MAY omit sending a 100 (Continue) response if
it has already received some or all of the content for the
corresponding request, or if the framing indicates that there is no
content.¶
A server that sends a 100 (Continue) response MUST
ultimately send a final status code, once it receives and processes the
request content, unless the connection is closed prematurely.¶
A server that responds with a final status code before reading the
entire request content SHOULD indicate whether it intends to
close the connection (e.g., see Section 9.6 of [HTTP/1.1]) or
continue reading the request content.¶
Upon receiving an HTTP/1.1 (or later) request that has a method, target URI,
and complete header section that contains a 100-continue expectation and
an indication that request content will follow, an origin server MUST
send either:¶
an immediate response with a final status code, if that status can be
determined by examining just the method, target URI, and header fields, or¶
an immediate 100 (Continue) response to encourage the client
to send the request content.¶
The origin server MUST NOT wait for the content
before sending the 100 (Continue) response.¶
Upon receiving an HTTP/1.1 (or later) request that has a method, target URI,
and complete header section that contains a 100-continue expectation and
indicates a request content will follow, a proxy MUST either:¶
send an immediate
response with a final status code, if that status can be determined by
examining just the method, target URI, and header fields, or¶
forward the request toward the origin server by sending a corresponding
request-line and header section to the next inbound server.¶
If the proxy believes (from configuration or past interaction) that the
next inbound server only supports HTTP/1.0, the proxy MAY generate an
immediate 100 (Continue) response to encourage the client to
begin sending the content.¶
The "From" header field contains an Internet email address for a human
user who controls the requesting user agent. The address ought to be
machine-usable, as defined by "mailbox"
in Section 3.4 of [RFC5322]:¶
From = mailbox
mailbox = <mailbox, see [RFC5322], Section 3.4>
The From header field is rarely sent by non-robotic user agents.
A user agent SHOULD NOT send a From header field without explicit
configuration by the user, since that might conflict with the user's
privacy interests or their site's security policy.¶
A robotic user agent SHOULD send a valid From header field so that the
person responsible for running the robot can be contacted if problems
occur on servers, such as if the robot is sending excessive, unwanted,
or invalid requests.¶
A server SHOULD NOT use the From header field for access control or
authentication, since its value is expected to be visible to anyone
receiving or observing the request and is often recorded within logfiles
and error reports without any expectation of privacy.¶
The "Referer" [sic] header field allows the user agent to specify a URI
reference for the resource from which the target URI was
obtained (i.e., the "referrer", though the field name is misspelled).
A user agent MUST NOT include the fragment and userinfo components
of the URI reference [URI], if any, when generating the
Referer field value.¶
The Referer header field allows servers to generate back-links to other
resources for simple analytics, logging, optimized caching, etc. It also
allows obsolete or mistyped links to be found for maintenance. Some servers
use the Referer header field as a means of denying links from other sites
(so-called "deep linking") or restricting cross-site request forgery (CSRF),
but not all requests contain it.¶
If the target URI was obtained from a source that does not have its own
URI (e.g., input from the user keyboard, or an entry within the user's
bookmarks/favorites), the user agent MUST either exclude the Referer header field
or send it with a value of "about:blank".¶
The Referer header field value need not convey the full URI of the referring
resource; a user agent MAY truncate parts other than the referring origin.¶
The Referer header field has the potential to reveal information about the request
context or browsing history of the user, which is a privacy concern if the
referring resource's identifier reveals personal information (such as an
account name) or a resource that is supposed to be confidential (such as
behind a firewall or internal to a secured service). Most general-purpose
user agents do not send the Referer header field when the referring
resource is a local "file" or "data" URI. A user agent SHOULD NOT send a
Referer header field if the referring resource was accessed with
a secure protocol and the request target has an origin differing from that
of the referring resource, unless the referring resource explicitly allows
Referer to be sent. A user agent MUST NOT send a
Referer header field in an unsecured HTTP request if the
referring resource was accessed with a secure protocol.
See Section 17.9 for additional
security considerations.¶
Some intermediaries have been known to indiscriminately remove Referer
header fields from outgoing requests. This has the unfortunate side effect
of interfering with protection against CSRF attacks, which can be far
more harmful to their users. Intermediaries and user agent extensions that
wish to limit information disclosure in Referer ought to restrict their
changes to specific edits, such as replacing internal domain names with
pseudonyms or truncating the query and/or path components.
An intermediary SHOULD NOT modify or delete the Referer header field when
the field value shares the same scheme and host as the target URI.¶
The "TE" header field describes capabilities of the client with regard to
transfer codings and trailer sections.¶
As described in Section 6.5,
a TE field with a "trailers" member sent in a request indicates that the
client will not discard trailer fields.¶
TE is also used within HTTP/1.1 to advise servers about which transfer
codings the client is able to accept in a response.
As of publication, only HTTP/1.1 uses transfer codings
(see Section 7 of [HTTP/1.1]).¶
The TE field value is a list of members, with each member (aside from
"trailers") consisting of a transfer coding name token with an optional
weight indicating the client's relative preference for that
transfer coding (Section 12.4.2) and
optional parameters for that transfer coding.¶
A sender of TE MUST also send a "TE" connection option within the
Connection header field (Section 7.6.1)
to inform intermediaries not to forward this field.¶
The "User-Agent" header field contains information about the user agent
originating the request, which is often used by servers to help identify
the scope of reported interoperability problems, to work around or tailor
responses to avoid particular user agent limitations, and for analytics
regarding browser or operating system use. A user agent SHOULD send
a User-Agent header field in each request unless specifically configured not
to do so.¶
The User-Agent field value consists of one or more product identifiers,
each followed by zero or more comments (Section 5.6.5), which together
identify the user agent software and its significant subproducts.
By convention, the product identifiers are listed in decreasing order of
their significance for identifying the user agent software. Each product
identifier consists of a name and optional version.¶
A sender SHOULD limit generated product identifiers to what is necessary
to identify the product; a sender MUST NOT generate advertising or other
nonessential information within the product identifier.
A sender SHOULD NOT generate information in product-version
that is not a version identifier (i.e., successive versions of the same
product name ought to differ only in the product-version portion of the
product identifier).¶
A user agent SHOULD NOT generate a User-Agent header field containing needlessly
fine-grained detail and SHOULD limit the addition of subproducts by third
parties. Overly long and detailed User-Agent field values increase request
latency and the risk of a user being identified against their wishes
("fingerprinting").¶
Likewise, implementations are encouraged not to use the product tokens of
other implementations in order to declare compatibility with them, as this
circumvents the purpose of the field. If a user agent masquerades as a
different user agent, recipients can assume that the user intentionally
desires to see responses tailored for that identified user agent, even
if they might not work as well for the actual user agent being used.¶
The response header fields below provide additional information about the
response, beyond what is implied by the status code, including information
about the server, about the target resource, or about related
resources.¶
The "Allow" header field lists the set of methods advertised as
supported by the target resource. The purpose of this field
is strictly to inform the recipient of valid request methods associated
with the resource.¶
The actual set of allowed methods is defined by the origin server at the
time of each request. An origin server MUST generate an Allow header field in a
405 (Method Not Allowed) response and MAY do so in any
other response. An empty Allow field value indicates that the resource
allows no methods, which might occur in a 405 response if the resource has
been temporarily disabled by configuration.¶
A proxy MUST NOT modify the Allow header field -- it does not need
to understand all of the indicated methods in order to handle them
according to the generic message handling rules.¶
The "Location" header field is used in some responses to refer to a
specific resource in relation to the response. The type of relationship is
defined by the combination of request method and status code semantics.¶
The field value consists of a single URI-reference. When it has the form
of a relative reference ([URI], Section 4.2),
the final value is computed by resolving it against the target
URI ([URI], Section 5).¶
For 201 (Created) responses, the Location value refers to
the primary resource created by the request.
For 3xx (Redirection) responses, the Location value refers
to the preferred target resource for automatically redirecting the request.¶
If the Location value provided in a 3xx (Redirection)
response does not have a fragment component, a user agent MUST process the
redirection as if the value inherits the fragment component of the URI
reference used to generate the target URI (i.e., the redirection
inherits the original reference's fragment, if any).¶
For example, a GET request generated for the URI reference
"http://www.example.org/~tim" might result in a
303 (See Other) response containing the header field:¶
which suggests that the user agent redirect to
"http://www.example.org/People.html#tim"¶
Likewise, a GET request generated for the URI reference
"http://www.example.org/index.html#larry" might result in a
301 (Moved Permanently) response containing the header
field:¶
which suggests that the user agent redirect to
"http://www.example.net/index.html#larry", preserving the original fragment
identifier.¶
There are circumstances in which a fragment identifier in a Location
value would not be appropriate. For example, the Location header field in a
201 (Created) response is supposed to provide a URI that is
specific to the created resource.¶
Servers send the "Retry-After" header field to indicate how long the user
agent ought to wait before making a follow-up request. When sent with a
503 (Service Unavailable) response, Retry-After indicates
how long the service is expected to be unavailable to the client.
When sent with any 3xx (Redirection) response, Retry-After
indicates the minimum time that the user agent is asked to wait before
issuing the redirected request.¶
The Retry-After field value can be either an HTTP-date or a number
of seconds to delay after receiving the response.¶
The "Server" header field contains information about the
software used by the origin server to handle the request, which is often
used by clients to help identify the scope of reported interoperability
problems, to work around or tailor requests to avoid particular server
limitations, and for analytics regarding server or operating system use.
An origin server MAY generate a Server header field in its responses.¶
The Server header field value consists of one or more product identifiers, each
followed by zero or more comments (Section 5.6.5), which together
identify the origin server software and its significant subproducts.
By convention, the product identifiers are listed in decreasing order of
their significance for identifying the origin server software. Each product
identifier consists of a name and optional version, as defined in
Section 10.1.5.¶
An origin server SHOULD NOT generate a Server header field containing needlessly
fine-grained detail and SHOULD limit the addition of subproducts by third
parties. Overly long and detailed Server field values increase response
latency and potentially reveal internal implementation details that might
make it (slightly) easier for attackers to find and exploit known security
holes.¶
HTTP provides a general framework for access control and authentication,
via an extensible set of challenge-response authentication schemes, which
can be used by a server to challenge a client request and by a client to
provide authentication information. It uses a case-insensitive
token to identify the authentication scheme:¶
Aside from the general framework, this document does not specify any
authentication schemes. New and existing authentication schemes are
specified independently and ought to be registered within the
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registry".
For example, the "basic" and "digest" authentication schemes are defined by
[RFC7617] and
[RFC7616], respectively.¶
The authentication scheme is followed by additional information necessary
for achieving authentication via that scheme as either a
comma-separated list of parameters or a single sequence of characters
capable of holding base64-encoded information.¶
The token68 syntax allows the 66 unreserved URI characters
([URI]), plus a few others, so that it can hold a
base64, base64url (URL and filename safe alphabet), base32, or base16 (hex)
encoding, with or without padding, but excluding whitespace
([RFC4648]).¶
Authentication parameters are name/value pairs, where the name token is
matched case-insensitively
and each parameter name MUST only occur once per challenge.¶
Parameter values can be expressed either as "token" or as "quoted-string"
(Section 5.6).
Authentication scheme definitions need to accept both notations, both for
senders and recipients, to allow recipients to use generic parsing
components regardless of the authentication scheme.¶
For backwards compatibility, authentication scheme definitions can restrict
the format for senders to one of the two variants. This can be important
when it is known that deployed implementations will fail when encountering
one of the two formats.¶
A 401 (Unauthorized) response message is used by an origin
server to challenge the authorization of a user agent, including a
WWW-Authenticate header field containing at least one
challenge applicable to the requested resource.¶
A 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response message is
used by a proxy to challenge the authorization of a client, including a
Proxy-Authenticate header field containing at least one
challenge applicable to the proxy for the requested resource.¶
A user agent that wishes to authenticate itself with an origin server
-- usually, but not necessarily, after receiving a
401 (Unauthorized) -- can do so by including an
Authorization header field with the request.¶
A client that wishes to authenticate itself with a proxy -- usually,
but not necessarily, after receiving a
407 (Proxy Authentication Required) -- can do so by
including a Proxy-Authorization header field with the
request.¶
Both the Authorization field value and the
Proxy-Authorization field value contain the client's
credentials for the realm of the resource being requested, based upon a
challenge received in a response (possibly at some point in the past).
When creating their values, the user agent ought to do so by selecting the
challenge with what it considers to be the most secure auth-scheme that it
understands, obtaining credentials from the user as appropriate.
Transmission of credentials within header field values implies significant
security considerations regarding the confidentiality of the underlying
connection, as described in
Section 17.16.1.¶
Upon receipt of a request for a protected resource that omits credentials,
contains invalid credentials (e.g., a bad password) or partial credentials
(e.g., when the authentication scheme requires more than one round trip),
an origin server SHOULD send a 401 (Unauthorized) response
that contains a WWW-Authenticate header field with at least
one (possibly new) challenge applicable to the requested resource.¶
Likewise, upon receipt of a request that omits proxy credentials or
contains invalid or partial proxy credentials, a proxy that requires
authentication SHOULD generate a
407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response that contains
a Proxy-Authenticate header field with at least one
(possibly new) challenge applicable to the proxy.¶
A server that receives valid credentials that are not adequate to gain
access ought to respond with the 403 (Forbidden) status
code (Section 15.5.4).¶
HTTP does not restrict applications to this simple challenge-response
framework for access authentication. Additional mechanisms can be used,
such as authentication at the transport level or via message encapsulation,
and with additional header fields specifying authentication information.
However, such additional mechanisms are not defined by this specification.¶
Note that various custom mechanisms for user authentication use the
Set-Cookie and Cookie header fields, defined in [COOKIE],
for passing tokens related to authentication.¶
The "realm" authentication parameter is reserved for use by
authentication schemes that wish to indicate a scope of protection.¶
A "protection space" is defined by the origin (see
Section 4.3.1) of the
server being accessed, in combination with the realm value if present.
These realms allow the protected resources on a server to be
partitioned into a set of protection spaces, each with its own
authentication scheme and/or authorization database. The realm value
is a string, generally assigned by the origin server, that can have
additional semantics specific to the authentication scheme. Note that a
response can have multiple challenges with the same auth-scheme but
with different realms.¶
The protection space determines the domain over which credentials can
be automatically applied. If a prior request has been authorized, the
user agent MAY reuse the same credentials for all other requests within
that protection space for a period of time determined by the authentication
scheme, parameters, and/or user preferences (such as a configurable
inactivity timeout).¶
The extent of a protection space, and therefore the requests to which
credentials might be automatically applied, is not necessarily known to
clients without additional information. An authentication scheme might
define parameters that describe the extent of a protection space. Unless
specifically allowed by the authentication scheme, a single protection
space cannot extend outside the scope of its server.¶
For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string syntax.
Recipients might have to support both token and quoted-string syntax for
maximum interoperability with existing clients that have been accepting both
notations for a long time.¶
A server generating a 401 (Unauthorized) response
MUST send a WWW-Authenticate header field containing at least one
challenge. A server MAY generate a WWW-Authenticate header field
in other response messages to indicate that supplying credentials
(or different credentials) might affect the response.¶
A proxy forwarding a response MUST NOT modify any
WWW-Authenticate header fields in that response.¶
User agents are advised to take special care in parsing the field value, as
it might contain more than one challenge, and each challenge can contain a
comma-separated list of authentication parameters. Furthermore, the header
field itself can occur multiple times.¶
This header field contains two challenges, one for the "Basic" scheme with
a realm value of "simple" and another for the "Newauth" scheme with a
realm value of "apps". It also contains two additional parameters, "type" and "title".¶
Some user agents do not recognize this form, however. As a result, sending
a WWW-Authenticate field value with more than one member on the same field
line might not be interoperable.¶
The "Authorization" header field allows a user agent to authenticate itself
with an origin server -- usually, but not necessarily, after receiving
a 401 (Unauthorized) response. Its value consists of
credentials containing the authentication information of the user agent for
the realm of the resource being requested.¶
If a request is authenticated and a realm specified, the same credentials
are presumed to be valid for all other requests within this realm (assuming
that the authentication scheme itself does not require otherwise, such as
credentials that vary according to a challenge value or using synchronized
clocks).¶
A proxy forwarding a request MUST NOT modify any
Authorization header fields in that request.
See Section 3.5 of [CACHING] for details of and requirements
pertaining to handling of the Authorization header field by HTTP caches.¶
HTTP authentication schemes can use the "Authentication-Info" response
field to communicate information after the client's authentication credentials have been accepted.
This information can include a finalization message from the server (e.g., it can contain the
server authentication).¶
The field value is a list of parameters (name/value pairs), using the "auth-param"
syntax defined in Section 11.3.
This specification only describes the generic format; authentication schemes
using Authentication-Info will define the individual parameters. The "Digest"
Authentication Scheme, for instance, defines multiple parameters in
Section 3.5 of [RFC7616].¶
The Authentication-Info field can be used in any HTTP response,
independently of request method and status code. Its semantics are defined
by the authentication scheme indicated by the Authorization header field
(Section 11.6.2) of the corresponding request.¶
A proxy forwarding a response is not allowed to modify the field value in any
way.¶
Authentication-Info can be sent as a trailer field
(Section 6.5)
when the authentication scheme explicitly allows this.¶
The "Proxy-Authenticate" header field consists of at least one
challenge that indicates the authentication scheme(s) and parameters
applicable to the proxy for this request.
A proxy MUST send at least one Proxy-Authenticate header field in
each 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) response that it
generates.¶
Unlike WWW-Authenticate, the Proxy-Authenticate header field
applies only to the next outbound client on the response chain.
This is because only the client that chose a given proxy is likely to have
the credentials necessary for authentication. However, when multiple
proxies are used within the same administrative domain, such as office and
regional caching proxies within a large corporate network, it is common
for credentials to be generated by the user agent and passed through the
hierarchy until consumed. Hence, in such a configuration, it will appear
as if Proxy-Authenticate is being forwarded because each proxy will send
the same challenge set.¶
Note that the parsing considerations for WWW-Authenticate
apply to this header field as well; see Section 11.6.1
for details.¶
The "Proxy-Authorization" header field allows the client to
identify itself (or its user) to a proxy that requires
authentication. Its value consists of credentials containing the
authentication information of the client for the proxy and/or realm of the
resource being requested.¶
Unlike Authorization, the Proxy-Authorization header field
applies only to the next inbound proxy that demanded authentication using
the Proxy-Authenticate header field. When multiple proxies are used
in a chain, the Proxy-Authorization header field is consumed by the first
inbound proxy that was expecting to receive credentials. A proxy MAY
relay the credentials from the client request to the next proxy if that is
the mechanism by which the proxies cooperatively authenticate a given
request.¶
The "Proxy-Authentication-Info" response header field is equivalent to
Authentication-Info, except that it applies to proxy authentication (Section 11.3)
and its semantics are defined by the
authentication scheme indicated by the Proxy-Authorization header field
(Section 11.7.2)
of the corresponding request:¶
However, unlike Authentication-Info, the Proxy-Authentication-Info header
field applies only to the next outbound client on the response chain. This is
because only the client that chose a given proxy is likely to have the
credentials necessary for authentication. However, when multiple proxies are
used within the same administrative domain, such as office and regional
caching proxies within a large corporate network, it is common for
credentials to be generated by the user agent and passed through the
hierarchy until consumed. Hence, in such a configuration, it will appear as
if Proxy-Authentication-Info is being forwarded because each proxy will send
the same field value.¶
Proxy-Authentication-Info can be sent as a trailer field
(Section 6.5)
when the authentication scheme explicitly allows this.¶
When responses convey content, whether indicating a success or
an error, the origin server often has different ways of representing that
information; for example, in different formats, languages, or encodings.
Likewise, different users or user agents might have differing capabilities,
characteristics, or preferences that could influence which representation,
among those available, would be best to deliver. For this reason, HTTP
provides mechanisms for content negotiation.¶
This specification defines three patterns of content negotiation that can
be made visible within the protocol:
"proactive" negotiation, where the server selects the representation based
upon the user agent's stated preferences; "reactive" negotiation,
where the server provides a list of representations for the user agent to
choose from; and "request content" negotiation, where the user agent
selects the representation for a future request based upon the server's
stated preferences in past responses.¶
Other patterns of content negotiation include
"conditional content", where the representation consists of multiple
parts that are selectively rendered based on user agent parameters,
"active content", where the representation contains a script that
makes additional (more specific) requests based on the user agent
characteristics, and "Transparent Content Negotiation"
([RFC2295]), where content selection is performed by
an intermediary. These patterns are not mutually exclusive, and each has
trade-offs in applicability and practicality.¶
Note that, in all cases, HTTP is not aware of the resource semantics.
The consistency with which an origin server responds to requests, over time
and over the varying dimensions of content negotiation, and thus the
"sameness" of a resource's observed representations over time, is
determined entirely by whatever entity or algorithm selects or generates
those responses.¶
When content negotiation preferences are sent by the user agent in a
request to encourage an algorithm located at the server to
select the preferred representation, it is called
"proactive negotiation"
(a.k.a., "server-driven negotiation"). Selection is based on
the available representations for a response (the dimensions over which it
might vary, such as language, content coding, etc.) compared to various
information supplied in the request, including both the explicit
negotiation header fields below and implicit
characteristics, such as the client's network address or parts of the
User-Agent field.¶
Proactive negotiation is advantageous when the algorithm for
selecting from among the available representations is difficult to
describe to a user agent, or when the server desires to send its
"best guess" to the user agent along with the first response (when that
"best guess" is good enough for the user, this avoids the round-trip
delay of a subsequent request). In order to improve the server's
guess, a user agent MAY send request header fields that describe
its preferences.¶
It is impossible for the server to accurately determine what
might be "best" for any given user, since that would require
complete knowledge of both the capabilities of the user agent
and the intended use for the response (e.g., does the user want
to view it on screen or print it on paper?);¶
Having the user agent describe its capabilities in every
request can be both very inefficient (given that only a small
percentage of responses have multiple representations) and a
potential risk to the user's privacy;¶
It complicates the implementation of an origin server and the
algorithms for generating responses to a request; and,¶
It limits the reusability of responses for shared caching.¶
A user agent cannot rely on proactive negotiation preferences being
consistently honored, since the origin server might not implement proactive
negotiation for the requested resource or might decide that sending a
response that doesn't conform to the user agent's preferences is better
than sending a 406 (Not Acceptable) response.¶
A Vary header field (Section 12.5.5) is
often sent in a response subject to proactive negotiation to indicate what
parts of the request information were used in the selection algorithm.¶
The request header fields Accept,
Accept-Charset, Accept-Encoding, and
Accept-Language are defined below for a user agent to engage
in proactive negotiation of the response content.
The preferences sent in these
fields apply to any content in the response, including representations of
the target resource, representations of error or processing status, and
potentially even the miscellaneous text strings that might appear within
the protocol.¶
With "reactive negotiation" (a.k.a., "agent-driven negotiation"), selection of
content (regardless of the status code) is performed by
the user agent after receiving an initial response. The mechanism for
reactive negotiation might be as simple as a list of references to
alternative representations.¶
If the user agent is not satisfied by the initial response content,
it can perform a GET request on one or more of the alternative resources
to obtain a different representation. Selection of such alternatives might
be performed automatically (by the user agent) or manually (e.g., by the
user selecting from a hypertext menu).¶
A server might choose not to send an initial representation, other than
the list of alternatives, and thereby indicate that reactive
negotiation by the user agent is preferred. For example, the alternatives
listed in responses with the 300 (Multiple Choices) and
406 (Not Acceptable) status codes include information about
available representations so that the user or user agent can react by
making a selection.¶
Reactive negotiation is advantageous when the response would vary
over commonly used dimensions (such as type, language, or encoding),
when the origin server is unable to determine a user agent's
capabilities from examining the request, and generally when public
caches are used to distribute server load and reduce network usage.¶
Reactive negotiation suffers from the disadvantages of transmitting
a list of alternatives to the user agent, which degrades user-perceived
latency if transmitted in the header section, and needing a second request
to obtain an alternate representation. Furthermore, this specification
does not define a mechanism for supporting automatic selection, though it
does not prevent such a mechanism from being developed.¶
When content negotiation preferences are sent in a server's response, the
listed preferences are called "request content negotiation"
because they intend to influence selection of an appropriate content for
subsequent requests to that resource. For example,
the Accept (Section 12.5.1) and
Accept-Encoding (Section 12.5.3)
header fields can be sent in a response to indicate preferred media types
and content codings for subsequent requests to that resource.¶
Similarly, Section 3.1 of [RFC5789] defines
the "Accept-Patch" response header field, which allows discovery of
which content types are accepted in PATCH requests.¶
For each of the content negotiation fields, a request that does not contain
the field implies that the sender has no preference on that dimension of
negotiation.¶
If a content negotiation header field is present in a request and none of
the available
representations for the response can be considered acceptable according to
it, the origin server can either honor the header field by sending a
406 (Not Acceptable) response or disregard the header field
by treating the response as if it is not subject to content negotiation
for that request header field. This does not imply, however, that the
client will be able to use the representation.¶
The content negotiation fields defined by this specification
use a common parameter, named "q" (case-insensitive), to assign a relative
"weight" to the preference for that associated kind of content.
This weight is referred to as a "quality value" (or "qvalue") because
the same parameter name is often used within server configurations to
assign a weight to the relative quality of the various representations
that can be selected for a resource.¶
The weight is normalized to a real number in the range 0 through 1,
where 0.001 is the least preferred and 1 is the most preferred;
a value of 0 means "not acceptable". If no "q" parameter is present,
the default weight is 1.¶
A sender of qvalue MUST NOT generate more than three digits after the
decimal point. User configuration of these values ought to be limited in
the same fashion.¶
Most of these header fields, where indicated, define a wildcard value ("*")
to select unspecified values. If no wildcard is present, values that are
not explicitly mentioned in the field are considered unacceptable.
Within Vary, the wildcard value means that the variance
is unlimited.¶
The "Accept" header field can be used by user agents to specify their
preferences regarding response media types. For example, Accept header
fields can be used to indicate that the request is specifically limited to
a small set of desired types, as in the case of a request for an in-line
image.¶
When sent by a server in a response, Accept provides information
about which content types are preferred in the content of a subsequent
request to the same resource.¶
The asterisk "*" character is used to group media types into ranges,
with "*/*" indicating all media types and "type/*" indicating all
subtypes of that type. The media-range can include media type
parameters that are applicable to that range.¶
Each media-range might be followed by optional applicable media type
parameters (e.g., charset), followed by an optional "q"
parameter for indicating a relative weight (Section 12.4.2).¶
Previous specifications allowed additional extension parameters to appear
after the weight parameter. The accept extension grammar (accept-params, accept-ext) has
been removed because it had a complicated definition, was not being used in
practice, and is more easily deployed through new header fields. Senders
using weights SHOULD send "q" last (after all media-range parameters).
Recipients SHOULD process any parameter named "q" as weight, regardless of
parameter ordering.¶
Verbally, this would be interpreted as "text/html and text/x-c are
the equally preferred media types, but if they do not exist, then send the
text/x-dvi representation, and if that does not exist, send the text/plain
representation".¶
Media ranges can be overridden by more specific media ranges or
specific media types. If more than one media range applies to a given
type, the most specific reference has precedence. For example,¶
The media type quality factor associated with a given type is
determined by finding the media range with the highest precedence
that matches the type. For example,¶
The "Accept-Charset" header field can be sent by a user agent to indicate
its preferences for charsets in textual response content. For example,
this field allows user agents capable of understanding more comprehensive
or special-purpose charsets to signal that capability to an origin server
that is capable of representing information in those charsets.¶
Charset names are defined in Section 8.3.2.
A user agent MAY associate a quality value with each charset to indicate
the user's relative preference for that charset, as defined in Section 12.4.2.
An example is¶
The "Accept-Encoding" header field can be used to indicate preferences
regarding the use of content codings (Section 8.4.1).¶
When sent by a user agent in a request, Accept-Encoding indicates the
content codings acceptable in a response.¶
When sent by a server in a response, Accept-Encoding provides information
about which content codings are preferred in the content of a subsequent
request to the same resource.¶
An "identity" token is used as a synonym for
"no encoding" in order to communicate when no encoding is preferred.¶
Each codings value MAY be given an associated quality value (weight)
representing the preference for that encoding, as defined in Section 12.4.2.
The asterisk "*" symbol in an Accept-Encoding field matches any available
content coding not explicitly listed in the field.¶
A server tests whether a content coding for a given representation is
acceptable using these rules:¶
If no Accept-Encoding header field is in the request, any content coding is
considered acceptable by the user agent.¶
If the representation has no content coding, then it is acceptable
by default unless specifically excluded by the Accept-Encoding header field
stating either "identity;q=0" or "*;q=0" without a more specific
entry for "identity".¶
If the representation's content coding is one of the content codings
listed in the Accept-Encoding field value, then it is acceptable unless
it is accompanied by a qvalue of 0. (As defined in Section 12.4.2, a
qvalue of 0 means "not acceptable".)¶
A representation could be encoded with multiple content codings. However, most
content codings are alternative ways to accomplish the same purpose
(e.g., data compression). When selecting between multiple content codings that
have the same purpose, the acceptable content coding with the highest
non-zero qvalue is preferred.¶
An Accept-Encoding header field with a field value that is empty
implies that the user agent does not want any content coding in response.
If a non-empty Accept-Encoding header field is present in a request and none of the
available representations for the response have a content coding that
is listed as acceptable, the origin server SHOULD send a response
without any content coding unless the identity coding is indicated as unacceptable.¶
When the Accept-Encoding header field is present in a response, it indicates
what content codings the resource was willing to accept in the associated
request. The field value is evaluated the same way as in a request.¶
Note that this information is specific to the associated request; the set of
supported encodings might be different for other resources on the same
server and could change over time or depend on other aspects of the request
(such as the request method).¶
Servers that fail a request due to an unsupported content coding ought to
respond with a 415 (Unsupported Media Type) status and
include an Accept-Encoding header field in that response, allowing
clients to distinguish between issues related to content codings and media
types. In order to avoid confusion with issues related to media types,
servers that fail a request with a 415 status for reasons unrelated to
content codings MUST NOT include the Accept-Encoding header
field.¶
The most common use of Accept-Encoding is in responses with a
415 (Unsupported Media Type) status code, in response to
optimistic use of a content coding by clients. However, the header field
can also be used to indicate to clients that content codings are supported in order
to optimize future interactions. For example, a resource might include it
in a 2xx (Successful) response when the request content was
big enough to justify use of a compression coding but the client failed do
so.¶
The "Accept-Language" header field can be used by user agents to
indicate the set of natural languages that are preferred in the response.
Language tags are defined in Section 8.5.1.¶
Each language-range can be given an associated quality value
representing an estimate of the user's preference for the languages
specified by that range, as defined in Section 12.4.2. For example,¶
would mean: "I prefer Danish, but will accept British English and
other types of English".¶
Note that some recipients treat the order in which language tags are listed
as an indication of descending priority, particularly for tags that are
assigned equal quality values (no value is the same as q=1). However, this
behavior cannot be relied upon. For consistency and to maximize
interoperability, many user agents assign each language tag a unique
quality value while also listing them in order of decreasing quality.
Additional discussion of language priority lists can be found in
Section 2.3 of [RFC4647].¶
For matching, Section 3 of [RFC4647] defines
several matching schemes. Implementations can offer the most appropriate
matching scheme for their requirements. The "Basic Filtering" scheme
([RFC4647], Section 3.3.1) is identical to the
matching scheme that was previously defined for HTTP in
Section 14.4 of [RFC2616].¶
It might be contrary to the privacy expectations of the user to send
an Accept-Language header field with the complete linguistic preferences of
the user in every request (Section 17.13).¶
Since intelligibility is highly dependent on the individual user, user
agents need to allow user control over the linguistic preference (either
through configuration of the user agent itself or by defaulting to a user
controllable system setting).
A user agent that does not provide such control to the user MUST NOT
send an Accept-Language header field.¶
The "Vary" header field in a response describes what parts of a request
message, aside from the method and target URI, might have influenced the
origin server's process for selecting the content of this response.¶
A Vary field value is either the wildcard member "*" or a list of
request field names, known as the selecting header fields, that might
have had a role in selecting the representation for this response.
Potential selecting header fields are not limited to fields defined by
this specification.¶
A list containing the member "*" signals that other aspects of the
request might have played a role in selecting the response representation,
possibly including aspects outside the message syntax (e.g., the
client's network address).
A recipient will not be able to determine whether this response is
appropriate for a later request without forwarding the request to the
origin server. A proxy MUST NOT generate "*" in a Vary field value.¶
indicates that the origin server might have used the request's
Accept-Encoding and Accept-Language
header fields (or lack thereof) as determining factors while choosing
the content for this response.¶
A Vary field containing a list of field names has two purposes:¶
To inform cache recipients that they MUST NOT use this response
to satisfy a later request unless the later request has the
same values for the listed header fields as the original request
(Section 4.1 of [CACHING]) or reuse of the
response has been validated by the origin server.
In other words, Vary expands the cache key
required to match a new request to the stored cache entry.¶
To inform user agent recipients that this response was subject to
content negotiation (Section 12) and a
different representation might be sent in a subsequent request if
other values are provided in the listed header fields
(proactive negotiation).¶
An origin server SHOULD generate a Vary header field on a cacheable
response when it wishes that response to be selectively reused for
subsequent requests. Generally, that is the case when the response
content has been tailored to better fit the preferences expressed by
those selecting header fields, such as when an origin server has
selected the response's language based on the request's
Accept-Language header field.¶
Vary might be elided when an origin server considers variance in
content selection to be less significant than Vary's performance impact
on caching, particularly when reuse is already limited by cache
response directives (Section 5.2 of [CACHING]).¶
There is no need to send the Authorization field name in Vary because
reuse of that response for a different user is prohibited by the field
definition (Section 11.6.2).
Likewise, if the response content has been selected or influenced by
network region, but the origin server wants the cached response to be
reused even if recipients move from one region to another, then there
is no need for the origin server to indicate such variance in Vary.¶
A conditional request is an HTTP request with one or more request header
fields that indicate a precondition to be tested before
applying the request method to the target resource.
Section 13.2 defines when to evaluate preconditions and
their order of precedence when more than one precondition is present.¶
Conditional GET requests are the most efficient mechanism for HTTP
cache updates [CACHING]. Conditionals can also be
applied to state-changing methods, such as PUT and DELETE, to prevent
the "lost update" problem: one client accidentally overwriting
the work of another client that has been acting in parallel.¶
Preconditions are usually defined with respect to a state of the target
resource as a whole (its current value set) or the state as observed in a
previously obtained representation (one value in that set). If a resource
has multiple current representations, each with its own observable state,
a precondition will assume that the mapping of each request to a
selected representation (Section 3.2)
is consistent over time.
Regardless, if the mapping is inconsistent or the server is unable to
select an appropriate representation, then no harm will result when the
precondition evaluates to false.¶
Each precondition defined below consists of a comparison between a
set of validators obtained from prior representations of the target
resource to the current state of validators for the selected
representation (Section 8.8). Hence, these
preconditions evaluate whether the state of the target resource has
changed since a given state known by the client. The effect of such an
evaluation depends on the method semantics and choice of conditional, as
defined in Section 13.2.¶
Other preconditions, defined by other specifications as extension fields,
might place conditions on all recipients, on the state of the target
resource in general, or on a group of resources. For instance, the "If"
header field in WebDAV can make a request conditional on various aspects
of multiple resources, such as locks, if the recipient understands and
implements that field ([WEBDAV], Section 10.4).¶
Extensibility of preconditions is only possible when the precondition can
be safely ignored if unknown (like If-Modified-Since), when
deployment can be assumed for a given use case, or when implementation
is signaled by some other property of the target resource. This encourages
a focus on mutually agreed deployment of common standards.¶
The "If-Match" header field makes the request method conditional on the
recipient origin server either having at least one current
representation of the target resource, when the field value is "*", or
having a current representation of the target resource that has an
entity tag matching a member of the list of entity tags provided in the
field value.¶
An origin server MUST use the strong comparison function when comparing
entity tags for If-Match (Section 8.8.3.2), since
the client intends this precondition to prevent the method from being
applied if there have been any changes to the representation data.¶
If-Match is most often used with state-changing methods (e.g., POST, PUT,
DELETE) to prevent accidental overwrites when multiple user agents might be
acting in parallel on the same resource (i.e., to prevent the "lost update"
problem). In general, it can be used with any method that involves the
selection or modification of a representation to abort the request if the
selected representation's current entity tag is not a
member within the If-Match field value.¶
When an origin server receives a request that selects a representation
and that request includes an If-Match header field,
the origin server MUST evaluate the If-Match condition per
Section 13.2 prior to performing the method.¶
An origin server that evaluates an If-Match condition MUST NOT perform
the requested method if the condition evaluates to false. Instead,
the origin server MAY
indicate that the conditional request failed by responding with a
412 (Precondition Failed) status code. Alternatively,
if the request is a state-changing operation that appears to have already
been applied to the selected representation, the origin server MAY respond
with a 2xx (Successful) status code
(i.e., the change requested by the user agent has already succeeded, but
the user agent might not be aware of it, perhaps because the prior response
was lost or an equivalent change was made by some other user agent).¶
Allowing an origin server to send a success response when a change request
appears to have already been applied is more efficient for many authoring
use cases, but comes with some risk if multiple user agents are making
change requests that are very similar but not cooperative.
For example, multiple user agents writing to a common resource as a
semaphore (e.g., a nonatomic increment) are likely to collide and
potentially lose important state transitions. For those kinds of resources,
an origin server is better off being stringent in sending 412 for every
failed precondition on an unsafe method.
In other cases, excluding the ETag field from a success response might
encourage the user agent to perform a GET as its next request to eliminate
confusion about the resource's current state.¶
A client MAY send an If-Match header field in a
GET request to indicate that it would prefer a
412 (Precondition Failed) response if the selected
representation does not match. However, this is only useful in range
requests (Section 14) for completing a previously
received partial representation when there is no desire for a new
representation. If-Range (Section 13.1.5)
is better suited for range requests when the client prefers to receive a
new representation.¶
A cache or intermediary MAY ignore If-Match because its
interoperability features are only necessary for an origin server.¶
Note that an If-Match header field with a list value containing "*" and
other values (including other instances of "*") is syntactically
invalid (therefore not allowed to be generated) and furthermore is
unlikely to be interoperable.¶
The "If-None-Match" header field makes the request method conditional on
a recipient cache or origin server either not having any current
representation of the target resource, when the field value is "*", or
having a selected representation with an entity tag that does not match any
of those listed in the field value.¶
A recipient MUST use the weak comparison function when comparing
entity tags for If-None-Match (Section 8.8.3.2),
since weak entity tags can be used for cache validation even if there have
been changes to the representation data.¶
If-None-Match is primarily used in conditional GET requests to enable
efficient updates of cached information with a minimum amount of
transaction overhead. When a client desires to update one or more stored
responses that have entity tags, the client SHOULD generate an
If-None-Match header field containing a list of those entity tags when
making a GET request; this allows recipient servers to send a
304 (Not Modified) response to indicate when one of those
stored responses matches the selected representation.¶
If-None-Match can also be used with a value of "*" to prevent an unsafe
request method (e.g., PUT) from inadvertently modifying an existing
representation of the target resource when the client believes that
the resource does not have a current representation (Section 9.2.1).
This is a variation on the "lost update" problem that might arise if more
than one client attempts to create an initial representation for the target
resource.¶
When an origin server receives a request that selects a representation
and that request includes an If-None-Match header field,
the origin server MUST evaluate the If-None-Match condition per
Section 13.2 prior to performing the method.¶
To evaluate a received If-None-Match header field:¶
If the field value is "*", the condition is false if the origin server
has a current representation for the target resource.¶
If the field value is a list of entity tags, the condition is false if
one of the listed tags matches the entity tag of the selected representation.¶
An origin server that evaluates an If-None-Match condition MUST NOT
perform the requested method if the condition evaluates to false; instead,
the origin server MUST respond with either
a) the 304 (Not Modified) status code if the request method
is GET or HEAD or b) the 412 (Precondition Failed) status
code for all other request methods.¶
Requirements on cache handling of a received If-None-Match header field
are defined in Section 4.3.2 of [CACHING].¶
Note that an If-None-Match header field with a list value containing "*" and
other values (including other instances of "*") is syntactically
invalid (therefore not allowed to be generated) and furthermore is
unlikely to be interoperable.¶
The "If-Modified-Since" header field makes a GET or HEAD request method
conditional on the selected representation's modification
date being more
recent than the date provided in the field value. Transfer of the selected
representation's data is avoided if that data has not changed.¶
A recipient MUST ignore If-Modified-Since if the request contains an
If-None-Match header field; the condition in
If-None-Match is considered to be a more accurate
replacement for the condition in If-Modified-Since, and the two are only
combined for the sake of interoperating with older intermediaries that
might not implement If-None-Match.¶
A recipient MUST ignore the If-Modified-Since header field if the
received field value is not a valid HTTP-date, the field value has more than
one member, or if the request method is neither GET nor HEAD.¶
A recipient MUST ignore the If-Modified-Since header field if the
resource does not have a modification date available.¶
A recipient MUST interpret an If-Modified-Since field value's timestamp
in terms of the origin server's clock.¶
If-Modified-Since is typically used for two distinct purposes:
1) to allow efficient updates of a cached representation that does not
have an entity tag and 2) to limit the scope of a web traversal to resources
that have recently changed.¶
When used for cache updates, a cache will typically use the value of the
cached message's Last-Modified header field to generate the field
value of If-Modified-Since. This behavior is most interoperable for cases
where clocks are poorly synchronized or when the server has chosen to only
honor exact timestamp matches (due to a problem with Last-Modified dates
that appear to go "back in time" when the origin server's clock is
corrected or a representation is restored from an archived backup).
However, caches occasionally generate the field value based on other data,
such as the Date header field of the cached message or the
clock time at which the message was received, particularly when the
cached message does not contain a Last-Modified header field.¶
When used for limiting the scope of retrieval to a recent time window, a
user agent will generate an If-Modified-Since field value based on either
its own clock or a Date header field received from the
server in a prior response. Origin servers that choose an exact
timestamp match based on the selected representation's
Last-Modified
header field will not be able to help the user agent limit its data
transfers to only those changed during the specified window.¶
When an origin server receives a request that selects a representation
and that request includes an If-Modified-Since header field without an
If-None-Match header field, the origin server SHOULD
evaluate the If-Modified-Since condition per
Section 13.2 prior to performing the method.¶
To evaluate a received If-Modified-Since header field:¶
If the selected representation's last modification date is earlier or
equal to the date provided in the field value, the condition is false.¶
An origin server that evaluates an If-Modified-Since condition
SHOULD NOT perform the requested method if the condition evaluates to
false; instead,
the origin server SHOULD generate a 304 (Not Modified)
response, including only those metadata that are useful for identifying or
updating a previously cached response.¶
Requirements on cache handling of a received If-Modified-Since header field
are defined in Section 4.3.2 of [CACHING].¶
The "If-Unmodified-Since" header field makes the request method conditional
on the selected representation's last modification date being
earlier than or equal to the date provided in the field value.
This field accomplishes the
same purpose as If-Match for cases where the user agent does
not have an entity tag for the representation.¶
A recipient MUST ignore If-Unmodified-Since if the request contains an
If-Match header field; the condition in
If-Match is considered to be a more accurate replacement for
the condition in If-Unmodified-Since, and the two are only combined for the
sake of interoperating with older intermediaries that might not implement
If-Match.¶
A recipient MUST ignore the If-Unmodified-Since header field if the
received field value is not a valid HTTP-date (including when the field
value appears to be a list of dates).¶
A recipient MUST ignore the If-Unmodified-Since header field if the
resource does not have a modification date available.¶
A recipient MUST interpret an If-Unmodified-Since field value's timestamp
in terms of the origin server's clock.¶
If-Unmodified-Since is most often used with state-changing methods
(e.g., POST, PUT, DELETE) to prevent accidental overwrites when multiple
user agents might be acting in parallel on a resource that does
not supply entity tags with its representations (i.e., to prevent the
"lost update" problem).
In general, it can be used with any method that involves the selection
or modification of a representation to abort the request if the
selected representation's last modification date has
changed since the date provided in the If-Unmodified-Since field value.¶
When an origin server receives a request that selects a representation
and that request includes an If-Unmodified-Since header field without
an If-Match header field,
the origin server MUST evaluate the If-Unmodified-Since condition per
Section 13.2 prior to performing the method.¶
To evaluate a received If-Unmodified-Since header field:¶
If the selected representation's last modification date is earlier than or
equal to the date provided in the field value, the condition is true.¶
An origin server that evaluates an If-Unmodified-Since condition MUST NOT
perform the requested method if the condition evaluates to false.
Instead, the origin server MAY indicate that the conditional request
failed by responding with a 412 (Precondition Failed)
status code. Alternatively, if the request is a state-changing operation
that appears to have already been applied to the selected representation,
the origin server MAY respond with a 2xx (Successful)
status code
(i.e., the change requested by the user agent has already succeeded, but
the user agent might not be aware of it, perhaps because the prior response
was lost or an equivalent change was made by some other user agent).¶
Allowing an origin server to send a success response when a change request
appears to have already been applied is more efficient for many authoring
use cases, but comes with some risk if multiple user agents are making
change requests that are very similar but not cooperative.
In those cases, an origin server is better off being stringent in sending
412 for every failed precondition on an unsafe method.¶
A client MAY send an If-Unmodified-Since header field in a
GET request to indicate that it would prefer a
412 (Precondition Failed) response if the selected
representation has been modified. However, this is only useful in range
requests (Section 14) for completing a previously
received partial representation when there is no desire for a new
representation. If-Range (Section 13.1.5)
is better suited for range requests when the client prefers to receive a
new representation.¶
A cache or intermediary MAY ignore If-Unmodified-Since because its
interoperability features are only necessary for an origin server.¶
The "If-Range" header field provides a special conditional request
mechanism that is similar to the If-Match and
If-Unmodified-Since header fields but that instructs the
recipient to ignore the Range header field if the validator
doesn't match, resulting in transfer of the new selected representation
instead of a 412 (Precondition Failed) response.¶
If a client has a partial copy of a representation and wishes
to have an up-to-date copy of the entire representation, it could use the
Range header field with a conditional GET (using
either or both of If-Unmodified-Since and
If-Match.) However, if the precondition fails because the
representation has been modified, the client would then have to make a
second request to obtain the entire current representation.¶
The "If-Range" header field allows a client to "short-circuit" the second
request. Informally, its meaning is as follows: if the representation is unchanged,
send me the part(s) that I am requesting in Range; otherwise, send me the
entire representation.¶
A valid entity-tag can be distinguished from a valid
HTTP-date by examining the first three characters for a
DQUOTE.¶
A client MUST NOT generate an If-Range header field in a request that
does not contain a Range header field.
A server MUST ignore an If-Range header field received in a request that
does not contain a Range header field.
An origin server MUST ignore an If-Range header field received in a
request for a target resource that does not support Range requests.¶
A client MUST NOT generate an If-Range header field containing an
entity tag that is marked as weak.
A client MUST NOT generate an If-Range header field containing an
HTTP-date unless the client has no entity tag for
the corresponding representation and the date is a strong validator
in the sense defined by Section 8.8.2.2.¶
A server that receives an If-Range header field on a Range request MUST
evaluate the condition per Section 13.2 prior to
performing the method.¶
To evaluate a received If-Range header field containing an
HTTP-date:¶
If the HTTP-date validator provided is not a
strong validator in the sense defined by
Section 8.8.2.2, the condition is false.¶
If the HTTP-date validator provided exactly matches
the Last-Modified field value for the selected
representation, the condition is true.¶
To evaluate a received If-Range header field containing an
entity-tag:¶
If the entity-tag validator provided exactly matches
the ETag field value for the selected representation
using the strong comparison function
(Section 8.8.3.2), the condition is true.¶
A recipient of an If-Range header field MUST ignore the
Range header field if the If-Range condition
evaluates to false. Otherwise, the recipient SHOULD process the
Range header field as requested.¶
Note that the If-Range comparison is by exact match, including when the
validator is an HTTP-date, and so it
differs from the "earlier than or equal to" comparison used when evaluating
an If-Unmodified-Since conditional.¶
Except when excluded below, a recipient cache or origin server MUST
evaluate received request preconditions after it has successfully performed
its normal request checks and just before it would process the request content
(if any) or perform the action associated with the request method.
A server MUST ignore all received preconditions if its response to the
same request without those conditions, prior to processing the request content,
would have been a status code other than a 2xx (Successful)
or 412 (Precondition Failed).
In other words, redirects and failures that can be detected before
significant processing occurs take precedence over the evaluation
of preconditions.¶
A server that is not the origin server for the target resource and cannot
act as a cache for requests on the target resource MUST NOT evaluate the
conditional request header fields defined by this specification, and it
MUST forward them if the request is forwarded, since the generating
client intends that they be evaluated by a server that can provide a
current representation.
Likewise, a server MUST ignore the conditional request header fields
defined by this specification when received with a request method that does
not involve the selection or modification of a
selected representation, such as CONNECT, OPTIONS, or TRACE.¶
Note that protocol extensions can modify the conditions under which
preconditions are evaluated or the consequences of their evaluation.
For example, the immutable cache directive
(defined by [RFC8246]) instructs caches to forgo
forwarding conditional requests when they hold a fresh response.¶
Although conditional request header fields are defined as being usable with
the HEAD method (to keep HEAD's semantics consistent with those of GET),
there is no point in sending a conditional HEAD because a successful
response is around the same size as a 304 (Not Modified)
response and more useful than a 412 (Precondition Failed)
response.¶
When more than one conditional request header field is present in a request,
the order in which the fields are evaluated becomes important. In practice,
the fields defined in this document are consistently implemented in a
single, logical order, since "lost update" preconditions have more strict
requirements than cache validation, a validated cache is more efficient
than a partial response, and entity tags are presumed to be more accurate
than date validators.¶
A recipient cache or origin server MUST evaluate the request
preconditions defined by this specification in the following order:¶
When recipient is the origin server and
If-Match is present,
evaluate the If-Match precondition:¶
perform the requested method and
respond according to its success or failure.¶
Any extension to HTTP that defines additional conditional request
header fields ought to define the order
for evaluating such fields in relation to those defined in this document
and other conditionals that might be found in practice.¶
Clients often encounter interrupted data
transfers as a result of canceled requests or dropped connections. When a
client has stored a partial representation, it is desirable to request the
remainder of that representation in a subsequent request rather than
transfer the entire representation. Likewise, devices with limited local
storage might benefit from being able to request only a subset of a larger
representation, such as a single page of a very large document, or the
dimensions of an embedded image.¶
Range requests are an OPTIONAL feature
of HTTP, designed so that recipients not implementing this feature (or not
supporting it for the target resource) can respond as if it is a normal
GET request without impacting interoperability. Partial responses are
indicated by a distinct status code to not be mistaken for full responses
by caches that might not implement the feature.¶
Representation data can be partitioned into subranges when there are
addressable structural units inherent to that data's content coding or
media type. For example, octet (a.k.a. byte) boundaries are a structural
unit common to all representation data, allowing partitions of the data to
be identified as a range of bytes at some offset from the start or end of
that data.¶
This general notion of a "range unit" is used
in the Accept-Ranges (Section 14.3)
response header field to advertise support for range requests, the
Range (Section 14.2) request header field
to delineate the parts of a representation that are requested, and the
Content-Range (Section 14.4)
header field to describe which part of a representation is being
transferred.¶
All range unit names are case-insensitive and ought to be registered
within the "HTTP Range Unit Registry", as defined in
Section 16.5.1.¶
Range units are intended to be extensible, as described in
Section 16.5.¶
Ranges are expressed in terms of a range unit paired with a set of range
specifiers. The range unit name determines what kinds of range-spec
are applicable to its own specifiers. Hence, the following grammar is
generic: each range unit is expected to specify requirements on when
int-range, suffix-range, and
other-range are allowed.¶
A range request can specify a single range or a set
of ranges within a single representation.¶
An int-range is a range expressed as two non-negative
integers or as one non-negative integer through to the end of the
representation data.
The range unit specifies what the integers mean (e.g., they might indicate
unit offsets from the beginning, inclusive numbered parts, etc.).¶
A suffix-range is a range expressed as a suffix of the
representation data with the provided non-negative integer maximum length
(in range units). In other words, the last N units of the representation
data.¶
To provide for extensibility, the other-range rule is a
mostly unconstrained grammar that allows application-specific or future
range units to define additional range specifiers.¶
The "bytes" range unit is used to express subranges of a representation
data's octet sequence.
Each byte range is expressed as an integer range at some offset, relative
to either the beginning (int-range) or end
(suffix-range) of the representation data.
Byte ranges do not use the other-range specifier.¶
The first-pos value in a bytes int-range
gives the offset of the first byte in a range.
The last-pos value gives the offset of the last
byte in the range; that is, the byte positions specified are inclusive.
Byte offsets start at zero.¶
If the representation data has a content coding applied, each byte range is
calculated with respect to the encoded sequence of bytes, not the sequence
of underlying bytes that would be obtained after decoding.¶
The first 500 bytes (byte offsets 0-499, inclusive):¶
The second 500 bytes (byte offsets 500-999, inclusive):¶
A client can limit the number of bytes requested without knowing the size
of the selected representation.
If the last-pos value is absent, or if the value is
greater than or equal to the current length of the representation data, the
byte range is interpreted as the remainder of the representation (i.e., the
server replaces the value of last-pos with a value that
is one less than the current length of the selected representation).¶
A client can refer to the last N bytes (N > 0) of the selected
representation using a suffix-range.
If the selected representation is shorter than the specified
suffix-length, the entire representation is used.¶
Additional examples, assuming a representation of length 10000:¶
The final 500 bytes (byte offsets 9500-9999, inclusive):¶
In the byte-range syntax, first-pos,
last-pos, and suffix-length are
expressed as decimal number of octets. Since there is no predefined limit
to the length of content, recipients MUST anticipate potentially
large decimal numerals and prevent parsing errors due to integer conversion
overflows.¶
The "Range" header field on a GET request modifies the method semantics to
request transfer of only one or more subranges of the
selected representation data (Section 8.1),
rather than the entire selected representation.¶
A server MAY ignore the Range header field. However, origin servers and
intermediate caches ought to support byte ranges when possible, since they
support efficient recovery from partially failed transfers and partial
retrieval of large representations.¶
A server MUST ignore a Range header field received with a request method
that is unrecognized or for which range handling is not defined. For this
specification, GET is the only method for which range handling
is defined.¶
An origin server MUST ignore a Range header field that contains a range
unit it does not understand. A proxy MAY discard a Range header
field that contains a range unit it does not understand.¶
A server that supports range requests MAY ignore or reject a
Range header field that contains an invalid
ranges-specifier (Section 14.1.1),
a ranges-specifier with more than two overlapping ranges,
or a set of many small ranges that are not listed in ascending order,
since these are indications of either a broken client or a deliberate
denial-of-service attack (Section 17.15).
A client SHOULD NOT request multiple ranges that are inherently less
efficient to process and transfer than a single range that encompasses the
same data.¶
A server that supports range requests MAY ignore a Range
header field when the selected representation has no content
(i.e., the selected representation's data is of zero length).¶
A client that is requesting multiple ranges SHOULD list those ranges in
ascending order (the order in which they would typically be received in a
complete representation) unless there is a specific need to request a later
part earlier. For example, a user agent processing a large representation
with an internal catalog of parts might need to request later parts first,
particularly if the representation consists of pages stored in reverse
order and the user agent wishes to transfer one page at a time.¶
The Range header field is evaluated after evaluating the precondition header
fields defined in Section 13.1, and only if the result in absence
of the Range header field would be a 200 (OK) response. In
other words, Range is ignored when a conditional GET would result in a
304 (Not Modified) response.¶
The If-Range header field (Section 13.1.5) can be used as
a precondition to applying the Range header field.¶
If all of the preconditions are true, the server supports the Range header
field for the target resource, the received Range field-value contains a
valid ranges-specifier with a range-unit
supported for that target resource, and that
ranges-specifier is satisfiable with respect
to the selected representation,
the server SHOULD send a 206 (Partial Content) response
with content containing one or more partial representations
that correspond to the satisfiable range-spec(s) requested.¶
The above does not imply that a server will send all requested ranges.
In some cases, it may only be possible (or efficient) to send a portion of
the requested ranges first, while expecting the client to re-request the
remaining portions later if they are still desired
(see Section 15.3.7).¶
If all of the preconditions are true, the server supports the Range header
field for the target resource, the received Range field-value contains a
valid ranges-specifier, and either the
range-unit is not supported for that target resource or
the ranges-specifier is unsatisfiable with respect to
the selected representation, the server SHOULD send a
416 (Range Not Satisfiable) response.¶
to indicate that it supports byte range requests for that target resource,
thereby encouraging its use by the client for future partial requests on
the same request path.
Range units are defined in Section 14.1.¶
A client MAY generate range requests regardless of having received an
Accept-Ranges field. The information only provides advice for the sake of
improving performance and reducing unnecessary network transfers.¶
Conversely, a client MUST NOT assume that receiving an Accept-Ranges field
means that future range requests will return partial responses. The content might
change, the server might only support range requests at certain times or under
certain conditions, or a different intermediary might process the next request.¶
A server that does not support any kind of range request for the target
resource MAY send¶
to advise the client not to attempt a range request on the same request path.
The range unit "none" is reserved for this purpose.¶
The Accept-Ranges field MAY be sent in a trailer section, but is preferred
to be sent as a header field because the information is particularly useful
for restarting large information transfers that have failed in mid-content
(before the trailer section is received).¶
The "Content-Range" header field is sent in a single part
206 (Partial Content) response to indicate the partial range
of the selected representation enclosed as the message content, sent in
each part of a multipart 206 response to indicate the range enclosed within
each body part (Section 14.6), and sent in 416 (Range Not Satisfiable)
responses to provide information about the selected representation.¶
If a 206 (Partial Content) response contains a
Content-Range header field with a range unit
(Section 14.1) that the recipient does not understand, the
recipient MUST NOT attempt to recombine it with a stored representation.
A proxy that receives such a message SHOULD forward it downstream.¶
Content-Range might also be sent as a request modifier to request a
partial PUT, as described in Section 14.5, based on private
agreements between client and origin server.
A server MUST ignore a Content-Range header field received in a request
with a method for which Content-Range support is not defined.¶
For byte ranges, a sender SHOULD indicate the complete length of the
representation from which the range has been extracted, unless the complete
length is unknown or difficult to determine. An asterisk character ("*") in
place of the complete-length indicates that the representation length was
unknown when the header field was generated.¶
The following example illustrates when the complete length of the selected
representation is known by the sender to be 1234 bytes:¶
A Content-Range field value is invalid if it contains a
range-resp that has a last-pos
value less than its first-pos value, or a
complete-length value less than or equal to its
last-pos value. The recipient of an invalid
Content-RangeMUST NOT attempt to recombine the received
content with a stored representation.¶
A server generating a 416 (Range Not Satisfiable) response
to a byte-range request SHOULD send a Content-Range header field with an
unsatisfied-range value, as in the following example:¶
The complete-length in a 416 response indicates the current length of the
selected representation.¶
The Content-Range header field has no meaning for status codes that do
not explicitly describe its semantic. For this specification, only the
206 (Partial Content) and
416 (Range Not Satisfiable) status codes describe a meaning
for Content-Range.¶
The following are examples of Content-Range values in which the
selected representation contains a total of 1234 bytes:¶
Some origin servers support PUT of a partial representation
when the user agent sends a Content-Range header field
(Section 14.4) in the request, though
such support is inconsistent and depends on private agreements with
user agents. In general, it requests that the state of the
target resource be partly replaced with the enclosed content
at an offset and length indicated by the Content-Range value, where the
offset is relative to the current selected representation.¶
An origin server SHOULD respond with a 400 (Bad Request)
status code if it receives Content-Range on a PUT for a
target resource that does not support partial PUT requests.¶
Partial PUT is not backwards compatible with the original definition of PUT.
It may result in the content being written as a complete replacement for the
current representation.¶
Partial resource updates are also possible by targeting a separately
identified resource with state that overlaps or extends a portion of the
larger resource, or by using a different method that has been specifically
defined for partial updates (for example, the PATCH method defined in
[RFC5789]).¶
When a 206 (Partial Content) response message includes the
content of multiple ranges, they are transmitted as body parts in a
multipart message body ([RFC2046], Section 5.1)
with the media type of "multipart/byteranges".¶
The "multipart/byteranges" media type includes one or more body parts, each
with its own Content-Type and Content-Range
fields. The required boundary parameter specifies the boundary string used
to separate each body part.¶
Additional CRLFs might precede the first boundary string in the body.¶
Although [RFC2046] permits the boundary string to be
quoted, some existing implementations handle a quoted boundary
string incorrectly.¶
A number of clients and servers were coded to an early draft
of the byteranges specification that used a media type of
"multipart/x-byteranges",
which is almost (but not quite) compatible with this type.¶
Despite the name, the "multipart/byteranges" media type is not limited to
byte ranges. The following example uses an "exampleunit" range unit:¶
HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 1995 06:25:24 GMT
Last-Modified: Tue, 14 July 04:58:08 GMT
Content-Length: 2331785
Content-Type: multipart/byteranges; boundary=THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-Type: video/example
Content-Range: exampleunit 1.2-4.3/25
...the first range...
--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-Type: video/example
Content-Range: exampleunit 11.2-14.3/25
...the second range
--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES--
The status code of a response is a three-digit integer code that describes
the result of the request and the semantics of the response, including
whether the request was successful and what content is enclosed (if any).
All valid status codes are within the range of 100 to 599, inclusive.¶
The first digit of the status code defines the class of response. The
last two digits do not have any categorization role. There are five
values for the first digit:¶
5xx (Server Error): The server failed to fulfill an apparently
valid request¶
HTTP status codes are extensible. A client is not required to understand
the meaning of all registered status codes, though such understanding is
obviously desirable. However, a client MUST understand the class of any
status code, as indicated by the first digit, and treat an unrecognized
status code as being equivalent to the x00 status code of that class.¶
For example, if a client receives an unrecognized status code of 471,
it can see from the first digit that there was something wrong with its
request and treat the response as if it had received a
400 (Bad Request) status code. The response
message will usually contain a representation that explains the status.¶
Values outside the range 100..599 are invalid. Implementations often use
three-digit integer values outside of that range (i.e., 600..999) for
internal communication of non-HTTP status (e.g., library errors). A client
that receives a response with an invalid status code SHOULD process the
response as if it had a 5xx (Server Error) status code.¶
A single request can have multiple associated responses: zero or more
"interim" (non-final) responses with status codes in the
"informational" (1xx) range, followed by exactly one
"final" response with a status code in one of the other ranges.¶
The status codes listed below are defined in this specification.
The reason phrases listed here are only recommendations -- they can be
replaced by local equivalents or left out altogether without affecting the
protocol.¶
Responses with status codes that are defined as heuristically cacheable
(e.g., 200, 203, 204, 206, 300, 301, 308, 404, 405, 410, 414, and 501 in this
specification) can be reused by a cache with heuristic expiration unless
otherwise indicated by the method definition or explicit cache controls
[CACHING]; all other status codes are not heuristically cacheable.¶
Additional status codes, outside the scope of this specification, have been
specified for use in HTTP. All such status codes ought to be registered
within the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Status Code Registry",
as described in Section 16.2.¶
The 1xx (Informational) class of status code indicates an
interim response for communicating connection status or request progress
prior to completing the requested action and sending a final response.
Since HTTP/1.0 did not define any 1xx status codes, a server MUST NOT send
a 1xx response to an HTTP/1.0 client.¶
A 1xx response is terminated by the end of the header section;
it cannot contain content or trailers.¶
A client MUST be able to parse one or more 1xx responses received
prior to a final response, even if the client does not expect one.
A user agent MAY ignore unexpected 1xx responses.¶
A proxy MUST forward 1xx responses unless the proxy itself
requested the generation of the 1xx response. For example, if a
proxy adds an "Expect: 100-continue" header field when it forwards a request,
then it need not forward the corresponding 100 (Continue)
response(s).¶
The 100 (Continue) status code indicates that the initial
part of a request has been received and has not yet been rejected by the
server. The server intends to send a final response after the request has
been fully received and acted upon.¶
When the request contains an Expect header field that
includes a 100-continue expectation, the 100 response
indicates that the server wishes to receive the request content,
as described in Section 10.1.1. The client
ought to continue sending the request and discard the 100 response.¶
If the request did not contain an Expect header field
containing the 100-continue expectation,
the client can simply discard this interim response.¶
The 101 (Switching Protocols) status code indicates that the
server understands and is willing to comply with the client's request,
via the Upgrade header field (Section 7.8), for
a change in the application protocol being used on this connection.
The server MUST generate an Upgrade header field in the response that
indicates which protocol(s) will be in effect after this response.¶
It is assumed that the server will only agree to switch protocols when
it is advantageous to do so. For example, switching to a newer version of
HTTP might be advantageous over older versions, and switching to a
real-time, synchronous protocol might be advantageous when delivering
resources that use such features.¶
The 200 (OK) status code indicates that the request has
succeeded. The content sent in a 200 response depends on the request
method. For the methods defined by this specification, the intended meaning
of the content can be summarized as:¶
the target resource, like GET, but without
transferring the representation data
POST
the status of, or results obtained from, the action
PUT, DELETE
the status of the action
OPTIONS
communication options for the target resource
TRACE
the request message as received by the server returning the
trace
Aside from responses to CONNECT, a 200 response is expected to contain
message content unless the message framing explicitly indicates that the
content has zero length. If some aspect of the request indicates a
preference for no content upon success, the origin server ought to send a
204 (No Content) response instead.
For CONNECT, there is no content because the successful result is a
tunnel, which begins immediately after the 200 response header section.¶
A 200 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
In 200 responses to GET or HEAD, an origin server SHOULD send any
available validator fields (Section 8.8) for the
selected representation, with both a strong entity tag and
a Last-Modified date being preferred.¶
In 200 responses to state-changing methods, any validator fields
(Section 8.8) sent in the response convey the
current validators for the new representation formed as a result of
successfully applying the request semantics. Note that the PUT method
(Section 9.3.4) has additional requirements that might preclude
sending such validators.¶
The 201 (Created) status code indicates that the request has
been fulfilled and has resulted in one or more new resources being created.
The primary resource created by the request is identified by either a
Location header field in the response or, if no
Location header field is received, by the target URI.¶
The 201 response content typically describes and links to the resource(s)
created. Any validator fields (Section 8.8)
sent in the response convey the current validators for a new
representation created by the request. Note that the PUT method
(Section 9.3.4) has additional requirements that might preclude
sending such validators.¶
The 202 (Accepted) status code indicates that the request
has been accepted for processing, but the processing has not been
completed. The request might or might not eventually be acted upon, as it
might be disallowed when processing actually takes place. There is no
facility in HTTP for re-sending a status code from an asynchronous
operation.¶
The 202 response is intentionally noncommittal. Its purpose is to
allow a server to accept a request for some other process (perhaps a
batch-oriented process that is only run once per day) without
requiring that the user agent's connection to the server persist
until the process is completed. The representation sent with this
response ought to describe the request's current status and point to
(or embed) a status monitor that can provide the user with an estimate of
when the request will be fulfilled.¶
The 203 (Non-Authoritative Information) status code
indicates that the request was successful but the enclosed content has been
modified from that of the origin server's 200 (OK) response
by a transforming proxy (Section 7.7). This status code allows the
proxy to notify recipients when a transformation has been applied, since
that knowledge might impact later decisions regarding the content. For
example, future cache validation requests for the content might only be
applicable along the same request path (through the same proxies).¶
A 203 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
The 204 (No Content) status code indicates that the server
has successfully fulfilled the request and that there is no additional
content to send in the response content. Metadata in the response
header fields refer to the target resource and its
selected representation after the requested action was applied.¶
For example, if a 204 status code is received in response to a PUT
request and the response contains an ETag field, then
the PUT was successful and the ETag field value contains the entity tag for
the new representation of that target resource.¶
The 204 response allows a server to indicate that the action has been
successfully applied to the target resource, while implying that the
user agent does not need to traverse away from its current "document view"
(if any). The server assumes that the user agent will provide some
indication of the success to its user, in accord with its own interface,
and apply any new or updated metadata in the response to its active
representation.¶
For example, a 204 status code is commonly used with document editing
interfaces corresponding to a "save" action, such that the document
being saved remains available to the user for editing. It is also
frequently used with interfaces that expect automated data transfers
to be prevalent, such as within distributed version control systems.¶
A 204 response is terminated by the end of the header section;
it cannot contain content or trailers.¶
A 204 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
The 205 (Reset Content) status code indicates that the
server has fulfilled the request and desires that the user agent reset the
"document view", which caused the request to be sent, to its original state
as received from the origin server.¶
This response is intended to support a common data entry use case where
the user receives content that supports data entry (a form, notepad,
canvas, etc.), enters or manipulates data in that space, causes the entered
data to be submitted in a request, and then the data entry mechanism is
reset for the next entry so that the user can easily initiate another
input action.¶
Since the 205 status code implies that no additional content will be
provided, a server MUST NOT generate content in a 205 response.¶
The 206 (Partial Content) status code indicates that the
server is successfully fulfilling a range request for the target resource
by transferring one or more parts of the
selected representation.¶
A server that supports range requests (Section 14) will
usually attempt to satisfy all of the requested ranges, since sending
less data will likely result in another client request for the remainder.
However, a server might want to send only a subset of the data requested
for reasons of its own, such as temporary unavailability, cache efficiency,
load balancing, etc. Since a 206 response is self-descriptive, the client
can still understand a response that only partially satisfies its range
request.¶
A client MUST inspect a 206 response's Content-Type and
Content-Range field(s) to determine what parts are enclosed
and whether additional requests are needed.¶
A server that generates a 206 response MUST generate the following
header fields, in addition to those required in the subsections below,
if the field would
have been sent in a 200 (OK) response to the same request:
Date, Cache-Control, ETag,
Expires, Content-Location, and
Vary.¶
A Content-Length header field present in a 206 response
indicates the number of octets in the content of this message, which is
usually not the complete length of the selected representation.
Each Content-Range header field includes information about the
selected representation's complete length.¶
A sender that generates a 206 response to a request with an If-Range
header field SHOULD NOT generate other representation header
fields beyond those required because the client
already has a prior response containing those header fields.
Otherwise, a sender MUST generate all of the representation header
fields that would have been sent in a 200 (OK) response
to the same request.¶
A 206 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
If a single part is being transferred, the server generating the 206
response MUST generate a Content-Range header field,
describing what range of the selected representation is enclosed, and a
content consisting of the range. For example:¶
HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content
Date: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 06:25:24 GMT
Last-Modified: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 04:58:08 GMT
Content-Range: bytes 21010-47021/47022
Content-Length: 26012
Content-Type: image/gif
... 26012 bytes of partial image data ...
If multiple parts are being transferred, the server generating the 206
response MUST generate "multipart/byteranges" content, as defined
in Section 14.6, and a
Content-Type header field containing the
"multipart/byteranges" media type and its required boundary parameter.
To avoid confusion with single-part responses, a server MUST NOT generate
a Content-Range header field in the HTTP header section of a
multiple part response (this field will be sent in each part instead).¶
Within the header area of each body part in the multipart content, the
server MUST generate a Content-Range header field
corresponding to the range being enclosed in that body part.
If the selected representation would have had a Content-Type
header field in a 200 (OK) response, the server SHOULD
generate that same Content-Type header field in the header area of
each body part. For example:¶
HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content
Date: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 06:25:24 GMT
Last-Modified: Wed, 15 Nov 1995 04:58:08 GMT
Content-Length: 1741
Content-Type: multipart/byteranges; boundary=THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-Type: application/pdf
Content-Range: bytes 500-999/8000
...the first range...
--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES
Content-Type: application/pdf
Content-Range: bytes 7000-7999/8000
...the second range
--THIS_STRING_SEPARATES--
When multiple ranges are requested, a server MAY coalesce any of the
ranges that overlap, or that are separated by a gap that is smaller than the
overhead of sending multiple parts, regardless of the order in which the
corresponding range-spec appeared in the received Range
header field. Since the typical overhead between each part of a
"multipart/byteranges" is around 80 bytes, depending on the selected
representation's media type and the chosen boundary parameter length, it
can be less efficient to transfer many small disjoint parts than it is to
transfer the entire selected representation.¶
A server MUST NOT generate a multipart response to a request for a single
range, since a client that does not request multiple parts might not
support multipart responses. However, a server MAY generate a
"multipart/byteranges" response with only a single body part if multiple
ranges were requested and only one range was found to be satisfiable or
only one range remained after coalescing.
A client that cannot process a "multipart/byteranges" response MUST NOT
generate a request that asks for multiple ranges.¶
A server that generates a multipart response SHOULD send
the parts in the same order that the corresponding range-spec appeared
in the received Range header field, excluding those ranges
that were deemed unsatisfiable or that were coalesced into other ranges.
A client that receives a multipart response MUST inspect the
Content-Range header field present in each body part in
order to determine which range is contained in that body part; a client
cannot rely on receiving the same ranges that it requested, nor the same
order that it requested.¶
A response might transfer only a subrange of a representation if the
connection closed prematurely or if the request used one or more Range
specifications. After several such transfers, a client might have
received several ranges of the same representation. These ranges can only
be safely combined if they all have in common the same strong validator
(Section 8.8.1).¶
A client that has received multiple partial responses to GET requests on a
target resource MAY combine those responses into a larger continuous
range if they share the same strong validator.¶
If the most recent response is an incomplete 200 (OK)
response, then the header fields of that response are used for any
combined response and replace those of the matching stored responses.¶
If the most recent response is a 206 (Partial Content)
response and at least one of the matching stored responses is a
200 (OK), then the combined response header fields consist
of the most recent 200 response's header fields. If all of the matching
stored responses are 206 responses, then the stored response with the most
recent header fields is used as the source of header fields for the
combined response, except that the client MUST use other header fields
provided in the new response, aside from Content-Range, to
replace all instances of the corresponding header fields in the stored
response.¶
The combined response content consists of the union of partial content
ranges within the new response and all of the matching stored responses.
If the union consists of the entire range of the representation, then the
client MUST process the combined response as if it were a complete
200 (OK) response, including a Content-Length
header field that reflects the complete length.
Otherwise, the client MUST process the set of continuous ranges as one of
the following:
an incomplete 200 (OK) response if the combined response is
a prefix of the representation,
a single 206 (Partial Content) response containing
"multipart/byteranges" content, or
multiple 206 (Partial Content) responses, each with one
continuous range that is indicated by a Content-Range header
field.¶
The 3xx (Redirection) class of status code indicates that
further action needs to be taken by the user agent in order to fulfill the
request. There are several types of redirects:¶
Redirection that offers a choice among matching resources capable
of representing this resource, as in the
300 (Multiple Choices) status code.¶
Redirection to a different resource, identified by the
Location header field, that can represent an indirect
response to the request, as in the 303 (See Other)
status code.¶
Redirection to a previously stored result, as in the
304 (Not Modified) status code.¶
If a Location header field
(Section 10.2.2) is provided, the user agent MAY
automatically redirect its request to the URI referenced by the Location
field value, even if the specific status code is not understood.
Automatic redirection needs to be done with care for methods not known to be
safe, as defined in Section 9.2.1, since
the user might not wish to redirect an unsafe request.¶
When automatically following a redirected request, the user agent SHOULD
resend the original request message with the following modifications:¶
Replace the target URI with the URI referenced by the redirection response's
Location header field value after resolving it relative to the original
request's target URI.¶
Remove header fields that were automatically generated by the implementation,
replacing them with updated values as appropriate to the new request. This
includes:¶
Resource-specific header fields, including (but not limited to)
Referer, Origin,
Authorization, and Cookie.¶
Consider removing header fields that were not automatically generated by the
implementation (i.e., those present in the request because they were added
by the calling context) where there are security implications; this
includes but is not limited to Authorization and Cookie.¶
Change the request method according to the redirecting status code's
semantics, if applicable.¶
The 300 (Multiple Choices) status code indicates that the
target resource has more than one representation, each with
its own more specific identifier, and information about the alternatives is
being provided so that the user (or user agent) can select a preferred
representation by redirecting its request to one or more of those
identifiers. In other words, the server desires that the user agent engage
in reactive negotiation to select the most appropriate representation(s)
for its needs (Section 12).¶
If the server has a preferred choice, the server SHOULD generate a
Location header field containing a preferred choice's URI
reference. The user agent MAY use the Location field value for automatic
redirection.¶
For request methods other than HEAD, the server SHOULD generate content
in the 300 response containing a list of representation metadata and URI
reference(s) from which the user or user agent can choose the one most
preferred. The user agent MAY make a selection from that list
automatically if it understands the provided media type. A specific format
for automatic selection is not defined by this specification because HTTP
tries to remain orthogonal to the definition of its content.
In practice, the representation is provided in some easily parsed format
believed to be acceptable to the user agent, as determined by shared design
or content negotiation, or in some commonly accepted hypertext format.¶
A 300 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
The 301 (Moved Permanently) status code indicates that the
target resource has been assigned a new permanent URI and
any future references to this resource ought to use one of the enclosed
URIs. The server is suggesting that a user agent with link-editing capability
can permanently replace references to the target URI with one of the
new references sent by the server. However, this suggestion is usually
ignored unless the user agent is actively editing references
(e.g., engaged in authoring content), the connection is secured, and
the origin server is a trusted authority for the content being edited.¶
The server SHOULD generate a Location header field in the
response containing a preferred URI reference for the new permanent URI.
The user agent MAY use the Location field value for automatic redirection.
The server's response content usually contains a short hypertext note with
a hyperlink to the new URI(s).¶
A 301 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
The 302 (Found) status code indicates that the target
resource resides temporarily under a different URI. Since the redirection
might be altered on occasion, the client ought to continue to use the
target URI for future requests.¶
The server SHOULD generate a Location header field in the
response containing a URI reference for the different URI.
The user agent MAY use the Location field value for automatic redirection.
The server's response content usually contains a short hypertext note with
a hyperlink to the different URI(s).¶
The 303 (See Other) status code indicates that the server is
redirecting the user agent to a different resource, as indicated by a URI
in the Location header field, which is intended to provide
an indirect response to the original request. A user agent can perform a
retrieval request targeting that URI (a GET or HEAD request if using HTTP),
which might also be redirected, and present the eventual result as an
answer to the original request. Note that the new URI in the Location
header field is not considered equivalent to the target URI.¶
This status code is applicable to any HTTP method. It is
primarily used to allow the output of a POST action to redirect
the user agent to a different resource, since doing so provides the
information corresponding to the POST response as a resource that
can be separately identified, bookmarked, and cached.¶
A 303 response to a GET request indicates that the origin server does not
have a representation of the target resource that can be
transferred by the server over HTTP. However, the
Location field value refers to a resource that is
descriptive of the target resource, such that making a retrieval request
on that other resource might result in a representation that is useful to
recipients without implying that it represents the original target resource.
Note that answers to the questions of what can be represented, what
representations are adequate, and what might be a useful description are
outside the scope of HTTP.¶
Except for responses to a HEAD request, the representation of a 303
response ought to contain a short hypertext note with a hyperlink to the
same URI reference provided in the Location header field.¶
The 304 (Not Modified) status code indicates that a
conditional GET or HEAD request has been
received and would have resulted in a 200 (OK) response
if it were not for the fact that the condition evaluated to false.
In other words, there is no need for the server to transfer a
representation of the target resource because the request indicates that
the client, which made the request conditional, already has a valid
representation; the server is therefore redirecting the client to make
use of that stored representation as if it were the content of a
200 (OK) response.¶
The server generating a 304 response MUST generate any of the following
header fields that would have been sent in a 200 (OK)
response to the same request:¶
Since the goal of a 304 response is to minimize information transfer
when the recipient already has one or more cached representations,
a sender SHOULD NOT generate representation metadata other
than the above listed fields unless said metadata exists for the
purpose of guiding cache updates (e.g., Last-Modified might
be useful if the response does not have an ETag field).¶
Requirements on a cache that receives a 304 response are defined in
Section 4.3.4 of [CACHING]. If the conditional request originated with an
outbound client, such as a user agent with its own cache sending a
conditional GET to a shared proxy, then the proxy SHOULD forward the
304 response to that client.¶
A 304 response is terminated by the end of the header section;
it cannot contain content or trailers.¶
The 307 (Temporary Redirect) status code indicates that the
target resource resides temporarily under a different URI
and the user agent MUST NOT change the request method if it performs an
automatic redirection to that URI.
Since the redirection can change over time, the client ought to continue
using the original target URI for future requests.¶
The server SHOULD generate a Location header field in the
response containing a URI reference for the different URI.
The user agent MAY use the Location field value for automatic redirection.
The server's response content usually contains a short hypertext note with
a hyperlink to the different URI(s).¶
The 308 (Permanent Redirect) status code indicates that the
target resource has been assigned a new permanent URI and
any future references to this resource ought to use one of the enclosed
URIs. The server is suggesting that a user agent with link-editing capability
can permanently replace references to the target URI with one of the
new references sent by the server. However, this suggestion is usually
ignored unless the user agent is actively editing references
(e.g., engaged in authoring content), the connection is secured, and
the origin server is a trusted authority for the content being edited.¶
The server SHOULD generate a Location header field in the
response containing a preferred URI reference for the new permanent URI.
The user agent MAY use the Location field value for automatic redirection.
The server's response content usually contains a short hypertext note with
a hyperlink to the new URI(s).¶
A 308 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
The 4xx (Client Error) class of status code indicates that
the client seems to have erred. Except when responding to a HEAD request,
the server SHOULD send a representation containing an explanation of
the error situation, and whether it is a temporary or permanent condition.
These status codes are applicable to any request method. User agents
SHOULD display any included representation to the user.¶
The 400 (Bad Request) status code indicates that the server
cannot or will not process the request due to something that is perceived
to be a client error (e.g., malformed request syntax, invalid request
message framing, or deceptive request routing).¶
The 401 (Unauthorized) status code indicates that the
request has not been applied because it lacks valid authentication
credentials for the target resource.
The server generating a 401 response MUST send a
WWW-Authenticate header field
(Section 11.6.1)
containing at least one challenge applicable to the target resource.¶
If the request included authentication credentials, then the 401 response
indicates that authorization has been refused for those credentials.
The user agent MAY repeat the request with a new or replaced
Authorization header field (Section 11.6.2).
If the 401 response contains the same challenge as the prior response, and
the user agent has already attempted authentication at least once, then the
user agent SHOULD present the enclosed representation to the user, since
it usually contains relevant diagnostic information.¶
The 403 (Forbidden) status code indicates that the
server understood the request but refuses to fulfill it.
A server that wishes to make public why the request has been forbidden
can describe that reason in the response content (if any).¶
If authentication credentials were provided in the request, the
server considers them insufficient to grant access.
The client SHOULD NOT automatically repeat the request with the same
credentials.
The client MAY repeat the request with new or different credentials.
However, a request might be forbidden for reasons unrelated to the
credentials.¶
An origin server that wishes to "hide" the current existence of a forbidden
target resourceMAY instead respond with a status
code of 404 (Not Found).¶
The 404 (Not Found) status code indicates that the origin
server did not find a current representation for the
target resource or is not willing to disclose that one
exists. A 404 status code does not indicate whether this lack of representation
is temporary or permanent; the 410 (Gone) status code is
preferred over 404 if the origin server knows, presumably through some
configurable means, that the condition is likely to be permanent.¶
A 404 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
The 405 (Method Not Allowed) status code indicates that the
method received in the request-line is known by the origin server but
not supported by the target resource.
The origin server MUST generate an Allow header field in
a 405 response containing a list of the target resource's currently
supported methods.¶
A 405 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
The 406 (Not Acceptable) status code indicates that the
target resource does not have a current representation that
would be acceptable to the user agent, according to the
proactive negotiation header fields received in the request
(Section 12.1), and the server is unwilling to supply a
default representation.¶
The server SHOULD generate content containing a list of available
representation characteristics and corresponding resource identifiers from
which the user or user agent can choose the one most appropriate.
A user agent MAY automatically select the most appropriate choice from
that list. However, this specification does not define any standard for
such automatic selection, as described in Section 15.4.1.¶
The 407 (Proxy Authentication Required) status code is
similar to 401 (Unauthorized), but it indicates that the client
needs to authenticate itself in order to use a proxy for this request.
The proxy MUST send a Proxy-Authenticate header field
(Section 11.7.1) containing a challenge
applicable to that proxy for the request. The client MAY repeat
the request with a new or replaced Proxy-Authorization
header field (Section 11.7.2).¶
The 408 (Request Timeout) status code indicates
that the server did not receive a complete request message within the time
that it was prepared to wait.¶
If the client has an outstanding request in transit, it MAY repeat that
request. If the current connection is not usable (e.g., as it would be in
HTTP/1.1 because request delimitation is lost), a new connection will be
used.¶
The 409 (Conflict) status code indicates that the request
could not be completed due to a conflict with the current state of the target
resource. This code is used in situations where the user might be able to
resolve the conflict and resubmit the request. The server SHOULD generate
content that includes enough information for a user to recognize the
source of the conflict.¶
Conflicts are most likely to occur in response to a PUT request. For
example, if versioning were being used and the representation being PUT
included changes to a resource that conflict with those made by an
earlier (third-party) request, the origin server might use a 409 response
to indicate that it can't complete the request. In this case, the response
representation would likely contain information useful for merging the
differences based on the revision history.¶
The 410 (Gone) status code indicates that access to the
target resource is no longer available at the origin
server and that this condition is likely to be permanent. If the origin
server does not know, or has no facility to determine, whether or not the
condition is permanent, the status code 404 (Not Found)
ought to be used instead.¶
The 410 response is primarily intended to assist the task of web
maintenance by notifying the recipient that the resource is
intentionally unavailable and that the server owners desire that
remote links to that resource be removed. Such an event is common for
limited-time, promotional services and for resources belonging to
individuals no longer associated with the origin server's site. It is not
necessary to mark all permanently unavailable resources as "gone" or
to keep the mark for any length of time -- that is left to the
discretion of the server owner.¶
A 410 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
The 411 (Length Required) status code indicates that the
server refuses to accept the request without a defined
Content-Length (Section 8.6).
The client MAY repeat the request if it adds a valid Content-Length
header field containing the length of the request content.¶
The 412 (Precondition Failed) status code indicates that one
or more conditions given in the request header fields evaluated to false
when tested on the server (Section 13). This
response status code allows the client to place preconditions on the
current resource state (its current representations and metadata) and,
thus, prevent the request method from being applied if the target resource
is in an unexpected state.¶
The 413 (Content Too Large) status code indicates
that the server is refusing to process a request because the request
content is larger than the server is willing or able to process.
The server MAY terminate the request, if the protocol version in use
allows it; otherwise, the server MAY close the connection.¶
If the condition is temporary, the server SHOULD generate a
Retry-After header field to indicate that it is temporary
and after what time the client MAY try again.¶
The 414 (URI Too Long) status code indicates that the server
is refusing to service the request because the
target URI is longer than the server is willing to
interpret. This rare condition is only likely to occur when a client has
improperly converted a POST request to a GET request with long query
information, when the client has descended into an infinite loop of
redirection (e.g., a redirected URI prefix that points to a suffix of
itself) or when the server is under attack by a client attempting to
exploit potential security holes.¶
A 414 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
The 415 (Unsupported Media Type) status code indicates that
the origin server is refusing to service the request because the content is
in a format not supported by this method on the target resource.¶
The format problem might be due to the request's indicated
Content-Type or Content-Encoding, or as a
result of inspecting the data directly.¶
If the problem was caused by an unsupported content coding, the
Accept-Encoding response header field
(Section 12.5.3) ought to be
used to indicate which (if any) content codings would have been accepted
in the request.¶
On the other hand, if the cause was an unsupported media type, the
Accept response header field (Section 12.5.1)
can be used to indicate which media types would have been accepted
in the request.¶
The 416 (Range Not Satisfiable) status code indicates that
the set of ranges in the request's Range header field
(Section 14.2) has been rejected either because none of
the requested ranges are satisfiable or because the client has requested
an excessive number of small or overlapping ranges (a potential denial of
service attack).¶
Each range unit defines what is required for its own range sets to be
satisfiable. For example, Section 14.1.2 defines what makes
a bytes range set satisfiable.¶
A server that generates a 416 response to a byte-range request SHOULD
generate a Content-Range header field
specifying the current length of the selected representation
(Section 14.4).¶
The 417 (Expectation Failed) status code indicates that the
expectation given in the request's Expect header field
(Section 10.1.1) could not be met by at least one of the
inbound servers.¶
[RFC2324] was an April 1 RFC that lampooned the various ways
HTTP was abused; one such abuse was the definition of an
application-specific 418 status code, which has been deployed as a joke
often enough for the code to be unusable for any future use.¶
Therefore, the 418 status code is reserved in the IANA HTTP Status Code
Registry. This indicates that the status code cannot be assigned to other
applications currently. If future circumstances require its use (e.g.,
exhaustion of 4NN status codes), it can be re-assigned to another use.¶
The 421 (Misdirected Request) status code indicates that the request was
directed at a server that is unable or unwilling to produce an
authoritative response for the target URI. An origin server (or gateway
acting on behalf of the origin server) sends 421 to reject a target URI
that does not match an origin for which the server has been
configured (Section 4.3.1) or does not match the connection
context over which the request was received
(Section 7.4).¶
A client that receives a 421 (Misdirected Request) response MAY retry the
request, whether or not the request method is idempotent, over a different
connection, such as a fresh connection specific to the target resource's
origin, or via an alternative service [ALTSVC].¶
The 422 (Unprocessable Content) status code indicates that the server
understands the content type of the request content (hence a
415 (Unsupported Media Type) status code is inappropriate),
and the syntax of the request content is correct, but it was unable to process
the contained instructions. For example, this status code can be sent if
an XML request content contains well-formed (i.e., syntactically correct), but
semantically erroneous XML instructions.¶
The 426 (Upgrade Required) status code indicates that the
server refuses to perform the request using the current protocol but might
be willing to do so after the client upgrades to a different protocol.
The server MUST send an Upgrade header field in a 426
response to indicate the required protocol(s) (Section 7.8).¶
HTTP/1.1 426 Upgrade Required
Upgrade: HTTP/3.0
Connection: Upgrade
Content-Length: 53
Content-Type: text/plain
This service requires use of the HTTP/3.0 protocol.
The 5xx (Server Error) class of status code indicates that
the server is aware that it has erred or is incapable of performing the
requested method.
Except when responding to a HEAD request, the server SHOULD send a
representation containing an explanation of the error situation, and
whether it is a temporary or permanent condition.
A user agent SHOULD display any included representation to the user.
These status codes are applicable to any request method.¶
The 500 (Internal Server Error) status code indicates that
the server encountered an unexpected condition that prevented it from
fulfilling the request.¶
The 501 (Not Implemented) status code indicates that the
server does not support the functionality required to fulfill the request.
This is the appropriate response when the server does not recognize the
request method and is not capable of supporting it for any resource.¶
A 501 response is heuristically cacheable; i.e., unless otherwise indicated by
the method definition or explicit cache controls (see Section 4.2.2 of [CACHING]).¶
The 502 (Bad Gateway) status code indicates that the server,
while acting as a gateway or proxy, received an invalid response from an
inbound server it accessed while attempting to fulfill the request.¶
The 503 (Service Unavailable) status code indicates that the
server is currently unable to handle the request due to a temporary overload
or scheduled maintenance, which will likely be alleviated after some delay.
The server MAY send a Retry-After header field
(Section 10.2.3) to suggest an appropriate
amount of time for the client to wait before retrying the request.¶
The 504 (Gateway Timeout) status code indicates that the
server, while acting as a gateway or proxy, did not receive a timely
response from an upstream server it needed to access in order to
complete the request.¶
The 505 (HTTP Version Not Supported) status code indicates
that the server does not support, or refuses to support, the major version
of HTTP that was used in the request message. The server is indicating that
it is unable or unwilling to complete the request using the same major
version as the client, as described in Section 2.5, other than with this
error message. The server SHOULD generate a representation for the 505
response that describes why that version is not supported and what other
protocols are supported by that server.¶
HTTP defines a number of generic extension points that can be used to
introduce capabilities to the protocol without introducing a new version,
including methods, status codes, field names, and further extensibility
points within defined fields, such as authentication schemes and
cache directives (see Cache-Control extensions in Section 5.2.3 of [CACHING]). Because the semantics of HTTP are
not versioned, these extension points are persistent; the version of the
protocol in use does not affect their semantics.¶
Version-independent extensions are discouraged from depending on or
interacting with the specific version of the protocol in use. When this is
unavoidable, careful consideration needs to be given to how the extension
can interoperate across versions.¶
Additionally, specific versions of HTTP might have their own extensibility
points, such as transfer codings in HTTP/1.1 (Section 6.1 of [HTTP/1.1]) and HTTP/2 SETTINGS or frame types
([HTTP/2]). These extension points are specific to the
version of the protocol they occur within.¶
Version-specific extensions cannot override or modify the semantics of
a version-independent mechanism or extension point (like a method or
header field) without explicitly being allowed by that protocol element. For
example, the CONNECT method (Section 9.3.6) allows this.¶
These guidelines assure that the protocol operates correctly and
predictably, even when parts of the path implement different versions of
HTTP.¶
Standardized methods are generic; that is, they are potentially
applicable to any resource, not just one particular media type, kind of
resource, or application. As such, it is preferred that new methods
be registered in a document that isn't specific to a single application or
data format, since orthogonal technologies deserve orthogonal specification.¶
Since message parsing (Section 6) needs to be
independent of method
semantics (aside from responses to HEAD), definitions of new methods
cannot change the parsing algorithm or prohibit the presence of content
on either the request or the response message.
Definitions of new methods can specify that only a zero-length content
is allowed by requiring a Content-Length header field with a value of "0".¶
Likewise, new methods cannot use the special host:port and asterisk forms of
request target that are allowed for CONNECT and
OPTIONS, respectively (Section 7.1).
A full URI in absolute form is needed for the target URI, which means either
the request target needs to be sent in absolute form or the target URI will
be reconstructed from the request context in the same way it is for other
methods.¶
A new method definition needs to indicate whether it is safe (Section 9.2.1), idempotent (Section 9.2.2),
cacheable (Section 9.2.3), what
semantics are to be associated with the request content (if any), and what
refinements the method makes to header field or status code semantics.
If the new method is cacheable, its definition ought to describe how, and
under what conditions, a cache can store a response and use it to satisfy a
subsequent request.
The new method ought to describe whether it can be made conditional
(Section 13.1) and, if so, how a server responds
when the condition is false.
Likewise, if the new method might have some use for partial response
semantics (Section 14.2), it ought to document this, too.¶
When it is necessary to express semantics for a response that are not
defined by current status codes, a new status code can be registered.
Status codes are generic; they are potentially applicable to any resource,
not just one particular media type, kind of resource, or application of
HTTP. As such, it is preferred that new status codes be registered in a
document that isn't specific to a single application.¶
New status codes are required to fall under one of the categories
defined in Section 15. To allow existing parsers to
process the response message, new status codes cannot disallow content,
although they can mandate a zero-length content.¶
Proposals for new status codes that are not yet widely deployed ought to
avoid allocating a specific number for the code until there is clear
consensus that it will be registered; instead, early drafts can use a
notation such as "4NN", or "3N0" .. "3N9", to indicate the class
of the proposed status code(s) without consuming a number prematurely.¶
The definition of a new status code ought to explain the request
conditions that would cause a response containing that status code (e.g.,
combinations of request header fields and/or method(s)) along with any
dependencies on response header fields (e.g., what fields are required,
what fields can modify the semantics, and what field semantics are
further refined when used with the new status code).¶
By default, a status code applies only to the request corresponding to the
response it occurs within. If a status code applies to a larger scope of
applicability -- for example, all requests to the resource in question or
all requests to a server -- this must be explicitly specified. When doing
so, it should be noted that not all clients can be expected to
consistently apply a larger scope because they might not understand the
new status code.¶
The definition of a new final status code ought to specify whether or not it
is heuristically cacheable. Note that any response with a final status code
can be cached if the response has explicit freshness information. A status
code defined as heuristically cacheable is allowed to be cached without
explicit freshness information.
Likewise, the definition of a status code can place
constraints upon cache behavior if the must-understand cache
directive is used. See [CACHING] for more information.¶
Finally, the definition of a new status code ought to indicate whether the
content has any implied association with an identified resource (Section 6.4.2).¶
HTTP's most widely used extensibility point is the definition of new header and
trailer fields.¶
New fields can be defined such that, when they are understood by a
recipient, they override or enhance the interpretation of previously
defined fields, define preconditions on request evaluation, or
refine the meaning of responses.¶
However, defining a field doesn't guarantee its deployment or recognition
by recipients. Most fields are designed with the expectation that a recipient
can safely ignore (but forward downstream) any field not recognized.
In other cases, the sender's ability to understand a given field might be
indicated by its prior communication, perhaps in the protocol version
or fields that it sent in prior messages, or its use of a specific media type.
Likewise, direct inspection of support might be possible through an
OPTIONS request or by interacting with a defined well-known URI
[RFC8615] if such inspection is defined along with
the field being introduced.¶
The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" defines the
namespace for HTTP field names.¶
Any party can request registration of an HTTP field. See Section 16.3.2 for considerations to take
into account when creating a new HTTP field.¶
The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" is located at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-fields/>.
Registration requests can be made by following the instructions located
there or by sending an email to the "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" mailing list.¶
Field names are registered on the advice of a designated expert
(appointed by the IESG or their delegate). Fields with the status
'permanent' are Specification Required
([RFC8126], Section 4.6).¶
Registration requests consist of the following information:¶
Field name:
The requested field name. It MUST conform to the
field-name syntax defined in Section 5.1, and it SHOULD be
restricted to just letters, digits, and hyphen ('-')
characters, with the first character being a letter.¶
Status:
"permanent", "provisional", "deprecated", or "obsoleted".¶
Specification document(s):
Reference to the document that specifies
the field, preferably including a URI that can be used to retrieve
a copy of the document. Optional but encouraged for provisional registrations.
An indication of the relevant section(s) can also be included, but is not required.¶
Additional information, such as about reserved entries.¶
The expert(s) can define additional fields to be collected in the
registry, in consultation with the community.¶
Standards-defined names have a status of "permanent". Other names can also
be registered as permanent if the expert(s) finds that they are in use, in
consultation with the community. Other names should be registered as
"provisional".¶
Provisional entries can be removed by the expert(s) if -- in consultation
with the community -- the expert(s) find that they are not in use. The
expert(s) can change a provisional entry's status to permanent at any time.¶
Note that names can be registered by third parties (including the
expert(s)) if the expert(s) determines that an unregistered name is widely
deployed and not likely to be registered in a timely manner otherwise.¶
HTTP header and trailer fields are a widely used extension point for the protocol.
While they can be used in an ad hoc fashion, fields that are intended for
wider use need to be carefully documented to ensure interoperability.¶
In particular, authors of specifications defining new fields are advised to consider
and, where appropriate, document the following aspects:¶
Under what conditions the field can be used; e.g., only in
responses or requests, in all messages, only on responses to a
particular request method, etc.¶
Whether the field semantics are further refined by their context,
such as their use with certain request methods or status codes.¶
The scope of applicability for the information conveyed.
By default, fields apply only to the message they are
associated with, but some response fields are designed to apply to all
representations of a resource, the resource itself, or an even broader
scope. Specifications that expand the scope of a response field will
need to carefully consider issues such as content negotiation, the time
period of applicability, and (in some cases) multi-tenant server
deployments.¶
Under what conditions intermediaries are allowed to insert,
delete, or modify the field's value.¶
If the field is allowable in trailers; by
default, it will not be (see Section 6.5.1).¶
Whether it is appropriate or even required to list the field name in the
Connection header field (i.e., if the field is to
be hop-by-hop; see Section 7.6.1).¶
Whether the field introduces any additional security considerations, such
as disclosure of privacy-related data.¶
Request header fields have additional considerations that need to be documented
if the default behavior is not appropriate:¶
If it is appropriate to list the field name in a
Vary response header field (e.g., when the request header
field is used by an origin server's content selection algorithm; see
Section 12.5.5).¶
If the field is intended to be stored when received in a PUT
request (see Section 9.3.4).¶
If the field ought to be removed when automatically redirecting a
request due to security concerns (see Section 15.4).¶
Authors of specifications defining new fields are advised to choose a short
but descriptive field name. Short names avoid needless data transmission;
descriptive names avoid confusion and "squatting" on names that might have
broader uses.¶
To that end, limited-use fields (such as a header confined to a single
application or use case) are encouraged to use a name that includes that use
(or an abbreviation) as a prefix; for example, if the Foo Application needs
a Description field, it might use "Foo-Desc"; "Description" is too generic,
and "Foo-Description" is needlessly long.¶
While the field-name syntax is defined to allow any token character, in
practice some implementations place limits on the characters they accept
in field-names. To be interoperable, new field names SHOULD constrain
themselves to alphanumeric characters, "-", and ".", and SHOULD
begin with a letter. For example, the underscore
("_") character can be problematic when passed through non-HTTP
gateway interfaces (see Section 17.10).¶
Field names ought not be prefixed with "X-"; see
[BCP178] for further information.¶
Other prefixes are sometimes used in HTTP field names; for example,
"Accept-" is used in many content negotiation headers, and "Content-" is used
as explained in Section 6.4. These prefixes are
only an aid to recognizing the purpose of a field and do not
trigger automatic processing.¶
A major task in the definition of a new HTTP field is the specification of
the field value syntax: what senders should generate, and how recipients
should infer semantics from what is received.¶
Authors are encouraged (but not required) to use either the ABNF rules in
this specification or those in [RFC8941] to define the syntax
of new field values.¶
Authors are advised to carefully consider how the combination of multiple
field lines will impact them (see Section 5.3). Because
senders might erroneously send multiple values, and both intermediaries
and HTTP libraries can perform combination automatically, this applies to
all field values -- even when only a single value is anticipated.¶
Therefore, authors are advised to delimit or encode values that contain
commas (e.g., with the quoted-string rule of
Section 5.6.4, the String data type of
[RFC8941], or a field-specific encoding).
This ensures that commas within field data are not confused
with the commas that delimit a list value.¶
For example, the Content-Type field value only allows commas
inside quoted strings, which can be reliably parsed even when multiple
values are present. The Location field value provides a
counter-example that should not be emulated: because URIs can include
commas, it is not possible to reliably distinguish between a single value
that includes a comma from two values.¶
Authors of fields with a singleton value (see Section 5.5) are additionally advised to document how to treat
messages where the multiple members are present (a sensible default would
be to ignore the field, but this might not always be the right choice).¶
The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registry"
defines the namespace for the authentication schemes in challenges and
credentials. It is maintained
at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes>.¶
There are certain aspects of the HTTP Authentication framework that put
constraints on how new authentication schemes can work:¶
HTTP authentication is presumed to be stateless: all of the information
necessary to authenticate a request MUST be provided in the request,
rather than be dependent on the server remembering prior requests.
Authentication based on, or bound to, the underlying connection is
outside the scope of this specification and inherently flawed unless
steps are taken to ensure that the connection cannot be used by any
party other than the authenticated user
(see Section 3.3).¶
The authentication parameter "realm" is reserved for defining protection
spaces as described in Section 11.5. New schemes
MUST NOT use it in a way incompatible with that definition.¶
The "token68" notation was introduced for compatibility with existing
authentication schemes and can only be used once per challenge or credential.
Thus, new schemes ought to use the auth-param syntax instead, because
otherwise future extensions will be impossible.¶
The parsing of challenges and credentials is defined by this specification
and cannot be modified by new authentication schemes. When the auth-param
syntax is used, all parameters ought to support both token and
quoted-string syntax, and syntactical constraints ought to be defined on
the field value after parsing (i.e., quoted-string processing). This is
necessary so that recipients can use a generic parser that applies to
all authentication schemes.¶
Note: The fact that the value syntax for the "realm" parameter
is restricted to quoted-string was a bad design choice not to be repeated
for new parameters.¶
Definitions of new schemes ought to define the treatment of unknown
extension parameters. In general, a "must-ignore" rule is preferable
to a "must-understand" rule, because otherwise it will be hard to introduce
new parameters in the presence of legacy recipients. Furthermore,
it's good to describe the policy for defining new parameters (such
as "update the specification" or "use this registry").¶
Authentication schemes need to document whether they are usable in
origin-server authentication (i.e., using WWW-Authenticate),
and/or proxy authentication (i.e., using Proxy-Authenticate).¶
The credentials carried in an Authorization header field are specific to
the user agent and, therefore, have the same effect on HTTP caches as the
"private" cache response directive (Section 5.2.2.7 of [CACHING]),
within the scope of the request in which they appear.¶
Therefore, new authentication schemes that choose not to carry
credentials in the Authorization header field (e.g., using a newly defined
header field) will need to explicitly disallow caching, by mandating the use of
cache response directives (e.g., "private").¶
The "HTTP Range Unit Registry" defines the namespace for the range
unit names and refers to their corresponding specifications.
It is maintained at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters>.¶
Registration of an HTTP Range Unit MUST include the following fields:¶
Other range units, such as format-specific boundaries like pages,
sections, records, rows, or time, are potentially usable in HTTP for
application-specific purposes, but are not commonly used in practice.
Implementors of alternative range units ought to consider how they would
work with content codings and general-purpose intermediaries.¶
Names of content codings MUST NOT overlap with names of transfer codings
(per the "HTTP Transfer Coding Registry" located at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters/>) unless
the encoding transformation is
identical (as is the case for the compression codings defined in
Section 8.4.1).¶
Values to be added to this namespace require IETF Review
(see Section 4.8 of [RFC8126]) and MUST
conform to the purpose of content coding defined in
Section 8.4.1.¶
New content codings ought to be self-descriptive whenever possible, with
optional parameters discoverable within the coding format itself, rather
than rely on external metadata that might be lost during transit.¶
The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Upgrade Token Registry" defines
the namespace for protocol-name tokens used to identify protocols in the
Upgrade header field. The registry is maintained at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-upgrade-tokens>.¶
Each registered protocol name is associated with contact information
and an optional set of specifications that details how the connection
will be processed after it has been upgraded.¶
Registrations happen on a "First Come First Served" basis (see
Section 4.4 of [RFC8126]) and are subject to the
following rules:¶
A protocol-name token, once registered, stays registered forever.¶
A protocol-name token is case-insensitive and registered with the
preferred case to be generated by senders.¶
The registration MUST name a responsible party for the
registration.¶
This section is meant to inform developers, information providers, and
users of known security concerns relevant to HTTP semantics and its
use for transferring information over the Internet. Considerations related
to caching are discussed in Section 7 of [CACHING],
and considerations related to HTTP/1.1 message syntax and parsing are
discussed in Section 11 of [HTTP/1.1].¶
The list of considerations below is not exhaustive. Most security concerns
related to HTTP semantics are about securing server-side applications (code
behind the HTTP interface), securing user agent processing of content
received via HTTP, or secure use of the Internet in general, rather than
security of the protocol. The security considerations for URIs, which
are fundamental to HTTP operation, are discussed in
Section 7 of [URI]. Various organizations maintain
topical information and links to current research on Web application
security (e.g., [OWASP]).¶
HTTP relies on the notion of an "authoritative response": a
response that has been determined by (or at the direction of) the origin
server identified within the target URI to be the most appropriate response
for that request given the state of the target resource at the time of
response message origination.¶
When a registered name is used in the authority component, the "http" URI
scheme (Section 4.2.1) relies on the user's local name
resolution service to determine where it can find authoritative responses.
This means that any attack on a user's network host table, cached names,
or name resolution libraries becomes an avenue for attack on establishing
authority for "http" URIs. Likewise, the user's choice of server for
Domain Name Service (DNS), and the hierarchy of servers from which it
obtains resolution results, could impact the authenticity of address
mappings; DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC, [RFC4033]) are
one way to improve authenticity, as are the various mechanisms for making
DNS requests over more secure transfer protocols.¶
Furthermore, after an IP address is obtained, establishing authority for
an "http" URI is vulnerable to attacks on Internet Protocol routing.¶
The "https" scheme (Section 4.2.2) is intended to prevent
(or at least reveal) many of these potential attacks on establishing
authority, provided that the negotiated connection is secured and
the client properly verifies that the communicating server's identity
matches the target URI's authority component
(Section 4.3.4). Correctly implementing such verification
can be difficult (see [Georgiev]).¶
Authority for a given origin server can be delegated through protocol
extensions; for example, [ALTSVC]. Likewise, the set of
servers for which a connection is considered authoritative can be changed
with a protocol extension like [RFC8336].¶
Providing a response from a non-authoritative source, such as a shared
proxy cache, is often useful to improve performance and availability, but
only to the extent that the source can be trusted or the distrusted
response can be safely used.¶
Unfortunately, communicating authority to users can be difficult.
For example, "phishing" is an attack on the user's perception
of authority, where that perception can be misled by presenting similar
branding in hypertext, possibly aided by userinfo obfuscating the authority
component (see Section 4.2.1).
User agents can reduce the impact of phishing attacks by enabling users to
easily inspect a target URI prior to making an action, by prominently
distinguishing (or rejecting) userinfo when present, and by not sending
stored credentials and cookies when the referring document is from an
unknown or untrusted source.¶
Origin servers frequently make use of their local file system to manage the
mapping from target URI to resource representations.
Most file systems are not designed to protect against malicious file
or path names. Therefore, an origin server needs to avoid accessing
names that have a special significance to the system when mapping the
target resource to files, folders, or directories.¶
For example, UNIX, Microsoft Windows, and other operating systems use ".."
as a path component to indicate a directory level above the current one,
and they use specially named paths or file names to send data to system devices.
Similar naming conventions might exist within other types of storage
systems. Likewise, local storage systems have an annoying tendency to
prefer user-friendliness over security when handling invalid or unexpected
characters, recomposition of decomposed characters, and case-normalization
of case-insensitive names.¶
Attacks based on such special names tend to focus on either denial-of-service
(e.g., telling the server to read from a COM port) or disclosure
of configuration and source files that are not meant to be served.¶
Origin servers often use parameters within the URI as a
means of identifying system services, selecting database entries, or
choosing a data source. However, data received in a request cannot be
trusted. An attacker could construct any of the request data elements
(method, target URI, header fields, or content) to contain data that might
be misinterpreted as a command, code, or query when passed through a
command invocation, language interpreter, or database interface.¶
For example, SQL injection is a common attack wherein additional query
language is inserted within some part of the target URI or header
fields (e.g., Host, Referer, etc.).
If the received data is used directly within a SELECT statement, the
query language might be interpreted as a database command instead of a
simple string value. This type of implementation vulnerability is extremely
common, in spite of being easy to prevent.¶
In general, resource implementations ought to avoid use of request data
in contexts that are processed or interpreted as instructions. Parameters
ought to be compared to fixed strings and acted upon as a result of that
comparison, rather than passed through an interface that is not prepared
for untrusted data. Received data that isn't based on fixed parameters
ought to be carefully filtered or encoded to avoid being misinterpreted.¶
Similar considerations apply to request data when it is stored and later
processed, such as within log files, monitoring tools, or when included
within a data format that allows embedded scripts.¶
Because HTTP uses mostly textual, character-delimited fields, parsers are
often vulnerable to attacks based on sending very long (or very slow)
streams of data, particularly where an implementation is expecting a
protocol element with no predefined length
(Section 2.3).¶
To promote interoperability, specific recommendations are made for minimum
size limits on fields (Section 5.4). These are
minimum recommendations, chosen to be supportable even by implementations
with limited resources; it is expected that most implementations will
choose substantially higher limits.¶
A server can reject a message that
has a target URI that is too long (Section 15.5.15) or request content
that is too large (Section 15.5.14). Additional status codes related to
capacity limits have been defined by extensions to HTTP
[RFC6585].¶
Recipients ought to carefully limit the extent to which they process other
protocol elements, including (but not limited to) request methods, response
status phrases, field names, numeric values, and chunk lengths.
Failure to limit such processing can result in arbitrary code execution due to
buffer or arithmetic
overflows, and increased vulnerability to denial-of-service attacks.¶
Some attacks on encrypted protocols use the differences in size created by
dynamic compression to reveal confidential information; for example, [BREACH]. These attacks rely on creating a redundancy between
attacker-controlled content and the confidential information, such that a
dynamic compression algorithm using the same dictionary for both content
will compress more efficiently when the attacker-controlled content matches
parts of the confidential content.¶
HTTP messages can be compressed in a number of ways, including using TLS
compression, content codings, transfer codings, and other extension or
version-specific mechanisms.¶
The most effective mitigation for this risk is to disable compression on
sensitive data, or to strictly separate sensitive data from attacker-controlled
data so that they cannot share the same compression dictionary. With
careful design, a compression scheme can be designed in a way that is not
considered exploitable in limited use cases, such as HPACK ([HPACK]).¶
Clients are often privy to large amounts of personal information,
including both information provided by the user to interact with resources
(e.g., the user's name, location, mail address, passwords, encryption
keys, etc.) and information about the user's browsing activity over
time (e.g., history, bookmarks, etc.). Implementations need to
prevent unintentional disclosure of personal information.¶
A server is in the position to save personal data about a user's requests
over time, which might identify their reading patterns or subjects of
interest. In particular, log information gathered at an intermediary
often contains a history of user agent interaction, across a multitude
of sites, that can be traced to individual users.¶
HTTP log information is confidential in nature; its handling is often
constrained by laws and regulations. Log information needs to be securely
stored and appropriate guidelines followed for its analysis.
Anonymization of personal information within individual entries helps,
but it is generally not sufficient to prevent real log traces from being
re-identified based on correlation with other access characteristics.
As such, access traces that are keyed to a specific client are unsafe to
publish even if the key is pseudonymous.¶
To minimize the risk of theft or accidental publication, log information
ought to be purged of personally identifiable information, including
user identifiers, IP addresses, and user-provided query parameters,
as soon as that information is no longer necessary to support operational
needs for security, auditing, or fraud control.¶
URIs are intended to be shared, not secured, even when they identify secure
resources. URIs are often shown on displays, added to templates when a page
is printed, and stored in a variety of unprotected bookmark lists.
Many servers, proxies, and user agents log or display the target URI
in places where it might be visible to third parties.
It is therefore unwise to include information within a URI that
is sensitive, personally identifiable, or a risk to disclose.¶
When an application uses client-side mechanisms to construct a target URI
out of user-provided information, such as the query fields of a form using
GET, potentially sensitive data might be provided that would not be
appropriate for disclosure within a URI. POST is often preferred in such
cases because it usually doesn't construct a URI; instead, POST of a form
transmits the potentially sensitive data in the request content. However, this
hinders caching and uses an unsafe method for what would otherwise be a safe
request. Alternative workarounds include transforming the user-provided data
prior to constructing the URI or filtering the data to only include common
values that are not sensitive. Likewise, redirecting the result of a query
to a different (server-generated) URI can remove potentially sensitive data
from later links and provide a cacheable response for later reuse.¶
Since the Referer header field tells a target site about the
context that resulted in a request, it has the potential to reveal
information about the user's immediate browsing history and any personal
information that might be found in the referring resource's URI.
Limitations on the Referer header field are described in Section 10.1.3 to
address some of its security considerations.¶
Servers often use non-HTTP gateway interfaces and frameworks to process a received
request and produce content for the response. For historical reasons, such interfaces
often pass received field names as external variable names, using a name mapping
suitable for environment variables.¶
For example, the Common Gateway Interface (CGI) mapping of protocol-specific
meta-variables, defined by Section 4.1.18 of [RFC3875],
is applied to received header fields that do not correspond to one of CGI's
standard variables; the mapping consists of prepending "HTTP_" to each name
and changing all instances of hyphen ("-") to underscore ("_"). This same mapping
has been inherited by many other application frameworks in order to simplify
moving applications from one platform to the next.¶
In CGI, a received Content-Length field would be passed
as the meta-variable "CONTENT_LENGTH" with a string value matching the
received field's value. In contrast, a received "Content_Length" header field would
be passed as the protocol-specific meta-variable "HTTP_CONTENT_LENGTH",
which might lead to some confusion if an application mistakenly reads the
protocol-specific meta-variable instead of the default one. (This historical practice
is why Section 16.3.2.1 discourages the creation
of new field names that contain an underscore.)¶
Unfortunately, mapping field names to different interface names can lead to
security vulnerabilities if the mapping is incomplete or ambiguous. For example,
if an attacker were to send a field named "Transfer_Encoding", a naive interface
might map that to the same variable name as the "Transfer-Encoding" field, resulting
in a potential request smuggling vulnerability (Section 11.2 of [HTTP/1.1]).¶
To mitigate the associated risks, implementations that perform such
mappings are advised to make the mapping unambiguous and complete
for the full range of potential octets received as a name (including those
that are discouraged or forbidden by the HTTP grammar).
For example, a field with an unusual name character might
result in the request being blocked, the specific field being removed,
or the name being passed with a different prefix to distinguish it from
other fields.¶
Although fragment identifiers used within URI references are not sent
in requests, implementers ought to be aware that they will be visible to
the user agent and any extensions or scripts running as a result of the
response. In particular, when a redirect occurs and the original request's
fragment identifier is inherited by the new reference in
Location (Section 10.2.2), this might
have the effect of disclosing one site's fragment to another site.
If the first site uses personal information in fragments, it ought to
ensure that redirects to other sites include a (possibly empty) fragment
component in order to block that inheritance.¶
The User-Agent (Section 10.1.5),
Via (Section 7.6.3), and
Server (Section 10.2.4) header fields often
reveal information about the respective sender's software systems.
In theory, this can make it easier for an attacker to exploit known
security holes; in practice, attackers tend to try all potential holes
regardless of the apparent software versions being used.¶
Proxies that serve as a portal through a network firewall ought to take
special precautions regarding the transfer of header information that might
identify hosts behind the firewall. The Via header field
allows intermediaries to replace sensitive machine names with pseudonyms.¶
Browser fingerprinting is a set of techniques for identifying a specific
user agent over time through its unique set of characteristics. These
characteristics might include information related to how it uses the underlying
transport protocol,
feature capabilities, and scripting environment, though of particular
interest here is the set of unique characteristics that might be
communicated via HTTP. Fingerprinting is considered a privacy concern
because it enables tracking of a user agent's behavior over time
([Bujlow]) without
the corresponding controls that the user might have over other forms of
data collection (e.g., cookies). Many general-purpose user agents
(i.e., Web browsers) have taken steps to reduce their fingerprints.¶
There are a number of request header fields that might reveal information
to servers that is sufficiently unique to enable fingerprinting.
The From header field is the most obvious, though it is
expected that From will only be sent when self-identification is desired by
the user. Likewise, Cookie header fields are deliberately designed to
enable re-identification, so fingerprinting concerns only apply to
situations where cookies are disabled or restricted by the user agent's
configuration.¶
The User-Agent header field might contain enough information
to uniquely identify a specific device, usually when combined with other
characteristics, particularly if the user agent sends excessive details
about the user's system or extensions. However, the source of unique
information that is least expected by users is
proactive negotiation (Section 12.1),
including the Accept, Accept-Charset,
Accept-Encoding, and Accept-Language
header fields.¶
In addition to the fingerprinting concern, detailed use of the
Accept-Language header field can reveal information the
user might consider to be of a private nature. For example, understanding
a given language set might be strongly correlated to membership in a
particular ethnic group.
An approach that limits such loss of privacy would be for a user agent
to omit the sending of Accept-Language except for sites that have been
explicitly permitted, perhaps via interaction after detecting a Vary
header field that indicates language negotiation might be useful.¶
In environments where proxies are used to enhance privacy, user agents
ought to be conservative in sending proactive negotiation header fields.
General-purpose user agents that provide a high degree of header field
configurability ought to inform users about the loss of privacy that might
result if too much detail is provided. As an extreme privacy measure,
proxies could filter the proactive negotiation header fields in relayed
requests.¶
The validators defined by this specification are not intended to ensure
the validity of a representation, guard against malicious changes, or
detect on-path attacks. At best, they enable more efficient cache
updates and optimistic concurrent writes when all participants are behaving
nicely. At worst, the conditions will fail and the client will receive a
response that is no more harmful than an HTTP exchange without conditional
requests.¶
An entity tag can be abused in ways that create privacy risks. For example,
a site might deliberately construct a semantically invalid entity tag that
is unique to the user or user agent, send it in a cacheable response with a
long freshness time, and then read that entity tag in later conditional
requests as a means of re-identifying that user or user agent. Such an
identifying tag would become a persistent identifier for as long as the
user agent retained the original cache entry. User agents that cache
representations ought to ensure that the cache is cleared or replaced
whenever the user performs privacy-maintaining actions, such as clearing
stored cookies or changing to a private browsing mode.¶
Unconstrained multiple range requests are susceptible to denial-of-service
attacks because the effort required to request many overlapping ranges of
the same data is tiny compared to the time, memory, and bandwidth consumed
by attempting to serve the requested data in many parts.
Servers ought to ignore, coalesce, or reject egregious range requests, such
as requests for more than two overlapping ranges or for many small ranges
in a single set, particularly when the ranges are requested out of order
for no apparent reason. Multipart range requests are not designed to
support random access.¶
Everything about the topic of HTTP authentication is a security
consideration, so the list of considerations below is not exhaustive.
Furthermore, it is limited to security considerations regarding the
authentication framework, in general, rather than discussing all of the
potential considerations for specific authentication schemes (which ought
to be documented in the specifications that define those schemes).
Various organizations maintain topical information and links to current
research on Web application security (e.g., [OWASP]),
including common pitfalls for implementing and using the authentication
schemes found in practice.¶
The HTTP authentication framework does not define a single mechanism for
maintaining the confidentiality of credentials; instead, each
authentication scheme defines how the credentials are encoded prior to
transmission. While this provides flexibility for the development of future
authentication schemes, it is inadequate for the protection of existing
schemes that provide no confidentiality on their own, or that do not
sufficiently protect against replay attacks. Furthermore, if the server
expects credentials that are specific to each individual user, the exchange
of those credentials will have the effect of identifying that user even if
the content within credentials remains confidential.¶
HTTP depends on the security properties of the underlying transport- or
session-level connection to provide confidential transmission of
fields. Services that depend on individual user authentication require a
secured connection prior to exchanging credentials
(Section 4.2.2).¶
Existing HTTP clients and user agents typically retain authentication
information indefinitely. HTTP does not provide a mechanism for the
origin server to direct clients to discard these cached credentials, since
the protocol has no awareness of how credentials are obtained or managed
by the user agent. The mechanisms for expiring or revoking credentials can
be specified as part of an authentication scheme definition.¶
Circumstances under which credential caching can interfere with the
application's security model include but are not limited to:¶
Clients that have been idle for an extended period, following
which the server might wish to cause the client to re-prompt the
user for credentials.¶
Applications that include a session termination indication
(such as a "logout" or "commit" button on a page) after which
the server side of the application "knows" that there is no
further reason for the client to retain the credentials.¶
User agents that cache credentials are encouraged to provide a readily
accessible mechanism for discarding cached credentials under user control.¶
Authentication schemes that solely rely on the "realm" mechanism for
establishing a protection space will expose credentials to all resources on
an origin server. Clients that have successfully made authenticated requests
with a resource can use the same authentication credentials for other
resources on the same origin server. This makes it possible for a different
resource to harvest authentication credentials for other resources.¶
This is of particular concern when an origin server hosts resources for multiple
parties under the same origin (Section 11.5).
Possible mitigation strategies include restricting direct access to
authentication credentials (i.e., not making the content of the
Authorization request header field available), and separating protection
spaces by using a different host name (or port number) for each party.¶
Adding information to responses that are sent over an unencrypted
channel can affect security and privacy. The presence of the
Authentication-Info and Proxy-Authentication-Info
header fields alone indicates that HTTP authentication is in use. Additional
information could be exposed by the contents of the authentication-scheme
specific parameters; this will have to be considered in the definitions of these
schemes.¶
The method name "*" is reserved because using "*" as a method name would
conflict with its usage as a wildcard in some fields (e.g.,
"Access-Control-Request-Method").¶
This specification updates the HTTP-related aspects of the existing
registration procedures for message header fields defined in [RFC3864].
It replaces the old procedures as they relate to HTTP by defining a new
registration procedure and moving HTTP field definitions into a separate
registry.¶
IANA has created a new registry titled "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
Field Name Registry" as outlined in Section 16.3.1.¶
IANA has moved all entries in the "Permanent Message Header Field
Names" and "Provisional Message Header Field Names" registries (see
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers/>) with the
protocol 'http' to this registry and has applied the following changes:¶
The 'Applicable Protocol' field has been omitted.¶
Entries that had a status of 'standard', 'experimental', 'reserved', or
'informational' have been made to have a status of 'permanent'.¶
Provisional entries without a status have been made to have a status of
'provisional'.¶
Permanent entries without a status (after confirmation that the
registration document did not define one) have been made to have a status of
'provisional'. The expert(s) can choose to update the entries' status if there is
evidence that another is more appropriate.¶
IANA has annotated the "Permanent Message Header Field
Names" and "Provisional Message Header Field Names" registries with the
following note to indicate that HTTP field name registrations have moved:¶
IANA has updated the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry"
with the field names listed in the following table.¶
The field name "*" is reserved because using that name as
an HTTP header field might conflict with its special semantics in the
Vary header field (Section 12.5.5).¶
IANA has updated the "Content-MD5" entry in the new registry to have
a status of 'obsoleted' with references to
Section 14.15 of [RFC2616] (for the definition
of the header field) and
Appendix B of [RFC7231] (which removed the field
definition from the updated specification).¶
IANA has updated the
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Upgrade Token Registry" at
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-upgrade-tokens>
with the registration procedure described in Section 16.7
and the upgrade token names summarized in the following table.¶
Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111, DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9111>.
[RFC1950]
Deutsch, P. and J-L. Gailly, "ZLIB Compressed Data Format Specification version 3.3", RFC 1950, DOI 10.17487/RFC1950, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1950>.
Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC5280]
Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6365]
Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365, DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6365>.
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
Bujlow, T., Carela-Español, V., Solé-Pareta, J., and P. Barlet-Ros, "A Survey on Web Tracking: Mechanisms, Implications, and Defenses", In Proceedings of the IEEE 105(8), DOI 10.1109/JPROC.2016.2637878, , <https://doi.org/10.1109/JPROC.2016.2637878>.
Georgiev, M., Iyengar, S., Jana, S., Anubhai, R., Boneh, D., and V. Shmatikov, "The Most Dangerous Code in the World: Validating SSL Certificates in Non-Browser Software", In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '12), pp. 38-49, DOI 10.1145/2382196.2382204, , <https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.2382204>.
Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and H. Frystyk, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0", RFC 1945, DOI 10.17487/RFC1945, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1945>.
[HTTP/1.1]
Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP/1.1", STD 99, RFC 9112, DOI 10.17487/RFC9112, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9112>.
International Organization for Standardization, "Information technology -- 8-bit single-byte coded graphic character sets -- Part 1: Latin alphabet No. 1", ISO/IEC 8859-1:1998, .
[Kri2001]
Kristol, D., "HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and Politics", ACM Transactions on Internet Technology 1(2), , <http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.SE/0105018>.
Fielding, R.T., "Architectural Styles and the Design of Network-based Software Architectures", Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, , <https://roy.gbiv.com/pubs/dissertation/top.htm>.
Moore, K., "MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) Part Three: Message Header Extensions for Non-ASCII Text", RFC 2047, DOI 10.17487/RFC2047, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2047>.
[RFC2068]
Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2068, DOI 10.17487/RFC2068, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2068>.
[RFC2145]
Mogul, J. C., Fielding, R., Gettys, J., and H. Frystyk, "Use and Interpretation of HTTP Version Numbers", RFC 2145, DOI 10.17487/RFC2145, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2145>.
Palme, J., Hopmann, A., and N. Shelness, "MIME Encapsulation of Aggregate Documents, such as HTML (MHTML)", RFC 2557, DOI 10.17487/RFC2557, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2557>.
[RFC2616]
Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, DOI 10.17487/RFC2616, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2616>.
[RFC2617]
Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication", RFC 2617, DOI 10.17487/RFC2617, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2617>.
Cooper, I., Melve, I., and G. Tomlinson, "Internet Web Replication and Caching Taxonomy", RFC 3040, DOI 10.17487/RFC3040, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3040>.
[RFC3864]
Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864, DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864>.
Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
[RFC4559]
Jaganathan, K., Zhu, L., and J. Brezak, "SPNEGO-based Kerberos and NTLM HTTP Authentication in Microsoft Windows", RFC 4559, DOI 10.17487/RFC4559, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4559>.
Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7231]
Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7232]
Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Conditional Requests", RFC 7232, DOI 10.17487/RFC7232, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7232>.
[RFC7233]
Fielding, R., Ed., Lafon, Y., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Range Requests", RFC 7233, DOI 10.17487/RFC7233, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7233>.
[RFC7234]
Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.
[RFC7235]
Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7538]
Reschke, J., "The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Status Code 308 (Permanent Redirect)", RFC 7538, DOI 10.17487/RFC7538, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7538>.
[RFC7540]
Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
Reschke, J., "HTTP Authentication-Info and Proxy-Authentication-Info Response Header Fields", RFC 7615, DOI 10.17487/RFC7615, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7615>.
[RFC7616]
Shekh-Yusef, R., Ed., Ahrens, D., and S. Bremer, "HTTP Digest Access Authentication", RFC 7616, DOI 10.17487/RFC7616, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7616>.
Reschke, J., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Client-Initiated Content-Encoding", RFC 7694, DOI 10.17487/RFC7694, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7694>.
[RFC8126]
Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8187]
Reschke, J., "Indicating Character Encoding and Language for HTTP Header Field Parameters", RFC 8187, DOI 10.17487/RFC8187, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8187>.
Dusseault, L., Ed., "HTTP Extensions for Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV)", RFC 4918, DOI 10.17487/RFC4918, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4918>.
The sections introducing HTTP's design goals, history, architecture,
conformance criteria, protocol versioning, URIs, message routing, and
header fields have been moved here.¶
The requirement on semantic conformance has been replaced with permission to
ignore or work around implementation-specific failures.
(Section 2.2)¶
The description of an origin and authoritative access to origin servers has
been extended for both "http" and "https" URIs to account for alternative
services and secured connections that are not necessarily based on TCP.
(Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2,
4.3.1, and 7.3.3)¶
Explicit requirements have been added to check the target URI scheme's semantics
and reject requests that don't meet any associated requirements.
(Section 7.4)¶
Parameters in media type, media range, and expectation can be empty via
one or more trailing semicolons.
(Section 5.6.6)¶
"Field value" now refers to the value after multiple field lines are combined
with commas -- by far the most common use. To refer to a single header
line's value, use "field line value".
(Section 6.3)¶
Trailer field semantics now transcend the specifics of chunked transfer coding.
The use of trailer fields has been further limited to allow generation
as a trailer field only when the sender knows the field defines that usage and
to allow merging into the header section only if the recipient knows the
corresponding field definition permits and defines how to merge. In all
other cases, implementations are encouraged either to store the trailer
fields separately or to discard them instead of merging.
(Section 6.5.1)¶
The priority of the absolute form of the request URI over the Host
header field by origin servers has been made explicit to align with proxy handling.
(Section 7.2)¶
The grammar definition for the Via field's "received-by" was
expanded in RFC 7230 due to changes in the URI grammar for host
[URI] that are not desirable for Via. For simplicity,
we have removed uri-host from the received-by production because it can
be encompassed by the existing grammar for pseudonym. In particular, this
change removed comma from the allowed set of characters for a host name in
received-by.
(Section 7.6.3)¶
Minimum URI lengths to be supported by implementations are now recommended.
(Section 4.1)¶
The following have been clarified: CR and NUL in field values are to be rejected or
mapped to SP, and leading and trailing whitespace needs to be
stripped from field values before they are consumed.
(Section 5.5)¶
Parameters in media type, media range, and expectation can be empty via
one or more trailing semicolons.
(Section 5.6.6)¶
An abstract data type for HTTP messages has been introduced to define the
components of a message and their semantics as an abstraction across
multiple HTTP versions, rather than in terms of the specific syntax form of
HTTP/1.1 in [HTTP/1.1], and reflect the contents after the
message is parsed. This makes it easier to distinguish between requirements
on the content (what is conveyed) versus requirements on the messaging
syntax (how it is conveyed) and avoids baking limitations of early protocol
versions into the future of HTTP. (Section 6)¶
The terms "payload" and "payload body" have been replaced with "content", to better
align with its usage elsewhere (e.g., in field names) and to avoid confusion
with frame payloads in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.
(Section 6.4)¶
The term "effective request URI" has been replaced with "target URI".
(Section 7.1)¶
Restrictions on client retries have been loosened to reflect implementation
behavior.
(Section 9.2.2)¶
The fact that request bodies on GET, HEAD, and DELETE are not interoperable has been clarified.
(Sections 9.3.1, 9.3.2, and 9.3.5)¶
"Accept Parameters" (accept-params and accept-ext ABNF production) have
been removed from the definition of the Accept field.
(Section 12.5.1)¶
The Accept-Charset field is now deprecated.
(Section 12.5.2)¶
The semantics of "*" in the Vary header field when other
values are present was clarified.
(Section 12.5.5)¶
Range units are compared in a case-insensitive fashion.
(Section 14.1)¶
The use of the Accept-Ranges field is not restricted to origin servers.
(Section 14.3)¶
The process of creating a redirected request has been clarified.
(Section 15.4)¶
Status code 308 (previously defined in [RFC7538])
has been added so that it's defined closer to status codes 301, 302, and 307.
(Section 15.4.9)¶
Status code 421 (previously defined in
Section 9.1.2 of [RFC7540]) has been added because of its general
applicability. 421 is no longer defined as heuristically cacheable since
the response is specific to the connection (not the target resource).
(Section 15.5.20)¶
Status code 422 (previously defined in
Section 11.2 of [WEBDAV]) has been added because of its general
applicability.
(Section 15.5.21)¶
Previous revisions of HTTP imposed an arbitrary 60-second limit on the
determination of whether Last-Modified was a strong validator to guard
against the possibility that the Date and Last-Modified values are
generated from different clocks or at somewhat different times during the
preparation of the response. This specification has relaxed that to allow
reasonable discretion.
(Section 8.8.2.2)¶
An edge-case requirement on If-Match and If-Unmodified-Since
has been removed that required a validator not to be sent in a 2xx
response if validation fails because the change request has already
been applied.
(Sections 13.1.1 and
13.1.4)¶
The fact that If-Unmodified-Since does not apply to a resource without a
concept of modification time has been clarified.
(Section 13.1.4)¶
Preconditions can now be evaluated before the request content is processed
rather than waiting until the response would otherwise be successful.
(Section 13.2)¶
Refactored the range-unit and ranges-specifier grammars to simplify
and reduce artificial distinctions between bytes and other
(extension) range units, removing the overlapping grammar of
other-range-unit by defining range units generically as a token and
placing extensions within the scope of a range-spec (other-range).
This disambiguates the role of list syntax (commas) in all range sets,
including extension range units, for indicating a range-set of more than
one range. Moving the extension grammar into range specifiers also allows
protocol specific to byte ranges to be specified separately.¶
It is now possible to define Range handling on extension methods.
(Section 14.2)¶
Aside from the current editors, the following individuals deserve special
recognition for their contributions to early aspects of HTTP and its
core specifications:
Marc Andreessen, Tim Berners-Lee, Robert Cailliau, Daniel W. Connolly,
Bob Denny, John Franks, Jim Gettys,
Jean-François Groff,
Phillip M. Hallam-Baker,
Koen Holtman, Jeffery L. Hostetler, Shel Kaphan,
Dave Kristol, Yves Lafon, Scott D. Lawrence,
Paul J. Leach, Håkon W. Lie,
Ari Luotonen, Larry Masinter, Rob McCool,
Jeffrey C. Mogul, Lou Montulli,
David Morris, Henrik Frystyk Nielsen, Dave Raggett, Eric Rescorla,
Tony Sanders, Lawrence C. Stewart,
Marc VanHeyningen, and Steve Zilles.¶
Since 2014, the following contributors have helped improve this
specification by reporting bugs, asking smart questions, drafting or
reviewing text, and evaluating issues:¶
Alan Egerton,
Alex Rousskov,
Amichai Rothman,
Amos Jeffries,
Anders Kaseorg,
Andreas Gebhardt,
Anne van Kesteren,
Armin Abfalterer,
Aron Duby,
Asanka Herath,
Asbjørn Ulsberg,
Asta Olofsson,
Attila Gulyas,
Austin Wright,
Barry Pollard,
Ben Burkert,
Benjamin Kaduk,
Björn Höhrmann,
Brad Fitzpatrick,
Chris Pacejo,
Colin Bendell,
Cory Benfield,
Cory Nelson,
Daisuke Miyakawa,
Dale Worley,
Daniel Stenberg,
Danil Suits,
David Benjamin,
David Matson,
David Schinazi,
Дилян Палаузов (Dilyan Palauzov),
Eric Anderson,
Eric Rescorla,
Éric Vyncke,
Erik Kline,
Erwin Pe,
Etan Kissling,
Evert Pot,
Evgeny Vrublevsky,
Florian Best,
Francesca Palombini,
Igor Lubashev,
James Callahan,
James Peach,
Jeffrey Yasskin,
Kalin Gyokov,
Kannan Goundan,
奥 一穂 (Kazuho Oku),
Ken Murchison,
Krzysztof Maczyński,
Lars Eggert,
Lucas Pardue,
Martin Duke,
Martin Dürst,
Martin Thomson,
Martynas Jusevičius,
Matt Menke,
Matthias Pigulla,
Mattias Grenfeldt,
Michael Osipov,
Mike Bishop,
Mike Pennisi,
Mike Taylor,
Mike West,
Mohit Sethi,
Murray Kucherawy,
Nathaniel J. Smith,
Nicholas Hurley,
Nikita Prokhorov,
Patrick McManus,
Piotr Sikora,
Poul-Henning Kamp,
Rick van Rein,
Robert Wilton,
Roberto Polli,
Roman Danyliw,
Samuel Williams,
Semyon Kholodnov,
Simon Pieters,
Simon Schüppel,
Stefan Eissing,
Taylor Hunt,
Todd Greer,
Tommy Pauly,
Vasiliy Faronov,
Vladimir Lashchev,
Wenbo Zhu,
William A. Rowe Jr.,
Willy Tarreau,
Xingwei Liu,
Yishuai Li, and
Zaheduzzaman Sarker.¶